Onyx – Autonomously Guided Parafoil System

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May 13, 2007

Onyx is an autonomously guided parafoil system designed to enable accurate aerial delivery from high altitudes of up to 35,000 ft and air-speeds up to 150 Knots Indicated Air Speed (KIAS). Maintaining a high glide ratio of over 4.5:1, Onyx can glide autonomously over a distance of 30 miles (44 km), and land its cargo on a preprogrammed target, within a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 100 meters. These systems are designed for operation from military fixed-wing and rotary aircraft such as a C-130 or C-17.

Onyx is a patented two-parachute (“hybrid”) precision airdrop system combining a high-efficiency, ram-air elliptical parafoil for autonomous guidance, and a round recovery parachute to achieve a reliably soft landing. This combination enables faster delivery through rapid descent and glide speed (up to 80 KTAS), thus reducing vulnerability to wind-induced errors and detection by the enemy, while maintaining soft landing. An advanced auto-pilot autonomously controls the system utilizing its on-board Global Positioning Satellite /Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) sensors and weather measurements conducted throughout the flight to navigate the system to a pre-programmed altitude and position, where a second, non-guided round recovery parachute deploys just prior to landing for a soft touchdown at its programmed point of impact.

The Onyx’s flight control system is equipped with adaptive control and flocking, swarming and collision avoidance capabilities enabling the Onyx to operate in dense airspace, simultaneously coordinating over 50 separate payloads, weighing up to 2,200 lbs each. With this technology, multiple Onyx systems (50+) with payloads ranging from small ground sensors or small munitions to mission-critical supplies can be deployed in the same airspace, guiding to one or multiple targets without the possibility of midair collisions. These algorithms operate in a fully decentralized fashion so that there is no need for a supervisory controller. Adaptive Control, an advanced self-learning method for flight control, enables Onyx systems to fly correctly with gross variances in wing loading, asymmetrically-rigged payloads caused by pre-flight rigging errors or cargo changes, and correct for damage induced while in flight.

Onyx can be operated with the JPADS-Mission Planner (MP) or through its proprietary base station software, which enables tracking of multiple systems. This Windows-based system presents tracks of several Onyxes in 2-D and 3-D maps, displayed in real-time during the flight or for post-analysis.

In 2006, Atair Aerospace was awarded a $3.2 million contract by the U.S. Army to supply the Onyx precision guided parachute systems for precision airdrop reliability and confidence testing. The U.S. Air force plans to modify a light version, known as Micro Onyx, to perform precision airdrop of sensor payloads and specialty munitions. The use of a parafoil over a small tail fin provides for significantly increased wing area allowing high standoff and the ability to be dropped from low speed cargo airplanes and even UAVs. Onyx systems are available in three payload configurations: Micro Onyx (0 to 20 lbs), Onyx 500 (0 to 500 lbs / 272 kg), and Onyx 2200 (500 to 2200 lbs / 0.27 – 1 ton).

SA-N-12

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May 13, 2007

The SA-N-12 (NATO code name Grizzly) is also used with the Buk M-1/2 (known by NATO as SA-11 Gadfly).

The 9M317E missile uses a dual-mode solid propellant motor and aerodynamic guidance. It is capable of sustaining dynamic loading up to 24 Gs.

The missile can engage targets at ranges between 3.5 and 32 km, and altitudes of 15 to 45,000 feet. It utilizes semi-active radar guidance to allow close-proximity intercepts of targets flying at speeds of up to 1,200 m/sec, and employs two methods (active impulse and semi-active proximity) to activate the fragmentation warhead when in close proximity to the target. Each missile weighs 715 kg, and has a warhead of 70kg. The missile’s length is 5.55 meters and the diameter is 40 cm.

Is Israel victimizing itself by its own openness?

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David Eshel

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May 13, 2007

Hezbollah won the Second Lebanon War by achieving a propaganda victory over Israel, a Harvard University study has concluded. Israel’s defeat came not at the hands of Hezbollah, however, but through the internal contradictions of being the region’s sole functioning democracy in the Internet age. “An open society, Israel, is victimized by its own openness,” Marvin Kalb and Dr. Carol Saivetz of the Shorenstein Center of Harvard University concluded in their research paper, “The Israeli Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict“.

The flagship of Hezbollah’s media empire is its TV satellite channel, Al-Manar, which was set up in 1991 with aid from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The channel’s broadcasts are slanted toward propaganda and reflect Hezbollah’s Iranian-inspired ideology and political agenda. To win its battle for hearts and minds, Hezbollah employs terminology expressing Iran’s extremist Shi’ite Islamic worldview. Special emphasis is put on fostering the values of jihad (holy war) and shahadah (death as a martyr for the sake of Allah) to justify the campaign of terrorism and guerilla warfare waged by Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations against Israel.

