BAE Systems’ fourth Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) prototype is being showcased at Eurosatory this week. Configured with a common top plate, the External Mission Equipment Package (ExMEP), the prototype showcases the vehicle’s ability to integrate capabilities and equipment packages internationally.
This AMPV prototype features Oshkosh Defense’s Medium Caliber Weapon System (MCWS), a 30mm weapon system with planned fielding to the U.S. Army’s Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The vehicle’s ExMEP can adapt to more than 30 different turret systems and build on the vehicle’s modularity. This creates a seamless path for international customers to address various mission needs with the AMPV platform.
“This latest prototype demonstrates the capabilities of a common top plate and the options it provides our allies and NATO partners for rapid integration of next-generation technology onto a proven vehicle,” said Bill Sheehy, AMPV program director for BAE Systems. “The adaptability of the AMPV design means we can execute new capability integration quickly and efficiently, further proving the platform’s future-proofed design.”
BAE Systems integrated and successfully demonstrated a C-UAS prototype in November 2023 while also integrating and delivering a 120mm unmanned Turreted Mortar capability to the U.S. Army in January 2024. The AMPV NxT prototype debuted with a 30mm turret at AUSA Global Force in March 2024—all three prototypes using the common top plate.
BAE Systems has received a $754 million contract award from the U.S. Army to continue manufacturing the AMPV Family of Vehicles (FoV), guaranteeing a second phase of full-rate production (FRP) volumes through February 2027. This follows the original $797 million FRP contract awarded in August 2023.
The five variants currently in production provide enhanced survivability and performance over the legacy M113 FoV. The AMPV’s modular chassis and commonality have proven it to be a low-risk and cost-effective solution that rapidly delivers continued combat overmatch solutions to troops ready for the battlefield.
The directional mine PARM 1 (DM12) and its improved version (DM22) is a German off-route mine that consists of a high-explosive anti-tank warhead with a diameter of 128mm coupled with a fin-stabilized rocket. It is capable of penetrating up to 600mm of armor. This enables the weapon to hit targets at ranges up to 40 meters. PARM is activated by a Passive Infra-Red (PIR) sensor triggered by the target vehicles moving on the road. Using a HEAT charge aimed at the low section, road wheels or suspension, the weapon causes mobility kill rather than catastrophic explosion. Mobility kill disables the use of the vehicle for an extended time. The mine can be laid passive and armed just as enemy vehicles are nearby.
The operator is located remotely and controls the weapon via a fiber-optic data link. It is a remotely operated weapon for ambushes at vantage points dominating roads and areas where the enemy is expected to move. Developed in the 1980s, the weapon was not widely used. About 2,600 such weapons were delivered by Germany and successfully used by the Ukrainian Army.
In 2023, the German MOD ordered replacement weapons and signed a contract for 12,000 weapons, of which 2,000 will be delivered in the first batches, and others will be procured under follow-on options. For these batches, the company intends to introduce an improved weaon fitted with an RF datalink, which enables remote control over a longer distance (4 km). The remote control is used to arm or disarm the mine, enabling friendly forces to move along roads that are covered by PARM weapons.
At Eurosatory 2024, RENK Group AG introduced its new ATREX transmission system, a groundbreaking hybrid solution for main battle tanks. Designed to meet the evolving needs of modern land forces, ATREX addresses critical areas such as fuel efficiency, digitalization, and autonomous driving capabilities.
The ATREX system, short for “Advanced Transmission Electric Cross Drive with Drive-by-Wire,” represents a significant advancement in drivetrain technology for military tracked vehicles. Combining traditional transmission technology with innovative new developments, ATREX offers a combined output of 1400 to 1500 kW, with up to 350 kW provided by electric drives. It is designed to power combat vehicles at a combat loaded weight of up to 70 tons and accelerate vehicles to a speed of 70 kph. At Eurosatory 2024, RENK is also showcasing its Next Generation Mobility System, featuring an ATREX propulsion system configured for a future battle tank. This exhibit demonstrates the integration of ATREX with components like InArm suspension, Track Tensioner, Active Damping Ride Height Control, and Drive-by-Wire systems, highlighting the potential for comprehensive, future-ready mobility solutions in military applications.
One of the core innovations of ATREX is its electro-mechanical steering system, which doubles as an electrical propulsion system and a power generator. This feature supports fuel efficiency by allowing the use of the electric drive for short distances, reducing the reliance on the diesel engine, thereby saving fuel and extending the vehicle’s operational range. The system’s advanced recuperation capability recharges the battery during braking, further enhancing efficiency and reducing maintenance needs.
The ATREX system also introduces new operational capabilities such as Silent Watch, Manoeuvring, and Sprint Boost. These functions enable low-noise and low-heat signature missions, enhancing passive protection and providing tactical advantages. In critical situations, the boost function allows for rapid vehicle movement using electrical energy, with the diesel engine engaging simultaneously for additional power.
