[ismember]FATEH 110 has been in development in Iran since 2002. It began after the Iranians have bought about 200 CSS-8 (DF-7) short range missiles from China in the late 1980s. Similar to the US Lance of the 1970s. While the payload weight (500 kg) was sufficient for Tehran, the range CSS-8 (90 nm – 166 km) was too short to satisfy the Iranians. Known as Tondar-69 SRBM, the new missile offered unprecedented ground mobility, enabling the missile to be moved to forward location unnoticed, evading enemy preemptive attack.[/ismember]
By the early 1990s the Chinese design evolved into the indigenously developed Zelzal II, under a joint program with Syria. The rocket’s 610mm diameter determined the new designation for the weapon – M600. Using larger propellant tank, the missile’s range was extended to 250km, but at these ranges, its course deviation would render the weapon useless attacking ground targets with any military significance.
Fateh 110 was designed to rectify this problem and turn the free-flight rocket into a ballistic missile that would improve its precision even at maximum range. The missile was fitted with an inertial guidance system (INS) and guidance system controlling four canards correcting the missiles’ trajectory, by nulling deviations caused by atmospheric conditions (wind, pressure) and propulsion irregularities. The missile was first tested in 2010, reached a distance of 200 km carrying a warhead of 650 kg.
[ismember]A year later this flight was followed by another test of a variant (called Khalij Fars) using electro-optically guidance, in addition to the INS, claimed to be capable of destroying naval vessels at a range of 200 km at sea. Earlier in 2014 the Iranians unveiled two new variants of the missile – an anti-radiation variant (radar killer) called Hormuz-1 and a new anti-ship version called Hormuz-2, which is likely to use an RF seeker instead of the EO/IR seeker originally used on Khalij Fars.[/ismember]
A fourth generation of the Fateh-110 was tested in 2012, demonstrating increased range (300km), increased payload (650 kg) improved precision and shorter reaction time. These missiles are now available with unitary warhead or cargo bay carrying up to 30 subminutions, each weighing 17 kg. [ismember]The missile is operated by Iran’s Republican Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Syrian strategic forces (designated ‘M-600 Tashreen’). Iranian engineers may have reduced the warhead size to 500 kilograms in order to increase the range to 350 kilometers.[/ismember]
Iran and Syria attempted several times to supply the the Iranian supported, Lebanese Hezbollah group with the missiles, some of those shipments were struck by Israel Air Force attacks. However, apparently some deliveries reached their destinations, as in November 2014 Hezbollah announced it has in its possession guided missiles with adequate precision and range to attack any target in Israel.
In the past Israel’s intelligence uncovered those ‘semi strategic’ threats – in 2006 these were the Zelzal 2 missiles delivered from Iran. All those missiles were destroyed during the first hours of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, as part of Israel’s retaliatory attack after the killing of four and abduction of two soldiers by Hezbollah on the Israel-Lebanon border. Since then it was reported that Hezbollah received several dozens of Scud D missiles from Syria, but, as liquid-propelled missiles, their operation would bee too slow, enabling the Israelis to strike them before they are launched.
Deliveries of advanced, precise solid-propelled missiles has been regarded by Israel as a ‘red line’, triggering preemptive response. In 2013 the Israel Air Force attacked a shipment of similar missiles near the airport in Damascus. In the past year, Israel is said to have attacked six missile-laden convoys, as well as missile storage sites, both in Syria and Lebanon, in a bid to prevent Syria from delivering ballistic missiles, anti-ship and anti-aircraft to Hezbollah.
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