Unfortunately, western media, even including much of Israel’s, have ignored Hezbollah’s weak point- its complete dependence on Tehran’s radical Khomeinistic Shiite doctrine, which contradicts Hezbollah’s basic pragmatism- fighting for Lebanon’s nationalism.

Nevertheless, the organization waged a propaganda campaign using sophisticated psychological warfare to attack its Israeli target audience lowering public morale, cause panic, increase fear of its rocket fire and enhancing Hezbollah’s image as a strong opponent, possessing impressive operational capabilities.

Al-Manar TV, which survived and remained on the air, even after the Israeli air force bombed its building in a southern suburb of Beirut has broadcast factual information throughout the war, mixed shrewdly with propaganda about its rocket fire and the successes it achieved in battle. Devoid of any reciprocal media balance by Israel, Hezbollah’s broadcasts served as a source for international media. Hassan Nasrallah was interviewed six times during the war and his statements were often quoted, especially in Lebanon, other Middle Eastern countries and around the world. To a great extent, during the war he succeeded in taking over TV screens, even in Israel itself, thus achieving an enormous psychological advantage over the local media and its rather clumsy official spokespersons.

Hezbollah’s main propaganda achievements were the result of its ability to prevent foreign journalists, Arab and Western alike , from directly accessing the combat zones and thus keep real-time information away from them, making it impossible for them to cover only topics which were compatible with the organization’s propaganda strategy. According to a postwar study by the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center the myth of Hezbollah’s “divine victory” concept of the campaign, was based on three main elements:

The IDF’s failure to stop or significantly reduce Hezbollah rocket fire throughout the war;
The harsh internal criticism expressed for the IDF and the government when the war ended: the many failures and mistakes exposed were used and are still being used by Hezbollah as grist for its propaganda mill.
Israel’s achievements and Hezbollah’s failures in the war were not sufficiently emphasized within Israel itself because of overblown internal criticism. Therefore, they were not always picked up in Lebanon and the Arab world, with the result that they did not succeed in undermining Hezbollah’s victory myth.

However, as the dust settled in the months following the war, and as the Lebanese internalized the destruction wrought upon their country, the myth of the “divine victory” began to crack, as internal criticism increased because of the high price Lebanon was forced to pay for Hezbollah’s military escapade. Even Iran has voiced its displeasure over Nasrallah’s war, as it destroyed, much too prematurely, Tehran’s painfully constructed forward base, before Iran could use it as a viable deterrent against US-Israeli attacks on its ambitious nuclear program.

Unfortunately, the public mood within Israel’s society was already too much involved in the postwar campaign of self-internecine search for culcables, to exploit the opportunity, which already presented itself on it’s neighbor’s doorstep.

The reason for Israel’s strange behavior lies in a fundamental development, which has evolved over decades and exacerbated since Saddam Hussein’s Scud offensive on Israel’s rear, in Spring 1991.

In his highly provocative lecture, during last week’s Annual Conference for National Security held by the Herzliya-based Fisher Brother’s Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, Dr. Guy Bechor made some soul-searching observations over the new Arab concept in fighting Israel’s military might. Dr Bechor, a leading Israeli expert in Arab affairs, expounded, that once the Arab regimes and organizations around Israel had concluded, that a classic military war waged by an Arab army against the IDF power base, would inevitably bring about their defeat, such option was no longer feasible. Some nations, like Egypt and Jordan, opted for peace with Israel by lack of choice, while others, and particularly Islamic organizations, started seeking a new method of warfighting. The result was a rather sophisticated “resistance” model that was used in the last Intifada and during the Second Lebanon War, shifting the fighting from classic military confrontation to the Israeli home front, using missiles, rockets and especially the notorious, but highly successful, suicide bombers reaping havoc in Israeli cities.

Inevitably, the impact of missiles and rockets on Israel’s public consciousness has been overrated beyond its actual effectiveness, enhanced mostly by irresponsible media reports. The sober fact indicates that during Operation Desert Storm 1991, with 39 Scuds targeting Israel, the total of the launched missiles that landed on Israel’s territory, while causing extensive property damage, resulted only in two directly related deaths. In addition to two deaths by Scud shrapnel, a total of seven Israelis died of suffocation from improper use of their gas masks.