With digital networking capabilities integrated into the drivetrain and other vehicle components, ATREX is equipped with Drive-by-Wire technology, paving the way for autonomous driving. This technology supports flexible driver stations and assistance systems, ensuring vehicles are mission-ready with enhanced control and responsiveness. Furthermore, ATREX’s design allows for scalability in size and weight, making it adaptable to specific customer requirements. The placement of electric motors on the exterior of the propulsion system facilitates easy modifications to the installed electrical power, providing tailored solutions for diverse operational needs.
The introduction of ATREX by RENK signifies a forward-thinking approach to armored mobility. It blends traditional reliability with modern innovations to meet the complex demands of contemporary and future military operations.
The conflict in Ukraine has served as a real-world laboratory for NAVWAR tactics and technologies. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces extensively deployed a variety of jammers and spoofers, demonstrating the critical role of electronic warfare in modern conflict.
Overall, the performance of US-delivered GPS-guided weaponry, such as the Excalibur 155mm artillery rounds, M31 Guided MLRS rockets, and JDAM GPS-guided bombs, has been degraded since their initial successful introduction by the Ukrainian forces. Apparently, the Russians gradually developed EW countermeasures against those threats. Due to operational security considerations, the absence of countermeasures, such as the SAASM anti-spoofing and M-Code anti-jam support for these weapons, may have degraded their resilience, facing an extensive and sophisticated Russian EW. Other weapon systems, such as the Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles, fared better over time as they rely on multiple navigation means and have fared better in prolonged combat.
During the 2023 summer counteroffensive, Ukraine used tens of thousands of small drones to strike Russian positions and vehicles, many of which failed to launch due to the extensive jamming employed by the Russians. This required the Ukrainians to disable many GNSS-based automation and degrade their drones to rely on visual navigation and control, which is also vulnerable to jamming and comm-loss. Such systems have impacted military operations and civilian sectors, underscoring the dual-use dilemma inherent in NAVWAR.
Both sides currently use Counter-drone and GNSS jammers in the Russo-Ukraine conflict. Some Russian armored vehicles employ the Volnorez EW system, using two emitters positioned in the front of the turret; the system covers 360 degrees and is designed to engage FPV attack drones. The system covers a range of 900 to 2000 MHz and disrupts drone signals at distances exceeding 600 meters. However, based on captured systems studies, Volnorez’s lack of continuous coverage may compromise its combat effectiveness. Other applications employ GNSS commercial jammers like the Saniya EW system, which is effective at a distance of 1,000 meters. The system can detect drones at 1,500 m’ distance and be used against attack and recce drones. The Ukrainian side also uses EW systems to defend its combat vehicles. The Piranha AVD360 creates a protective ‘electronic dome’ blocking communications and navigation signals to reach the attacking drone within 600 meters of the protected vehicle.
To address these countermeasures and enable the FPV drones to maintain combat effectiveness, more sophisticated navigation and targeting systems are employed; these include applying machine vision to enable drones to take control and pursue the attack, relying on autonomous image recognition via the camera when there is datalink loss.
GNSS Spoofers Protecting High-End Targets
Sophisticated spoofers take NAVWAR to a higher level of complexity and deception. Unlike jammers, spoofers emit signals that mimic GNSS signals, misleading receivers with false positioning or timing data.
Spoofing was considered rare until recently. It is not always possible to distinguish jamming from spoofing or to determine who is behind the interference. The worst-affected regions include the aerial space above the Black Sea area from Turkey to Azerbaijan, the Mediterranean Sea extending from Cyprus to Libya, the Baltic Sea near Poland and Latvia, and the Arctic near Finland and Norway. Israel alerted pilots in mid-October it had restricted GPS in the region and warned pilots not to rely on satellite navigation systems for landing. The GNSS interference has been felt up to 190 miles away from battle zones and “appears to go well beyond simple military mission effectiveness,” according to Eurocontrol, Europe’s primary air traffic control manager.
Spoofing causes more problems for GNSS users. In some attacks, a spoofer disguises its transmissions as a true satellite by recording a genuine satellite signal and rebroadcasting it with amplification or a delay to disguise it as an authentic signal, thus deceiving the receiver into plotting a bogus location.
The Ring, developed by Regulus Cyber, represents a cutting-edge spoofing approach capable of generating highly convincing false GNSS signals to mislead sophisticated GNSS receivers. Ring targets the platform’s basic navigation subsystem commands set by feeding it with false satellite data that triggers a reaction in a certain way, such as fend off, stop and hover, or descend abruptly and crash. Unlike large, strategic spoofing systems, Ring was designed as a tactical system; at a weight of 6.5 kg, it can be installed on a vessel, armored vehicle, artillery piece, or air defense system, fed by the vehicle’s power or battery powered, carried in a backpack for dismounted operation. The system creates a defensive hemispheric shield around the protected platform that ‘fends off’ drones and other threats employing GNSS navigation systems. This hemispheric ‘bubble’ is effective against drones and other threats that rely on GNSS for navigation. According to the developers, the system can mitigate all such threats, regardless of their operating and guidance system, protocols, and countermeasures.
