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One of the apparent reasons, was the
anticipated 'information overload' at TOCs. Well, according to a US
Marine officer fresh out of OIF describing his workload in combat:
"Members of my force often had to use a helmet headset, four radios
and two laptop computers- all crammed into a light armored vehicle-all
at once!" adding that" we were overwhelmed with communications systems
for every eventuality, but these did not really integrate with each
other. For example, a Marine commander riding aboard a LAV had to use
a headset to use the intercom to talk to his driver and gunner, answer
his squad leaders by grabbing hand-held radio and speak to
accompanying infantry by another radio, all this while monitoring two
laptop positions of friendly and hostile forces!"
(This is a clear evidence of the risk of overloading a command vehicle
with excessive systems. Usually a rapid flick through an intercom
button should allow frequency changes without removing the harness!)
To make matters worse, one had to have a closer look at tactical
command vehicles. Here the clutter was beyond all imagination: every
single shelf was occupied by a radio and seat spaces loaded with open
computers. Any single system compatible to share information could
have solved this acute problem, which made the workload under combat
conditions nearly impossible on the move.
Reports indicate that sharing messages was often solved only by the
new Blue Force Tracking system. But not all units had this facility,
working through the Mobile Data Automated Communications Terminal (MDACT),
offering the same functions, as Blue Force Tracking (BFT), but unable to talk to each other!
BFT is a marvelous system. Derived from the
FBCB2 program, it provides
unprecedented vertical and horizontal information integration.
Featuring a large mission data base, the information is displayed on
maps, overlays of individual unit platforms. Positioning information
gathered from GPS and data provided by users are automatically sent
via L-band satellite to data fusion centers at command centers. The
map displays not only combat messages, but using geo-referenced
satellite imagery it provides updated information on terrain features
etc.
The trend is to reduce the size of the
BFT equipment to handheld versions for lower tactical commanders.
There is already a mini model available, used sofar by some SOF units,
developed by General Dynamics Mission Systems, as Individual Combat
Identification System. The pocket sized version sends coded signals
every five to 10 minutes relaying their GPS coordinates to TOCs.
How impressive BFT performed during OIF could be highlighted by an
incident south of Baghdad. On April 1 Alpha Company of 69th Armor, was
advanced vanguard east of Karbala, when the commander was about to
order "Red Free" (meaning ' shoot at everything that moves in front').
What he had not been told was that a US infantry force, was moving
across his front, a situation 'ripe for fratricide'. The tank officer
identified the move displayed as blue icon on his BFT screen and
immediately ordered "Hold!", preventing a serious blue-on-blue
incident.
Here is how it worked: about every five
minutes, or 800 yards movement, the platoon leaders BFT computer
automatically sends position data changes through satellite to
internet servers. The server updates every BFT equipped platform
within reach, so that all commanders receive constantly updated
situational awareness.
A major problem, repeatedly mentioned by lower command levels, which
has to be solved quickly, is available bandwidth. A senior commander
mentions this in his report, demanding solutions to cope with this
deficiency: "No matter how perfect a future network and CP we
build, it won't do us much good until we fix the overarching problem
of bandwidth management." Limited bandwidth was a major issue
during OIF. While fixed command and control installations reliably use
high-bandwidth communications, the communications architecture for
mobile or semi-mobile CPs at the tactical level is too fragile and not
robust enough to support our needs. It negatively affected
collaboration, information sharing and in some cases, the Commander's
ability to command. Satellite based communication works; but we need
more bandwidth to push the synergy of network enhanced operations down
to the tactical level.
In an environment where competition for limited bandwidth is fierce,
we must seek efficiencies through a more sophisticated management
solution. The time to fix bandwidth problems is now, before we deploy
to the next fight!
Once the Army overcomes satellite bandwidth constraints, we can
aggressively address the "Digital Divide" that exists between the
operational and the tactical levels of war. We can extend the power of
the network down to the tactical level. Despite our efforts to realize
network enhanced warfare since Desert Storm, the trigger puller on the
ground still can't tap into the network and realize its benefits. In
OIF, this was most pronounced in dissemination of intelligence
information".
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