| Two years
of diplomatic and economic isolation don't seem to have tarnished
Syria President Bashar Assad's shine. The Baker plan, with its
request that the White House revise its politics in the Middle
East , has brought him back to the center of the international
stage. The emergence of a Shia-dominated government in Iraq
has raised the possibility for a wider Shiite linkup with Iran
and Syria where the Alawite Shia minority dominate the Sunni
majority and Nasrallah's political upsurge in Lebanon, following
Hezbollah's ostensible showing during last summer's war with
Israel.
Experts on the Arab world disagree on Syria's
part in Iran's regional ambitions. Some say the so-called "Shiite
crescent," which presumably includes Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
and Iran, is being overblown. First, the claim states, that
Syria is not Shiite but Alawite, a secular sect of Islam that
ascribes to Arab nationalism, rather on its religious heritage,
which puts it at odds with Shiite regional Islamic interests.
On the other hand, in their mountainous corner of Syria, the
Alawis claim to represent the furthest extension of "Twelver
Shi'ism".
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In a Tripoli hotel in July 1973, Musa al-Sadr
issued a fatwa declaring Alawites to be part of the
Shiite Muslim community, helping Assad weather a political
crisis over the Syrian constitution's requirement that
the president be a Muslim
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Numbering perhaps only a million
persons—about 12 percent of Syria's population the
Alawites derive from a schism in the 9th century around
the 11th imam, al-Askari, who they consider the last legitimate
descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.
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 The
origin of the Alawite sect still raises essential questions
about religious authority and orthodoxy in contemporary Twelver
Shi'ism. But this does not seem to prevent its fullest relationship
with revolutionary Iran, including its Shiite clerigal regime.While
the old controversy over the origins of the Alawis may be forgotten,
the contemporary Alawi enigma is this: By whose authority, and
in whose eyes, are the Alawis counted as Twelver Shi'ites? An
important visible sign of Alawi esoterism was the absence of
mosques from Alawi regions. But The Sayyida Zainab Shrine, in
downtown Damascus, where granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammad
is buried, has recently gained new reverence to Shiite pilgrims.
Sunni heresiographers excoriated Alawi beliefs and viewed the
Alawis as disbelievers (kuffar) and idolators (mushrikun). What
was needed was some form of recognition from a Twelver Shi'ite
authority, who could buttress the Alawis' own problematic claim
that they were indeed Twelver Shi'ites. The solution appeared
in the person of the late Imam Musa al-Sadr, Iranian-born head
of the Shiite Supreme Council in Lebanon, who became a "confidant,
political ally, and friend" of then-Syrian President Hafez
Assad in the early 1970s. In a covenant which was sealed in
a Tripoli hotel in July 1973, Musa al-Sadr issued a fatwa declaring
Alawites to be part of the Shiite Muslim community, helping
Assad weather a political crisis over the Syrian constitution's
requirement that the president be a Muslim and boost his legitimacy
among a Sunni majority population accustomed to thinking of
Alawites as heretics. Arabist scholars consider that Sadr's
fatwa may well have encouraged Hafez Assad's brutal crack down
on his Sunni opponents in the notorious 1982 Hama riots. However,
the shrewd Hafez, "Lion of Damascus" carefully balanced
his sensitive relations with clerical Iran during his iron rule,
keeping its within limits of mutual convenience.
As result of latest developments in the region, in which fundamentalist
extremist elements are on the rise to new power bases, an emerging
"Shiite bloc" of Iran, southern Iraq, Alawite-ruled
Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah is being envisioned by Tehran's
Ayathollahs. Sofar Mid East experts assumed, that Assad's Alawite
minority, which faces decades of Sunni mistrust, would hesitate
to throw in Syria's lot with a Shiite Iran, but Bashar Assad,
clearly lacking his father's faculties of political wisdom,
has changed some of Syria's fundanemtal strategic policies,
which, on the long run may have serious consequence to his country.