Low-cost jammers are widely accessible and offer a basic but effective means of disrupting GNSS signals. Drivers who want to prevent their bosses from constantly tracking delivery trucks use such devices. They emit radio frequency (RF) noise or signals on the same frequencies used by GNSS satellites, overwhelming the receiver’s ability to discern the legitimate satellite signal. Their affordability and simplicity make them a common choice for non-state actors and less technologically advanced militaries.
In a counter-UAS role, GPS denial often uses broadband jamming and datalink disruption as part of a comprehensive EW capability. The Australia-based DroneShield company, one of the pioneers in this field, has recently announced the introduction of GNSS disruption targeted to a specific area.
Military users often opt for dedicated EW assets to engage radio-electronic signals at the GNSS frequencies (lower and upper L bands). Some systems employ signal generators to defeat specific threats, such as drones and GPS-guided weapons, while others disrupt GNSS signals, creating a ‘defensive bubble’ around important assets and targets, thus reducing the probability of successful attack by guided weapons. Some of these systems are mounted on vehicles, enabling the relocation of assets, while others are fixed in specific positions. A typical relocatable system that blocks GNSS signals at longer distances is the Russian R30Zh Zhitel, which can jam satellite and cellular phone communications from 100 MHz to 2,000 MHz frequency bands, covering all GNSS frequencies. Zhitel has an effective radius of 25 km against cellular phones and longer against GNSS.
Denial of GNSS signals over a wide area requires a more powerful or distributed array of emitters. Two Russian systems are known to be capable of delivering GNSS jamming over a large area. The Pole 21E system consists of jammers placed on cell towers. Multiple elements of this type can be integrated into a jammer network, denying GNSS signal over large areas. The system uses the communications mast’s power and GSM communications as a backup. The Ukrainians have repeatedly attacked cell towers along the front lines to destroy such systems and open the sky for drone activity.
Another powerful Russian counter-GNSS effort is the 14Ts227 Tobol, a system designed to disrupt GNSS signals over a large area, thus denying navigation signals from attack drones and cruise missiles. Ten such systems are employed across Russian territory, one of which is in Kaliningrad. These powerful systems suppress GPS coverage in the Baltic, Scandinavia, and Eastern Europe. While the Tobol was reportedly the cause of GNSS disruptions across Europe, the Ukrainians repeatedly conducted precision drone attacks inside Russia, demonstrating their ability to operate in GNSS-contested airspace.
In 2021, the Turkish defense industry organization and Meteksan teamed to develop the Seymen, a sophisticated, mobile NAVWAR EW system unveiled as a scaled model at the IDEF exhibition. The system will enable selective jamming and deception of GNSS signals affecting targeted systems while enabling friendly forces to operate without signal degradation. The system can engage multiple targets in different directions and across several GNSS constellations. Seymen can operate independently or in coordination with multiple emitters as part of a system.
The key for operating systems such as Symen is using active electronic steered antennae (AESA) for a more discrete approach. An example of such a system is SRC’s steerable electronic attack phases array (SEAPA), a prototype system that employs precision electronic targeting and engagement for congested environments. SEAPA covers the L band and the entire GNSS frequency band and can deliver surgical PNT disruption for air and missile defense, counter UAS, and critical infrastructure defense. This RF solution can precisely target and disrupt hostile systems while ensuring friendly systems’ safety and continued operation in the same airspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. SEAPA uses configurable beamforming to steer the electronic jamming beams in azimuth and elevation, allowing the system to track targets in flight. Beams can be narrowed to 20 deg for precision effects or widened to 60 deg to engage swarms. Using variable power beams, it can simultaneously engage targets at both short and long-range. Unlike omnidirectional systems, SEAPA provides advanced NAVWAR capabilities while minimizing unintended impact on non-targeted systems.
A different selective GNSS denial can be employed tactically, localized using drone-based effectors or artillery-deployed jammers, enabling forces to project electronic warfare capabilities deep into enemy territory. Two examples from SRC are the Silent Cyclone from SRC, a backpacked EW system, and the Silent Impact, a puck-like device packable into 155mm artillery rounds and fired at the enemy’s rear area. These systems can deliver cyber electromagnetic attack (CEMA) payloads in flight, using parachutes to stay aloft for an extended period. The jammers are built to survive the ground impact and continue their jamming on the ground.