At the time, civilian reaction while serious, did not cause not panic, due to the impression that US coalition was fighting its war for them in Iraq and that the leadership had matters under control. There was also a lull between attacks, which enabled conducting normal life in between missile alerts.

The situation altered considerably last summer. During that war, from July 13 to August 13, Israel Police reported 4,228 rocket impacts inside Israel from rockets fired by Hezbollah. No geographical area in the world has sustained such a large quantity of rocket strikes since the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s. Public reaction was devastating. Over a million Israelis were huddling in shelters, for nearly six weeks, no central control was visible and panic raged, as there were insufficient pre-impact warnings given, enabling normal life conduct in between alerts.

However, two important facts were withheld from the public: Most rockets fired by Hezbollah at Israel were taken from the Syrian arsenals rather than from Iran and only one-fourth of the rockets that landed within Israel actually landed within built-up areas. Compared to the massive barrage, sustained over nearly six weeks, the results were rather unimpressive. Israel’s losses and damage from Hezbollah rocket attacks included civilian 53 fatalities, 250 severely wounded, and 2,000 lightly wounded, mostly Post Traumatic Stress victims. There was extensive damage to hundreds of dwellings, several public utilities, and dozens of industrial plants. But the most damaging aspect was that over one million Israelis were forced to live near or in shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000 civilians evacuating the high-risk north, relocating to other areas in the country, considered safe. The latter became one of the reasons for the public outrage over Ehud Olmert’s deplorable conduct of the war.

Still, much could have been saved, if Israel’s leadership had excreted its control over the media. Hezbollah was able to skillfully exploit the technological innovations wrought by the internet and the demands of the international news cycle, by constructing the narrative story line for the “first really ‘live’ war in history”, where “the camera and the computer” became unrestricted “weapons of war.” As a tight, centrally controlled sect, Hezbollah retained almost total grip of the daily message of journalism and propaganda, thus shrewdly manipulating its image to the world. No reporter was allowed into the zone of battle by Hezbollah media agents, which kept strictly manipulated control over any visits to places where maximum damage was inflicted on what seemed civilian properties.

On the Israeli side, the situation was chaotic. While officials made mostly awkward and ineffective efforts to control and contain media coverage, these essentially failed and the press quickly gained unfettered access to the battlefield. Network anchors, representing cable TV operations, ranging from Al Jazeera to Fox news, managed to set up their cameras along the Israeli-Lebanese border, right along IDF forces going in and out of Lebanon. The result was devastating to public morale, which was bombarded by uncensored information, usually incorrect, or even manipulative, by rating-competitive news networks. “In strictly military terms, Israel did not lose to Hezbollah in this war, but it clearly did not win. In the war of information, news and propaganda, the battlefield central to Hezbollah’s strategy, Israel lost this war,” Kalb and Saivetz concluded in their study.

A closed society can control the image and the message that it wishes to convey to the rest of the world is, by far more effectively than that of an open democratic society, especially one engaged in an existential struggle for its survival. Under critical situations, like asymmetric warfare, a democratic society quickly becomes the victim of its own openness. During the war, no Hezbollah secrets were disclosed, but in Israel secrets were constantly leaked, rumors spreading like wildfire, so that leaders frequently felt obliged to issue ill-prepared and hasty statements, often based on incomplete knowledge. Journalists and pseudo-experts were driven by competing news networks to publish and broadcast unsubstantiated information, contradicting factual information-with devastating moral effect on the public. An open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality, rumor, self criticism and irresponsible revelation, normally will convey the impression of total disorder, chaos and uncertainty. Under these circumstances, Israel became unfortunately “victimized by its own openness.”

This deplorable situation inevitably brought about serious repercussions, which could become critical in a future crisis situation. Much of this perception is brought about by the unfettered revelations of the Winograd Commission reports. Results can already be clearly visible in the reaction of the Arab world.

“The Winograd report stressed that Hezbollah was victorious and that Israel is beatable,” a senior spokesman for the Iranian-backed group told the organization’s Al-Manar television channel. In fact, the shockwaves going through Israel, like the commissions of inquiry, political turmoil and social instability are already enhancing Nasrallah’s perception, which aims to see Israeli democracy destroying itself. Nasrallah and his Iranian mentors clearly believe that the most important aspect is to shift the war deep into Israeli territory “and to pierce its castle walls.” The shockwaves in Israel, the outcry and the loss of a sense of security already mark a psychological triumph for Islamic Jihad”.

