A
year ago, Iran inaugurated its experimental uranium enrichment
plant at Natanz. This facility is an underground site that, according
to Iranian claims, houses 3,000 centrifuges. According to Israeli
intelligence sources and foreign reports, Iran has encountered
technical difficulties in connecting the centrifuges and operating
them at high speed – which is imperative in order for the
uranium enrichment procedure.
Natanz is a small quite tranquil mountain town located forty-nine
miles from Kashan, famed for its bracing climate and fruit orchards.
Vulture Mountain looms over the town, and local residents point
in its direction telling how the troops of Alexander killed the
Achaemenian King, Darius III, nearby. Many small shrines dot the
mountain side like the Shrine of Abdas-Samad as shown below. The
elements in the present complex date from 1304 with subsequent additions
and restorations. The lofty minaret is dated 1325. The pyramidal
roof is over the tomb of the Shaykh which is dated 1307. But near
Natanz also exists one of the more dangerous places in the world,
where in deep underground bunkers, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear
scientists are at hard work to try and produce the Islamic doomsday
weapon- Iran's prestigious Shi'ite nuclear bomb. But how far is
this frightening project really on its way to threaten world peace
and especially Israel- which Ahmadinejad already officially targeted
for extinction?

Sofar,
world attention has focused on Iran's uranium enrichment program.
This process is far from being simplistic affair. Basic uranium
enrichment involves increasing the concentration of fissile U-235
found in uranium, which must be enriched to about 3.5 percent for
a controlled nuclear reaction, however weapons-grade uranium requires
enrichment to over 90%. The entire process requires passing uranium
through a series of centrifuges, which are 1.8cm-high spinning tubes
creating centrifugal force separating the different uranium isotopes.
By connecting 164 of the centrifuge machines together in a cascade,
the gas is successively enriched in several individual stages, providing
the basic module for an enrichment facility.
In early April 2006, Iran proudly announced that it had mastered
the uranium enrichment process. By January 2007, Iranian scientists
boasted their achievement claiming they came twice as fast as foreign
analysts had predicted. Alas in their haste and almost reckless
hurry proving this, the Iranians had skipped many of the intermediate
testing steps. Bearing in mind that assembling 2,952 centrifuges
(18 cascades) and getting them working together smoothly, would
have taken some time – (experts estimate at least three years)
which would include performing all the diagnostic, calibration and
sustainability testing stages, each being a highly complex and sensitive
process, it seems that Iran may have skipped these over, severely
degrading this highly sensitive process.
Thus, not surprisingly, western intelligence sources reported on
a series of mysterious malfunctions at Natanz apparently resulting
from the supply of flawed components, probably purchased wholesale
on the notorious A.Q. Khan’s black market. Some of these actually
exploded upon their installation. At the time, there was no evidence
that Iran was capable of mass producing its own nuclear-related
components and thus was frantically searching suitable material
on the world market. Since, they may have made some progress, but
it seems highly likely that, due to more stringent sanctions enforced
recently, the Iranians themselves might not know how well their
domestically produced components will actually function and what
technical problems they may still encounter in their attempt to
produce a military grade nuclear device. The simple fact remains
that in order to build a nuclear bomb, Iran needs to run its centrifuges
continuously. But according to intelligence estimates, it seems
that the Natanz centrifuges were running at best only 20% of the
time!
Ahmadinejad's repeated triumphant and provocative claim that Iran
has joined the club of nuclear nations must be taken seriously,
but at the same time be examined cautiously - based on known and
estimated factual and realistic assessments.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad felt it necessary to claim, during
his last year's visit to the new underground Natanz enrichment facility
that the Islamic Republic was already capable of uranium enrichment
on an "industrial scale", which being in direct contravention
of United Nations resolutions, could be taken as an attempt to bluff
the West.
That such claims should be treated as highly suspicious, warned
an Israeli disarmament expert, Dr Emily Landau from the Institute
for National Security Studies, quote: "I don't think that it
is really indicative of Iran being at that point of no return or
a technical threshold where it can go it alone and start industrial-scale
production."
Israeli intelligence officials have cast great doubt on the veracity
of Ahmadinejad's repeated claims, but one should certainly not underestimate
Iran's technical skill. Nevertheless, a leading Israeli analyst,
Gerald Steinberg Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University
is more outspoken on this issue: "Ahmadinejad and the Iranian
regime are bluffing," the professor claimed recently, "Iran
is indeed advancing, all the time, in its uranium enrichment project,
but even once the centrifuges work as they should it would take
a long time to produce the material needed for a nuclear bomb".
In fact other analysts argue that Ahmadinejad's latest boast is
more likely to be read as a political tactic than a statement of
Iran's technological capability.
President Ahmadinejad might still remain confident of continued
backing from Russia, following Vladimir Putin's recent "blitz"
visit to Tehran, but his confidence could shatter, if a new understanding
between Moscow and Washington, will erase the pending tension over
Bush's determination deploying his missile defense on Putin's doorstep.