This deployment method allows for targeted jamming in specific areas near headquarters, forward landing strips, or choke points where no navigation could cause many disruptions. Using low-power localized effects can potentially blind and disorient enemy forces without widespread disruption that might affect friendly forces.
By using countermeasures against NAVWAR threats, Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) is achieved. These countermeasures are as varied and sophisticated as the offensive capabilities they aim to neutralize. Nations and corporations worldwide have invested in technologies designed to detect, mitigate, and adapt to GNSS disruption and spoofing. Signal-behavior monitoring represents an important method of assessing the integrity of PNT systems at the system or unit level. By observing PNT signals for behavior such as dropouts, discontinuities, unusual signal fluctuations, data bit changes, or other anomalies, this technique can detect a potential failure or false manipulation of the source, indicate the system to revert to a ‘safe mode’, use of countermeasures, or act against the perpetrator.
A common combination provides navigation resilience using an inertial measurement unit (IMU) with a GNSS receiver. By correlating the GNSS position with the IMU data, the navigation system compares the position intervals reported by the GNSS subsystem with the relative position determined by directional accelerations and time measured by the IMU relative to the previous GNSS interval. Trusted timing standards are also part of such combined sensor systems, assessing the integrity of PNT signals. By correlating the information provided by the different sensors and an integral atomic clock, all the sensors must agree on the location and timing solution. If one sensor disagrees with the others, that sensor may be considered suspect, either for failure or compromise.
While this method is immune to external interference, it is susceptible to position measurement inaccuracies (also known as ‘drift’) proportional to the distance and time traveled. Adding Artificial Intelligence sensor fusion to the system enhances the system’s processing capabilities, primarily in an environment where satellite signals are obstructed or challenged, such as indoors or in urban areas. GPS/INS systems are common in most aviation and naval systems and are also being introduced in military land systems. However, due to the IMU cost and complexity, they are used mainly in high-value systems such as air defense, artillery, and recce units.
An anti-jam antenna unit is another method of PNT resilience. Anti-jam solutions use smart technologies such as controlled radiation pattern antennas to focus on satellite signals while attenuating the signal received from ground-based jammers.
A typical system of this class is the ADA GNSS Anti-Jamming system from IAI. ADA protects aircraft, drones, surface vehicles, or ships from GNSS disruption. It uses a multichannel antenna that filters out signals coming from undesirable directions. The technology can also detect and mitigate spoofing attacks, ensuring the integrity of GNSS signals. IAI offers ADA in several versions, including a lightweight system optimized for use on missiles, drones, and loitering weapons and the Compact ADA unveiled earlier this year.
Other systems developed by Elbit Systems’ Rokar unit are JaGuard and GUR. These systems use up to four antennae elements to perform null steering techniques and processing units to perform complex anti-jam and GNSS calculations simultaneously. The system is optimized for efficient multipath mitigation in urban or naval environments. JaGuard can be mounted on the platform, while GUR is designed for integration at the subsystem or embedded solution level.
The Canadian NovaTel is offering advanced anti-jamming antennas. These systems employ enhanced GNSS tracking performance, new direction-finding capabilities, improved electronic situational awareness, and a new silent mode feature that reduces its thermal signature. The system’s receiver employs algorithms that use various detection metrics at multiple stages within the signal processing to provide a robust overall spoofing detection alert. While the receiver may be spoofed, the resulting falsified position, navigation, and timing (PNT) measurements won’t fool the user. Because of the alert, users have increased situational awareness of when their receiver’s measurements may be untrustworthy.
While ADA, JaGuard, and GUR are designed specifically for the military user, other GNSS-AJ solutions have been optimized as dual-use systems. Infinidome, a pioneer in GNSS protection, has developed the GPS Dome, a cost-effective and compact system designed to shield commercial and military assets from jamming.
Infinidome, an Israeli GPS protection specialist company, has introduced GPSDome, which uses two antennae to perform passive ‘null steering’ by attenuating the reception from the direction of the most powerful signal (the jammer). The company developed a proprietary filter to isolate this signal and implemented it into an integrated circuit.
The latest generation, GPSDome2, is a software-defined GNSS-AJ solution that offers a wider frequency range, higher efficiency, and the ability to simultaneously deal with multiple jammers from three directions. GPSDome2 is packed in a small package weighing only 500 gr. That can be installed as a retrofit or in new systems. Under a collaboration with Honeywell, the system has been integrated into Honeywell’s Resilient Navigation System, introduced in 2022 as an aviation-certified navigation system designed to overcome GNSS vulnerabilities. A similar system is under development in South Korea in cooperation with Hanwha, which has also invested in the company. Both are positioned to provide these navigation capabilities for the Autonomous Air Mobility systems. (AAM).