While all this is going on, senior analysts warn, the Israeli society is unfortunately busy as usual, with internal battles, cruelly tearing off its own limbs in regarding the past and with self -hate, whose origins are hard to fathom, all this, while the imminent threats are already clearly visible.

The Iranian deputy interior minister has explicitly warned, that in the event of an American attack, Iran would fire tens of thousands of missiles at Israel; Syria is moving and positioning thousands of missiles close to the border with Israel; Hezbollah has completed the replenishment of its missiles and rockets arsenal, which is capable of striking at the heart of Israel and Hamas has transferred tons of explosives and rockets into the Gaza Strip in an attempt to create a balance of power with the IDF.

The dominant question is therefore asked by military experts, whether the IDF is capable of fighting a multi-frontal war within a foreseeable time. Under its new chief, Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi, the IDF is investing huge efforts to recover its basic operational faculties. Filling the gaps in emergency depots and holding large-scale, realistic military exercises, with combined forces is now the high-priority order-of-the-day. But there are some crucial issues which have to be resolved without delay. Can Israel’s political leadership sustain another crisis management, without taking some drastic steps to redress the recent failures? Does Israel have its own missile arsenal for creating an adequate and viable deterrence against Iran, Syria or other “rogue” nations, which might still provoke a military foray, taking advantage of Israel’s ostensive weakness? There are no simple answers to these questions, but some of these will, no doubt, be found in Washington.

Projectile Detection and Cueing (PDCue)

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May 11, 2007

AAI’s Projectile Detection and Cueing (PDCue) system uses a tetrahedral array, or conformal microphones distributed at the four corners of the vehicle. The conformal system assembly is more expensive but provides better accuracy and redundancy and is better suited for remote weapon station application. The system displays a situational map on a console, depicting the vehicle and relative location of the sources of fire identified. The system can operate on moving or stationary vehicles.

PASSM – Precision Attack, Air-to-Surface Missile

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May 10, 2007

Raytheon unveiled new details about the Precision Attack, Air-to-Surface Missile (PASSM), under development addressing future requirements for airborne multi-sensor precision attack weapons designed against a target set including armored vehicles and buildings, hardened bunkers and small naval targets. PASSM will use the current Hellfire rail launchers, enabling simple integration with AH-64 Apache and Longbow and Super Cobra attack helicopters and MH-60B naval helicopters.

It will use the Hellfire’s M299 launcher but will offer electro-optical (EO) based “fire and forget” capability, providing pilots the advantage of extending stand-off engagement range of 20 km, well beyond the range of short range air defenses. The missile will be equipped with the tri-mode seeker technology developed by Raytheon for the Joint Common Missile (JCM) and Precision Attack Missile (PAM) program, enabling fully autonomous engagement as well as laser designation capability. The seeker is designed for lock-on after launch to optimize long range lethality for attack helicopters.

The missile length is expected to be 63-66 inch, weighing 115-120 pounds. The diameter will be 7 inch multi-mode seeker developed under a U.S. Army system design demonstration (SDD) program. The missile shares much of the technologies developed for the Precision Attack Missile. Each missile will be fitted with a radio, establishing itself as a “node” on the battlefield network. This capability will enable it to receive targeting from multiple on-board and remote sources. A new motor will be used, to reduce flight time and increase range. Motor modularity will enable propulsion improvements as part of the missile’s life cycle.

UAV Wing Gets Predator Simulators

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May 10, 2007

The US Air Force received five Predator Mission Aircrew Training System (PMATS). By June 2007 seven PMATS systems will be based at the Creech Air Force Base in Indian Springs, NV to support the newly established 432nd unmanned systems wing, the first US Air Force wing totally dedicated to Predator and Reaper operations. L-3 Link is a division of L-3 Communications (NYSE: LLL). The simulator enables Predator UAS pilots and sensor operators to undergo fully immersive, mission-based simulated training exercises.

“The high fidelity training provided by PMATS units will enable the U.S. Air Force to rely less on live flight training, enable Predator crews to increasingly practice procedures to counter potentially catastrophic emergencies and conduct networked training exercises aimed at combating the Global War on Terrorism.” said Mike Wallace, Vice President for Air Force and Navy Programs at L-3 Link Simulation and Training.

High fidelity training delivered by PMATS units is the result of L-3 Link’s simulation software being integrated with the Predator’s actual operational flight program software and ground control station hardware. The simulated synthetic environment takes into account time of day, winds, adverse weather and thermal effects.

