|
 Realizing
the capabilities of the Merkava
4 tank, Hezbollah allocated their most advanced weaponry
to combat this advanced tank, engaging these tanks exclusively
with the heavier, more capable missiles such as 9M133
AT-14 Kornet, 9M131 Metis
M and RPG-29.
RPG-29 and 9M113
Konkurs (AT-5) were employed mostly against Merkava 3 and
2 while non-tandem weapons, such as Tow, Fagot and improved
RPG 7Vs were left to engage
other armored vehicles such as AIFV. The least used were AT-3
Sagger and, to a limited extent, the TOW
as well as non tandem RPGs, were considered obsolete against
tanks, but proved quite lethal against troops seeking cover
in buildings.
|
|  Overall,
almost 90% of the tanks hit were by tandem warheads. In general,
Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava Mk 4 over Merkava Mk
2 and 3, and in general, targeted tanks over AIFV. At the beginning
of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the main Israeli concern
was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian Kornet antitank
missiles. However, it also saw the RPG-29 Vampir with a tandem
HEAT that had stolen the show. There were even rumors that Hezbollah
had received the notorious TBG-29V thermobaric rounds, but these
could not be confirmed in action.
Hezbollah deployed their tank-killer teams in
a thin but effective defensive scheme, protecting the villages
where the organization's Shiite members reside; villages where
their short range rockets were positioned and where command
infrastructure and logistics support was set up. An estimated
500 to 600 members of their roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah fighting
strength in South Lebanon were divided into tank-killer teams
of 5 or 6, each armed with 5-8 anti-tank missiles, with further
supplies stored in small fortified well camouflaged bunkers
and fortified basements, built to withstand Israeli air attacks.
Due to mountainous area, engagements were encountered
at ranges below 3000 meters. Hezbollah tank-killer teams would
lay in wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, having planted
large IEDs on known approach routes. Once an Israeli tank would
detonate one of these, Hezbollah would start lobbing mortar
shells onto the scene to prevent rescue teams rushing forward,
also firing at outflanking Merkava tanks by targeting the more
vulnerable rear zone with RPGs. In general, Hezbollah demonstrated
rather slow regrouping and response rate, since their mobility
and command links were severely restricted by the IDF dominating
the open areas. However, even this slow pace was fast enough
to match the slow and indecisive movements of the Israelis forces.
The night vision equipment used by Hezbollah
was not as advanced as the IDF's. They possess mainly individual
night vision equipment and some night observation systems, but
generally lacked night capabilities for their anti-tank weapons.
Benefiting from its superior night combat capability, the IDF
conducted most movements at night, minimizing exposure of forces
during day time.
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Read David Eshel's past commentary here |