Another method the US military uses to foil spoofing is the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) GPS signal, employing encryption to discriminate between true and false signals. GPS satellites transmit signals with encrypted code, and SAASM-protected receivers have decryption keys that authenticate the signal. Military receivers deployed after 2006 were required to use SAASM. These techniques are not available to commercial users and require special authorization by the US Government. Therefore, not all military GNSS receivers use encrypted signals, and those that do not may be vulnerable to spoofing. The European Union (EU) Galileo system also supports encrypted signal techniques through the Public Regulated Service (PRS) reserved for EU government users.
While SAASM is available only to the US government and authorized users, other APNT applications employ software-based GNSS protection to detect spoofing attacks. The Pyramid system, developed by Regulus Cyber, detects, alerts, and reports the presence of GNSS spoofing signals, enabling the user to employ alternative navigation or correction measures to protect the navigation system and the platform. The system uses software updates to keep up with the latest attack methods.
Since 2018, when the first 3rd generation GPS satellite was deployed, a new encrypted M-Code has been used in the L1 and L2 GPS bands, supporting U.S. military operations. M-Code is designed to improve resistance to GPS threats such as jamming and spoofing. M-Code receivers use a higher-power signal to resist jamming interference and encryption, among other security features, to thwart spoofing attacks. M-Code support has been mandatory for all new military GPS receivers since 2017. Some forces of European Union members are also starting to get access to M-Code.
Vision technologies promise an alternative for some GNSS-dependent navigation applications, with image-based solutions capable of accurately positioning without reliance on satellite signals. Such a system is the AeroGuardian NOCTA developed by Asio Technologies. As a vision-based system, it provides a jam-proof navigation solution that can operate with or without GNSS input based on visual mapping of the terrain in which it operates. This self-contained system provides the host system with position and navigation data based on a terrain map that any surveillance can prepare means available to the user. It can be integrated with any drone and operate with or without other navigation systems. This combat-tested solution is especially suited for environments where GNSS signals are compromised, jammed, or unavailable.
The US company Scientific Systems has developed ImageNav, a non-GPS precision navigation software library that uses inertial measurement information to match EO/IR video images captured by an onboard camera against stored geo-registered digital terrain elevation data (DTED) to determine the precise location of the carrying platform in real-time. ImageNav uses time-synchronized camera imagery up to 1024×1024 pixels in size at up to 30 frames per second. ImageNav can be integrated with Space, Weight, and Power (SWAP) challenged applications such as loitering weapons, launched effects, guided weapons, and UAS, where it can be implemented as a software library, a stand-alone processor board, or a self-contained hardware payload.
Artificial Intelligence
AI algorithms can ingest data of attack patterns and learn over time, so they become more advanced in protecting PNT systems. By analyzing interference and spoofing attack patterns, AI can help develop predictive models to counteract these threats or dynamically adjust to ensure the integrity of PNT data. For this purpose, the US Department of Homeland Security released the Epsilon algorithm in 2021. Epsilon provides spoofing detection functions to existing receivers as a software library without requiring hardware modifications. Commercial GNSS receivers also use AI techniques to enable multipath reception in urban environments. AI has also proved effective in vision navigation systems, where it is used to recognize patterns for objects and reference points.
Quantum Navigation
The development of quantum navigation technologies offers promising PNT alternatives for terrestrial applications on Earth and in outer space. Quantum sensors can provide highly accurate PNT information independent of satellite systems, potentially rendering GNSS jamming and spoofing obsolete.
Cybersecurity for GNSS Infrastructure
Recognizing that GNSS infrastructure is a target, future efforts will focus on enhancing the cybersecurity of ground stations, control systems, and communication links. Protecting these critical components is essential to safeguarding the GNSS ecosystem against disruptions.
Strategic Implications
The strategic implications of these advancements in NAVWAR are profound. The importance of PNT systems is not limited to military capabilities or commercial uses but as a cornerstone of global security, economic stability, and societal functioning. Dominating the NAVWAR terrain, defeating adversary actions, dominating the spectrum, and mitigating cyber threats require international cooperation, regulatory frameworks, and shared standards and norms to ensure the reliable use of space-based navigation and alternative navigation solutions.
Conclusion
The future of NAVWAR is a complex interplay of technology, strategy, and diplomacy. As we advance into this future, the key to success lies in innovation, collaboration, and the relentless pursuit of resilience. By staying ahead of the curve in detecting and mitigating NAVWAR threats, we can secure the PNT services that underpin our modern way of life against the challenges of tomorrow. The journey ahead is one of constant vigilance and adaptation as we navigate the ever-evolving terrain of electronic warfare to protect and preserve the unseen signals that guide us through the world.
Navigation Warfare, or NAVWAR, represents a critical domain within the broader spectrum of Electronic Warfare (EW), focusing on the contest for dominance over positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities essential for military and civilian operations. It encompasses a range of offensive and defensive measures aimed at exploiting, deceiving, disrupting, or protecting satellite navigation systems—principally the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), which include the United States GPS, Russia’s GLONASS, Europe’s Galileo, and China’s BeiDou. These satellite constellations are used for commercial and military services and provide navigation services to users worldwide.