As presently designed, PMATS provides high fidelity modeling of the Predator MQ-1 aircraft platform, sensors and weapons. Plans call for PMATS to be enhanced in 2008 to provide simulation of the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft system. The simulation software backbone L-3 Link provides also can be used to support future generations of the Predator and other unmanned aircraft systems.

Obstacle Avoidance radar for Military Helicopters

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May 10, 2007

Prototype obstacle warning radar, developed at BAE Systems has completed flight testing on a helicopter. The system can operate under all-weather conditions, identifying cables and other obstacles, indicating the pilot the precise altimeter information necessary to negotiate the obstacle through combat flight maneuvering. The system detects cables and other obstacles using low-probability-of-intercept, low-probability-of-detection radar technology.

BAE Systems developed the test program with input from multiple government agencies and performed the evaluation in Arlington, Texas, using Bell Helicopter’s new 430 test aircraft. The system weighs less than 8 pounds, plus antennas, and can detect unknown obstacles at distances greater than 2.5 km. BAE Systems also is developing a commercial version of the system. Elbit System’s El-OP and EADS have already introduced laser based obstacle avoidance systems, developed for similar applications.

Sikorsky Selects CH-53K Fuselage Supplier Team

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May 10, 2007

Sikorsky Aircraft announced today that it has selected four subcontractors to design and fabricate the major fuselage sections for its new CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter currently under development for the United States Marine Corps. Sikorsky’s Fuselage Team will consist of Aurora Flight Sciences, EDO Corp., GKN Aerospace, and Spirit AeroSystems. Sikorsky will conduct the integration and test program on the complete fuselage structure. The major subcontracted sections include the cockpit and cabin (Spirit), aft transition (GKN), tail rotor pylon and sponsons (EDO), and main rotor pylon (Aurora).

The USMC is expected to replace 156 current CH-53E Super Stalion helicopters with the CH-53K aircraft. The CH-53K will maintain virtually the same footprint as the CH-53E but will nearly double the payload to 27,000 pounds over 110 nautical miles under “hot high” ambient conditions. The CH-53K’s maximum gross weight will increase to 84,700 pounds from 72,500 pounds for the CH-53E.

The CH-53K also is expected to result in reduced operation and support costs. Upgrades include joint interoperable glass cockpit; fly-by-wire flight controls; fourth generation rotor blades with anhedral tip; low-maintenance elastomeric rotorhead; gross weight expansion; upgraded engine system; cargo rail locking system; external cargo handling improvements; and survivability enhancements.

TRACER: Counter-Concealment Radar for the Reaper

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May 10, 2007

A synthetic aperture radar system with the capability to operate in all types of weather, day or night, is one step closer to providing warfighters with high resolution reconnaissance imagery. A recent review has concluded that the Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] Tactical Reconnaissance and Counter-Concealment Enabled Radar (TRACER) system is acceptable for integration onto manned and unmanned aerial platforms.

The Critical Design Review (CDR) focused on the design and integration details associated with the radar’s operation on an unmanned aerial system and concluded that the TRACER podded design is acceptable for use on the Predator B platform. The review was conducted for the United States Army Communications-Electronic Research Development and Engineering Center Intelligence and Information Warfare Directorate (I2WD). This successful CDR paves the way for the first flight of TRACER on an unmanned aerial vehicle scheduled for late summer.

TRACER addresses the Army’s critical need to identify hidden targets, enemy equipment and facilities. Incorporating both a VHF and UHF band within the synthetic aperture radar system, TRACER provides images to ground units in all-weather, day or night conditions. The system also incorporates provisions for a data link that allows airborne processed results to be down-linked to ground stations immediately. The system’s design is predicated on Lockheed Martin’s proven foliage penetration (FOPEN) technology. FOPEN was developed specifically to detect vehicles, buildings, and large metallic objects in broad areas of dense foliage, forested areas, camouflage netting and wooded terrain. It will be able to spot suspicious cavities, which could be used for used for weapon caches in building or underground or explosive charges buried at roadsides. TRACER will able to provide long-range, wide area detection of targets under camouflage, concealment & deception (CC&D) conditions, and support wide area mapping in complex environments.

In 2007 Lockheed Martin has been selected to provide the TRACER capability to the United States Army. Under this contract, Lockheed Martin will work with the Army to incorporate low frequency synthetic aperture radar systems into Predator class unmanned aerial vehicles. The total value of the TRACER contract is approximately $40M.