Then an Iranian bomb threat could very much become Moscow's nightmare,
just like everybody else's concern. The newly developing alliance
between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and George W Bush, joining
the Anglo-US anti-Iranian entity - could substantially encourage
the hesitating anti-Shi'ite Crescent, led by Saudi Arabia and other
moderate Sunni nations-all deeply concerned by the Shi'ite bomb
threat from Tehran. No doubt that Ahmadinejad, who might be seen,
superficially as a rhetoric madman, but is no fool - may already
be losing some sleep over the newly developing trend, which is already
shaping up by his Sunni adversaries. If pressure will be building
up in New York's UN Headquarters and Russia takes another direction-
the Peoples Republic of China, might also take another step in blocking
Iran's nuclear ambition, perhaps before it is too late to avert
another military conflict, with its inevitable global repercussions.
But there is another angle to Ahmadinejad's reckless bravado rhetoric:
With the Iranian economy tottering and growing criticism within
senior circles in Teheran on his reckless diplomatic conduct, Ahmadinejad's
grip on power seems far from firm.
Mr Ali Larijani unexpected resignation from the dominant position
of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and the secretary of the Supreme
National Security Council and a personal friend of Grand Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, left the Iranian political system in a state of shock.
Several important politicians, including Ahmad Tavkoli, the head
of Majles' Research Center, and Mohsen Rezaie, the Expediency Council's
secretary, have already expressed their concern and unease about
Larijani's resignation as well as his replacement by a novice, Saeed
Jalili, Ahmadinejad's close associate. This latest move has already
raised questions regarding Ayatollah Khamenei's sofar undisputed
control over the nuclear file which could well unsettle the already
shaking domestic political scene.
There are already rumors in Tehran over growing uneasiness among
political heavyweights, led by Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
joined by Mohammed Khatami, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mehdi Karroubi and now
Ali Larijani. Analysts believe that it may still be too early to
predict an upsurge of Ahmadinejad's regime, at least as long as
his former mentor Khamenei decides to support him. But even the
Grand Ayatollah may already be losing his patience with his younger
protégé, who may well be viewed as wielding too much
ambition for total power, in the still clerical-dominated establishment.
Another outspoken opponent of Ahmadinejad is Grand Ayatollah Hossein
Ali Montazeri, an architect of the 1979 Islamic Khomeni revolution,
who recently criticized the president's handling of Iran's nuclear
policy- warning that in order to avoid a catastrophe; the nuclear
issue should be resolved through direct negotiation with Washington.
Meanwhile in Israel in a briefing to the Knesset's Defense and
Foreign Affairs Committee Tuesday, Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz,
head of research at Military Intelligence, updated senior government
officials on the strength of Israel's foes. According to press reports,
the brigadier-general indicated that Iran's current regime is not
in actual danger of collapsing and may even go nuclear by the end
of 2009. However this doomsday prophesy is disputed by other intelligence
assessments, which consider several more years for Iran's nuclear
weapons operational capability to extend for at least into the next
decade.
Iran's Nuclear Weapons Alternatives
General Baidatz's comments may have been directed at secret information,
indicating that Iran is engaged in secret production of plutonium
for nuclear weapons as well as radioactive materials for a "dirty
bomb", in parallel to its uranium enrichment projects. Sources
indicate that Israeli intelligence has monitored this dangerous
trend for over three years. Israeli intelligence sources reported
that these developments could throw new light on the role of the
Iranian heavy water plant at Arak, whose capacity to produce plutonium
places it at the center of Iran’s alternative nuclear program.
Intelligence reports indicating Iran's efforts to buy a large heavy-water
reactor had already set off alarm bells. It is well known that when
adequately reprocessed, fuel rods irradiated in such reactors could
yield high-quality, weapons-grade plutonium. Experts estimate that
when the Arak reactor is completed, which the Iranians say could
happen as early as 2009, it will be capable of producing enough
plutonium for about two bombs a year. This could well be what the
Israeli officer hinted at.
While the nuclear threat from Tehran must be taken with utmost
caution and strategic foresight, certainly not all in Israel are
overmuch concerned by Ahmadinejad's provocative bravado speeches.
Professor Martin van Crevelt, one of Israel's most prominent military
historians, claims that Ahmadinejad's fulminations should not be
taken too seriously, as the Islamic Republic will not even be an
existential threat to Israel. The latter has long had what it needs
to deter an Iranian attack. But should deterrence fail, van Crevelt
warns, "Jerusalem can quickly turn Tehran into a radioactive
desert - a fact of which Iranians are fully aware". Efraim
Halevi former Mossad chief and Israel's National Security Committee
also stated categorically that "Israel cannot be destroyed
for many reasons, some of which are known and others you can presume",
stressing that "There is a chance that something serious
will happen here, but I tend to say the following when I am abroad:
Israel cannot be destroyed. If you do not believe this, then don't,
but I suggest that you do not try it." In other words
- President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be warned against taking
his sofar rhetorical bravado, into action-one step too far.
For further reading we recommend:
Defense Update Analysis December 2006:
Defense Update Analysis Sept. 14, 2007:
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