The Strategic Importance of GNSS
GNSS plays a pivotal role in the modern world, far beyond its military applications. It underpins critical infrastructure, from telecommunications and electricity grids to banking systems. In military use, GNSS is the backbone of precision-guided munitions, real-time troop and asset tracking, and synchronized operations across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. Thus, the accuracy and reliability of PNT data are not merely operational requirements but are fundamentally intertwined with national security and global stability.
Vulnerabilities and Threats
Despite its advantages, the reliance on GNSS introduces significant vulnerabilities. GNSS signals, being low-power radio waves transmitted from thousands of kilometers away in space, are inherently susceptible to intentional or accidental interference. NAVWAR exploits these vulnerabilities through:
Jamming: The deliberate broadcasting of radio frequency noise on the same frequencies used by GNSS receivers to drown out the actual satellite signals, rendering them unusable.
Spoofing: More sophisticated than jamming, spoofing involves broadcasting false GNSS signals. Receivers tricked by these signals can produce erroneous positions and times, potentially leading to disastrous outcomes.
Cyber Attacks: Cyber attacks target the data links and control segments of GNSS infrastructure and can alter or disrupt the flow of accurate PNT information.
Historical Context
The concept of NAVWAR is not new but has evolved with technology. Early examples include using signal jammers during World War II to disrupt radio navigation. The 1991 Gulf War highlighted the strategic value of GPS, marking the beginning of its widespread military use and, consequently, the advent of modern NAVWAR tactics. Since then, the technological race has intensified, with state and non-state actors developing increasingly sophisticated means to exploit GNSS vulnerabilities.
The Dual-Use Dilemma
A unique aspect of NAVWAR is its dual-use dilemma. The same capabilities that enable military operations might degrade friendly force operations and harm civilian systems. The widespread use of GNSS across various sectors means that NAVWAR technologies have implications far beyond the battlefield, affecting everything from commercial aviation to emergency services. This interconnection mandates a cautious approach to NAVWAR, balancing offensive capabilities with the potential risks to civilian infrastructure.
The future of NAVWAR is a complex interplay of technology, strategy, and diplomacy. As we advance into this future, the key to success lies in innovation, collaboration, and the relentless pursuit of resilience. By staying ahead of the curve in detecting and mitigating NAVWAR threats, we can secure the PNT services that underpin our modern way of life against the challenges of tomorrow. The journey ahead is one of constant vigilance and adaptation as we navigate the ever-evolving terrain of electronic warfare in the quest to protect and preserve the unseen signals that guide us through the world.
KNDS recently completed a test firing series with the 140mm ASCALON gun, demonstrating the applicability of the new gun design for current and future main combat systems, including the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). During the tests series company personnel demonstrated an easy and quick gun caliber change, replacing a 120mm barrel with the 140mm in less than one hour.
KNDS presents the ASCALON cannon and its ammunition as a mature solution n. The three-year firing campaign that began in May 2024 has shown the excellent capacities of the ASCALON in the 140 and 120mm barrels, as well as its APFSDS rounds maturity. SInce it began, the system was fired several hundreds of times from gun mounts in 120 and 140mm barrels. These tests are scheduled to continue through 2025. The next important step is firing tests from a Main Battle Tank (MBT) in 2025.
ASCALON delivers performance levels that current technologies do not offer while offering a significant growth potential. The system KNDS designed ASCALON with an open architecture to serve as a basis for cooperative development of a combat gun platform within the framework of the Franco-German MGCS program, laying the foundations
for the future standard of European tank gun and ammunition.
Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace teams with German partners Diehl Defence and MBDA Deutschland to develop the Tyrfing, an advanced Super-Sonic Strike Missile (3SM). The new missile is expected to replace the Naval Strike Missile deployed on Norwegian naval vessels beginning in 2035. Induction with the German Navy is expected to follow. The project became a collaborative program in 2021, with public endorsement by the two governments. Germany is expected to announce its plans of commissioning the new missile this year. Kongsberg’s teaming with two German companies seems to be a step in this direction.
The Norwegian government announced this initiative in November 2023, and the industry team essential for the success of this project has now entered a partnership agreement. “I am so impressed with this team’s depth and capabilities. I look forward to cooperating with Diehl and MBDA Deutschland and combining our teams’ knowledge and expertise to develop 3SM for both nations,” said Eirik Lie, President of Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace.
This partnership, led by KONGSBERG, combines the strengths of the three companies and brings together decades of missile development experience to create this highly advanced, long-distance, maneuverable supersonic strike missile for Norwegian, German, and Allied customers in the future.