The 32 months program includes the development, integration and test of two VHF/UHF dual-band synthetic aperture radar systems, which will be integrated into Predator class unmanned aerial vehicles. The system will process raw radar data on-board in near real-time processing change detection and possibly orthorectification to provide accurate geo-location of targets. These dual-band synthetic aperture radars can provide images to ground units in all-weather, day or night conditions and incorporate a data link that allows processed results to be downlinked to ground stations immediately. The TRACER ground station element will provide the target reports, with appropriate time-tag, geolocation and other information.

Developed under the sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force in the late 1990’s, the FOPEN system has successfully flown hundreds of missions.

Israel’s Postwar Commission Urges: Crisis Management Imperative

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David Eshel

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May 8, 2007

A major issue, which the Winograd Investigatory Commission emphasized repeatedly in their April 30 Interim Report, is largely contributed to the failures and weakness of high-level staff work at the decision-making process of the political leadership. In a democratic state, it should be irrelevant whether the man at the top is a seasoned military veteran, or a civilian with the necessary faculties to lead a nation in peace and war. Therefore a strong crisis management team, manned by professionals, having the trust and loyalty of the supreme leadership, now seems imperative, based on the dubious results of last summer’s Second Lebanon War and its aftermath.

This article will deal merely with these issues, intentionally ignoring all aspects of the many military and political topics, which the commission raised, which will be dealt in an analysis when the final report will be published in late Summer 2007.

“This weakness (in crisis management) existed under all previous prime ministers and this continuing failure is the responsibility of these prime ministers and their cabinets. The current political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the security system that could have helped it.”

Quotation from the Winograd Report:

As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:

a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel’s challenges, and orderly procedures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.

b. Full incorporation of the Foreign Ministry in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.

c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security Council, the establishment of a national assessment team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister’s Office.

The enigma of a non-functioning National Security Council

There is no legal provision for a National Security Council in Israel as there is in the US and in other countries in different forms. Founding the committee may have just been the leadership’s way of paying lip service to the idea, following the tragic security events in Israel. Therefore, due to lack of a systematized official system for handling strategic planning at the political top, the only forum which carries almost absolute weight on security issues is the army. Professor Yehezkel Dror, an outspoken member of the Winograd Committee claims that Israel has no comprehensible, competent, strategic doctrine, and the executive branch is devoid of any grand strategic conception. In spite of its national defense doctrine being top priority in a high-threat environment, past Israeli governments and security authorities have taken vital decisions at times of stress without profound analysis, while looking only at short time considerations from a narrow perspective, the professor deplores.

On June 19, 1996, twenty two years after the unimplemented Agranat Commission Report, then newly elected prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu began his first full day in office by establishing the National Security Council (NSC). Unfortunately, Netanyahu dropped the plan because then-defense minister Yizhak Mordechai, a retired general, feared that the NSC would infringe on his sphere of responsibility. It was a serious mistake, unfortunately not the first nor the last in a long line of Israeli decisions. However, when Mordechai was ousted from office, Netanyahu reinstated the NSC, after appointing his former mentor Professor Moshe Arens, a civilian, as defense minister. Unfortunately, the nomination was short-termed, as Netanyahu soon lost his seat to former chief-of-staff Ehud Barak, who took over in 1999. During his term, NSC functionimg again deteriorated, with Barak relying on his own faculties in all defense issues.

Altogether, the formulation of Israeli national security policies has tended to be quite a haphazard affair. It has always owed more to the random predilections of individual political leaders and generals than to a systematic process of reasoned analysis. Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion made some attempts at sketching a national security strategy, integrating political and military elements, during the first years following the creation of the Jewish state. But the exercise was never formalized. More important, no institutional framework was established in order to facilitate its repetition. The absence of a well-entrenched national security council that might examine and formalize a long-term security concept was to cost Israel dearly over decades. Nevertheless, opposition on the part of the IDF leadership and successive Ministers of Defense with personal military experience, obstructed this initiative until 1999. Even thereafter its formation, resistance remained powerful enough to emasculate the skeleton body which was finally established.

Strangely perhaps, the most serious casualty suffering from this deplorable situation has been the IDF itself. In retrospect its very short-sighted policy backfired on the military establishment in many ways. Foremost was the lack of a sound administration body, not subordinated to the dominant Finance Ministry, which brought about the annual haggling over the defense budget. Bereft of clear national guidelines for a multi-year budget, based on sound strategic assessments, the Defense Department was forced to argue each year anew, with periodic dialogues stressing its needs. Generals were virtually forced to function on a hand-to-mouth agenda, instead of operating within a conceptualized set of principles, guided by clear national priorities and missions, which had been worked out by an independent, apolitical staff, consulting to the top political leadership.