There are already many mutterings within Syria that the current
President's father, the shrewd and forceful leader Hafez, would
have never let matters get to this stage - with Syria condemned
not only as a rogue state, because of its alleged killing of
Rafik Hariri, but having been coerced to withdraw its troops
from the Lebanon, its lucrative economic backyard, after a 30-year
occupation. As its seems, Bashar Assad is fully committed to
Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's growing patronage. Intelligence
reports indicate that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) or Pasdaran, is busy building its power base in the outskirts
of Syria's capital Damascus. Accordingly, an extensive communications
center is being constructed within the compound of Syria's Presidential
Guard at Almaza, its commander being the president's younger
brother Maher. Unconfirmed reports mentioned, that from this
very center, operations were conducted during the Hezbollah
war in summer 2006.
| The questions
asked these days are: Can the " Sunni moderate axis"
( Saudi Arabia- Jordan and Egypt) still sever the Syrian
"missing chain" to Ahmadinejad's ambitious "Shiite
Crescent"? Unfortunately, there seems to be little
hope for that.
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A future palace coup is only likely
if the Alawites can be convinced that Bashar is in fact
endangering their survival as the rulers of Syria and
even their community.
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There is no doubt that Sunni Arab governments
are trying to pry Syria out of its alliance with Iran, before
its is too late, but sofar very little has been done to implement
this wish. Meanwhile the Bush Administration has been quietly
nurturing individuals and parties opposed to the Syrian government
in an effort to undermine the regime of President Bashar Assad
anti-Assad groups in Washington, Europe and inside Syria mechanisms
of democratic change in Syria National Salvation Front affiliated
to the Muslim Brotherhood. Soberly considering Syria's internal
conditions, Middle East experts assess these efforts rather
futile. The Syrian security forces are very effective in ferreting
any opposition leaders out and hunt these down ruthlessly.
The Sunni majority tolerates the Alawite minority regime for
one simple reason: they don't want another Lebanon in Syria
because they know there will be blood in the streets and the
Alawites will fight to the last man. They are willing to wait.
A future palace coup is only likely if the Alawites can be convinced
that Bashar is in fact endangering their survival as the rulers
of Syria and even perhaps as a community. Sofar this seems far
fetched wishful thinking- as Bashar has even weathered the forced
ousting from Lebanon following the 2005 "Cedar Revolution".
As has been repeatedly demonstrated in this region, any American-orchestrated
attempt to conduct in regime change proved a waste of effort
only due to fail. Syria's opposition is so fractured and weak
that there is little to be gained by such a venture. Even young
Assad, has managed to consolidate his power by moving allies
into critical positions and demoting those considered threats—including
the veteran Abdel Halim Khaddam, a former vice president and
one of the few Sunnis in Syria's top positions who was driven
into foreign exile.
However there are some indications that Sunni leaders are waking
up to the ongoing emergency on their very doorstep. Saudi king
Abdullah II recently met with Syrian opposition leaders –
Sheikh Ali al-Bayanoni, the banished head of Syria's Muslim
Brotherhood currently residing in Belgium, and Bashar's uncle,
Rifat Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam. Whether such meetings will
become a new Sunni strategy remains highly questionable. Certainly,
Syria, Lebanon and Iraq are crucial protagonists in the specter
of a Shi'ite crescent, according to the Saudi royal family,
King Abdullah of Jordan and conservative American think tanks,
however the facts on the ground are much more complex than a
simplistic formula to solve this dilemma.
In sum, it seems that Bashar Assad has chosen to gamble. He
hopes that defiance of Washington will strengthen his position
at home and that, after George W. Bush leaves office, U.S. policy
toward Syria will soften. Should his gamble succeed, he could
emerge more influential. Should it fail, he may lose his regime.
His latest move to align his strategy to Moscow's new ventures
in the region and even his sofar dubious signals toward Israel,
may indicate that young Bashar has, after all, more on his pallet
than a London Ophthalmologist's certificate.
Read David Eshel's past commentary here
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