The team will work closely with the Norwegian and German Defence Forces and their national research organizations to define and develop a highly advanced long-range strike capability to meet future surface threats.
According to Thomas Gottschild, Managing Director of MBDA Deutschland, the importance of stand-off weapons was demonstrated in the past two years and is crucial for credible deterrence and defence. Joining forces between our companies will strengthen the Norwegian, German, and European armed forces, improving the defense of our home nations.” “We will develop a game changer with 3SM that none of us could develop on our own.” Helmut Rauch, CEO of Diehl Defence added.
RAFAEL announces the launch of the X-Guard RT, the latest addition to its X-Guard family of reusable towed EW decoys for fighter aircraft, cargo planes, early warning and intelligence platforms, patrol aircraft, special missions platforms, and more.
According to a company official, the new towed decoy was developed in response to the lessons learned from recent conflicts, with air forces facing advanced and diverse Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) effective over long ranges, lack of intelligence on threats, and extended periods of lacking air dominance. The new towed decoy operates independently of the platform’s ECM system, thus enabling aircraft that previously operated far from perceived threats and, therefore, lacked self-protection to add effective CM using the X-Guard RT towed decoy. “We have overcome the great aero-mechanical challenges of making this unique towed EW system reusable, making it an affordable protection for most platforms.”
The X-Guard family boasts several key features enabling unique and effective protection for aerial platforms. As a towed EW decoy retractable during flight, it is reusable and a cost-effective solution that enables users to integrate more advanced techniques. Featuring extremely high transmission power and wide spatial coverage, the X-Guard offers exceptional EW protection capabilities. With minimal limitations on aircraft maneuverability, X-Guard RT supports a broad flight envelope, maintaining operational flexibility without degradation of in-flight performance.
Unlike previous generations and EW common decoys that rely on the aircraft’s EW systems for signal receiving and processing and use the decoy to transmit signals remotely of the aircraft, X-Guard RT operates independently, using an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) for receive and transmit with signal processing on board, without requiring support from the aircraft ECM. Operating across a wide frequency range with advanced Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) techniques, the decoy can match the transmitted signals to match the hostile radar and mimic the target’s profile, thus ensuring advanced threat detection and effective jamming against a broad spectrum of radar-guided threats. The decoy is fully programmable, enabling mission customization and adaptation to new threats. Enhanced with longer engagement times, the X-Guard RT allows wider protection coverage during missions.
Elbit Systems has rolled out the Hermes 650 Spark, the latest addition to its Hermes family of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS). The company has reported that this new model in the Hermes UAS portfolio delivers an advanced design with enhanced performance features and greater payload flexibility. The Hermes 650 Spark is designed to be the contemporary successor to the long-serving Hermes 450, aiming to modernize UAS fleets that currently consist of mixed 450/900 models or are exclusively equipped with the 450 variants.
A Long Legacy
In the 1990s, the Hermes 450 set a precedent in the tactical UAS domain with its slender body, pusher propeller, V-tail, and underwing hardpoints. The early 2000s saw the larger Hermes 900 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) build on this foundation, tailoring it for broader mission profiles by accommodating multiple payloads, thanks to its enlarged body, additional underwing hardpoints, and expanded payload bay. A decade later, the Starliner evolved these concepts further and became the first MALE UAS certified for unsegregated operation in civilian-controlled airspace.
The Spark represents a significant leap forward from the tactical Hermes 450 by adopting a mission-optimized aerodynamic design and featuring an aviation-certified forward engine, enhancing performance and spatial efficiency to support extended missions up to 24 hours. The newly designed configuration increases payload capacity by integrating versatile payload bays and multiple mounting points. Its mission performance is characterized by an extended range, heightened flight speed, increased endurance, and improved operational efficiency, enabling it to transport payloads up to 120 kg without impacting its extended flight duration.
With a maximum take-off weight of 650 kg, the Spark can transport a 260 kg payload to altitudes of 22,000 ft, maintaining operations at distances of 300 km within line of sight or farther when utilizing its integrated satellite communications uplink. The aircraft is powered by a potent 100-hp aviation-certified engine coupled with a variable-pitch, three-blade tractor propeller tailored for peak efficiency. The UAS can cruise at 120 knots towards the mission zone and sustain a 55-knot loitering speed above the target area, operating the engine at low RPM to maximize efficiency and endurance. Should more power be necessary, the robust engine can contend with up to 80 knots of headwinds.
Designed for autonomous operations, the Spark includes autonomous ground taxi capabilities and automated take-off and landing abilities, even in crosswinds of up to 25 knots. It requires only a 200m take-off strip and an 800m landing runway. Post-landing, the ground team can ready the UAS for its next mission within an hour, thanks to predictive maintenance and automated pre-flight protocols. Such efficiency leads to a lower Life Cycle Cost (LCC). The Spark can carry multiple advanced payloads, such as high-definition electro-optics (EO) for intelligence, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance missions, radar, and SIGINT systems, and is compatible with payloads currently used by the Hermes 450 and 900.