A strong functioning National Security Council is Imperative to Israel’s Decision making process

Unfortunately, as the Winograd Report states, on July 12th, Olmert’s decision-making proved extremely demanding. In regard to Olmert’s “hasty” and “faulty” decision-making process, the report concludes that the prime minister was led by the army and predominantly by its chief of staff, who equally shunned his general staff on alternative options, the report stressed. Olmert did not demand the IDF to present alternatives, nor ask the questions expected of him, to clarify the Army’s strategic intentions. In addition, Olmert was unable to create a political horizon conducive to ending the conflict. All these questions, which became crucial under critical circumstances, could have been submitted in a orderly procedure by professional staff work of a National Security Council, having the trust of and loyalty to the prime minister.

Nobody knows the inherent weaknesses of the NSC better than retired Major General Uzi Dayan. Former deputy chief of staff, Dayan became council’s director under the dominant prime minister Ariel Sharon: stepping into the job with high hopes in 2000, but leaving in frustration two years later. Sharon, constantly under severe paranoia because of his coalition members, adhered solely to the advice of his trusted aides – all devoid, unfortunately, of defense-related experience. Sharon, himself a seasoned warrior, took his own decisions in a crisis situation; however, not always the right one, as the notorious aftermath of his unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 clearly demonstrated.

General Dayan was not the only NSC director to quit his post in dismay. No less than three consecutive directors did the same, the last being Major General Giora Eiland, a brilliant strategist who formally tendered his resignation in August 2005. His presence was sorely missed during the following summer crisis in July 2006!?Not that there are legally established political bodies lacking in Israel’s political establishment to fill in the gap. On paper, there are three: the National Security Council, the Foreign Ministry and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and its highly prestigious sub-committee for secret affairs. Leading Knesset members participating in the committee meetings are of senior military rank, including former chiefs of staff and highly experienced generals. However, their conclusions are usually ignored by political decision-makers, subjected to coalition constraints and politically undermined with notorious leaks to the media. If Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is serious about implementing the Winograd Committee’s recommendations, the time may be ripe for creating an effective National Security Council, former NSC head Giora Eiland told The Jerusalem Post last Tuesday. However, based on the past, analysts consider such implementation in full highly dubious.

In the final chapter of the interim report, entitled “Institutional Recommendations,” the committee wrote: “It is urgently essential to strengthen staff work so that the prime minister will be able to make more educated professional decisions in diplomatic-security affairs. Israel already has such an institution, the National Security Council, but it is vital to rebuild it into an effective system- determined by law.” Dr. Chuck Freilich was Israel’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Foreign Affairs. In a recent article Dr. Freilich aired his discontent over Israel’s top political decision-making process. “If the determination to see the war through to its painful end was lacking – and in broad terms the price was known in advance – the government should have gone through the motions, made some limited response to show its “displeasure” and waited for more propitious circumstances,” Freilich stressed. In his words, the six-year-long state of tenuous “calm”, despite periodic flare-ups on the Lebanese border, was ultimately untenable but acceptable until Israel chose the right time to retaliate. Undoubtedly, Israeli restraint would have strengthened Hezbollah’s stature even more and encouraged further provocations. But the timing could have been Israel’s choosing and then more fully prepared, both militarily and in terms of strategic goals.

This constraint actually paid off once in Israel’s history: On the eve of the 1967 Six Day War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol vehemently defied a near military coup by his general staff who tried to force him into an early war against Egypt. Eshkol weathered the attack, biding his time, until all his efforts for a diplomatic solution were exhausted. When Israel finally attacked after a three weeks waiting period, with the forces fully mobilized and trained, this tactic brought about a resounding success on all fronts. ?According to Dr Freilich, neither Prime Minister Olmert nor Defense Minister Peretz had time to learn the complexities of the Lebanon issue or the limitations of the IDF’s capability of dealing with it. Israeli political decision-makers, wishing to learn from other nations’ handling of strategic crisis management par excellence, should study the late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s admirable conduct of the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis, a real cliffhanger which prevented a global nuclear conflict only through wise statesmanship, aided by a sound consultation team process.

WIN-T -Warfighter’s Information Network – Tactical

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May 5, 2007

WIN-T is the Army’s on-the-move, high-speed, high-capacity backbone communications network, linking warfighters on the tactical ground units with commanders and the Global Information Grid, the U.S. Dept. of Defense’s worldwide network- centric information system. WIN-T is a critical enabler of LandWarNet, the Army’s far-reaching effort to transform into joint, network-centric, knowledge-based warfare; the network provides a clear operational picture for theater combatant commanders by using true satellite on-the-move capabilities, robust network management and high-bandwidth radio systems to keep mobile forces connected, communicating and synchronized.