Future Plans
Development and flight testing of the Hermes 650 Spark is in progress, with the first deliveries forecasted for the following year. Upon deployment, it is expected to progressively replace Hermes 450 units in operational use for over three decades. Similarly to its predecessors, the Spark is designed to integrate seamlessly into mixed fleets alongside the Hermes 900 MALE UAS and the Starliner, ensuring high operational safety, resilience, and adaptability across various weather conditions to meet various mission demands. This integration is supported using standardized payloads, control systems, and ground support equipment.
In response to the necessity for UAS operation in civilian airspace, the Hermes 650 Spark has been developed from the ground up to meet NATO STANAG 4671 regulations, which stipulate the criteria for certifiable UAS. This strategy was initially realized with the company’s Starliner, developed from the Hermes 900, which achieved the distinction of being the first MALE UAS to be granted such certification in 2022.
Milrem Robotics, an Estonian company partly owned by the UAE based EDGE Group will equip the UAE Armed Forces with 60 Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), according to an official announcement released yesterday at the colsong day of the UMEX exhibition in Dubai and the International Armored Vehicles (IAV2024) conference in London, today. The contract includes 40 units of Milrem’s THeMIS UGVs and 20 units of the larger, tracked Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCV, formally known as TypeX) currently under development. The equipment will be part of the first operational trail program with the UAE armed forces, expected to be followed by a larger order on completion.
Under the terms of the contract, Milrem Robotics will lead an experimentation and trial program aimed at integrating unmanned ground capabilities into the UAE Armed Forces’ arsenal. This initiative is a significant step towards enhancing the Armed Forces’ combat capabilities through the deployment of THeMIS UGVs and tracked RCVs, which are both equipped with advanced autonomy features, third party payloads and high-quality communication solutions.
“EDGE Group’s investment in Milrem Robotics has opened new avenues for us in the region, further expanding our international growth and market presence.” Kuldar Väärsi, CEO of Milrem Robotics said. “This project highlights the strategic value of incorporating advanced robotic systems into force structure, thereby enhancing their combat capabilities and operational efficiency.”
The TypeX RCV weighs 12 tons and can carry a payload weight of up to four tons. At a weight of 1,630 kg, THeMIS carries a maximum payload of 1.2 tons. Both platforms will be equipped with 30mm guns. The tracked RCVs will receive an armored turret carrying the 30x173mm MK44 cannon, while the lighter THeMIS Combat units will be equipped with a weapon station mounting 30x113mm M230LF Remote Weapon Stations and with Indirect Fire Systems. THeMIS Observe units will be equipped with a mast-mounted radar and camera systems, including shot detection capabilities.
Under the contract Milrem Robotics will provide comprehensive training and supervision to ensure the relevant personnel achieve a satisfactory skill level in operating combat unmanned ground systems.
At the IAV 2024 event Milrem Robotics unveiled a new 8×8 wheeled platform developed for an international customer, believed to be EDGE. At the IDEX exhibition EDGE displayed a larger 8×8 RCV weighing 23 tons. This platform is believed to be replaced by the new platform currently under development at Milrem, that will weigh only 12 tons, and carry 3-5 tons of payload. At a length of six meters, width and height of 2.7 meters, the new wheeled platform will provide a similar surface area as the TypeX, but is expected to be more affordable than the Tracked RCV, be faster on road (110 km/h, compared to 80 km/h of TypeX), with maximum 50 km/h off road speed. Such an RCV will weigh about half the weight as comparable manned vehicle, but has the same, or even better performance, positioning it as an effective support platform for mechanized formations.
The U.S. Army has taken a significant step forward in modernizing its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities at the company level. In a recent announcement, the Army revealed its selection of two Small Uncrewed Aircraft...
Anduril Industries has recently introduced its new "Barracuda" family of autonomous cruise missiles, addressing air forces’ need for affordably increased stockpiles of precision weapons. The Barracuda missiles are currently in the company flight-testing phase....
BAE Systems Australia has introduced a wheeled uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) designed to support dismounted and mechanized forces in combat. The Autonomous Tactical Light Armour System (ATLAS) Collaborative Combat Variant (CCV) is an 8x8...
Dive into the latest global defense and military technology developments with Defense-Update Weekly News. Visit Defense-Update to dive deeper in this week's news:
Highlights:
New Russian EO/IR payload for drones
Ukraine's "Dragon's Breath" FPV drones
...
The Norwegian KONGSBERG Defense company secured a $95 million contract to supply Joint Strike Missiles (JSM) for Australia's F-35A aircraft, enhancing the country's long-range strike capabilities. Australia joins Norway, Japan, and the United States...