The $10 billion WIN-T program is under development by Team Matrix. Prime contractor is General Dynamics leading a team including Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Harris Corporation, L-3 Communications and Cisco Systems.

The first Army unit is scheduled to field WIN-T by 2008, replacing the Mobile Subscriber Unit system. WIN-T provides secure, high-speed, high capacity backbone for the objective force C2. The network will expand the bandwidth and networking capability available to mobile users, from theater to battalion level and below. With WIN-T, commanders will be able to maintain constant battlefield situational awareness on-the-move, and will be able to better synchronize their combat power. The environment established with WIN-T will enable commanders at all echelons to collaborate, operating with ‘virtual staff’ and analytical centers operated at remote locations throughout the battlespace. Unlike most current military networks, WIN-T will offer seamless interoperability with other networks, including legacy, joint, coalition and even commercial networks, utilizing all available links to support the warfighters anywhere on the globe. The system will utilize commercially available elements and will be able to integrate with existing systems as well as and new, with dedicated systems designed specifically for the military.

Due to the system’s configuration and adaptability, WIN-T is expected to support high maneuverability of the forces, with full on-the-move, broadband communications capability. The system supports dynamic bandwidth allocation with satellite communications on-the-move implemented with self-healing, self-forming network. The system will comprise standard elements such as wireless networks supporting voice over IP (VOIP) communications, with support quality of service (QOS) functionality, over IPv4 and IPv6. THE SYSTEM SUPPORTS information assurance and dissemination technologies, mobile computing, and will integrate the new Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS), personal communication devices and small satellite links. All network elements are designed for C-130 aircraft deployment and for rapid activation after landing.

By December 2005 the system demonstrated key capabilities such as on-the-move networking over terrestrial (line of sight) and satellite (non-line of sight) links; voice-, video- and data-over-IP; self-healing network properties; satellite tracking and adaptive signal retrieval; network operations with real-time situational awareness; network security; secure cellular communications, and; collaboration tools reaching from commanders to foot soldiers.

In January 2008 WIN-T passed an important field test last month, as General Dynamics C4 Systems and teammate Lockheed Martin have successfully completed the engineering field test and preliminary design review for Increment Two phase of the WIN-T system. The new system provides a mobile broadband network extending the functionality, tools and collaboration used in stationary command post to forward elements on-the-move. WIN-T Increment Two fielding is scheduled to begin in 2009 following the completion of a limited user tests scheduled for 2008. Increment Three includes development of WIN-T components to meet the full range of network capacity, security and fully on-the-move capabilities for the modular force, with limited user testing scheduled to begin in 2011. Increment Three also addresses the size, weight, power and cooling requirements for systems in Future Combat Systems vehicles. WIN-T Increment Four represents the last of the developmental program elements and will provide technology insertions to enable enhanced satellite communications protection and greater throughput afforded by transformational communications satellites.

The recent tests evaluated the new network centric waveform developed for WIN-T, which enables mobile platforms to access the WIN-T network; the Highband Networking Waveform, a wideband, wireless wide area networking capability; and the WIN-T Network Management System, which uses commercial-standard network and systems management protocols and interfaces to provide the necessary automation to keep mobile forces networked. Increment Two Network Management System uses Increment One building blocks, adds features to enable network mobility and manages the entire tactical network enterprise.

The test was followed by the preliminary design review, a detailed analysis of the system design to determine that it meets the documented performance and engineering requirements, was conducted in Foxboro, Mass.

XM242 Fuze

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May 5, 2007

ATK and IMI teamed to produce the XM242 fuses replacing the M223 fuses in existing M42/M46 grenades forming current DPICM ammunition. This fuse utilizes dual activation mechanisms, by impact and pyrotechnic delay ensuring self destruct after impact, therefore ensuring reliability of over 99%. If failed, unexploded ordnance is self-neutralized for maximum safety.

IMI has already produced over 80 million self destruct fuses deployed with many NATO armies, but, unfortunately, not with the Israeli forces which relied primarily on ammunition delivered under the U.S. Asistance package. According to Israeli sources The IDF used cluster munitions of different types, mostly of US origin, during the second Lebanon War. Only part of these munitions was equipped with locally produced (IMI) self-destruct fuses. Use of these advanced fuses could have contributed to a “cleaner” battlefield after the end of the hostilities, preventing the hazard to UNIFIL explosive ordnance teams, as well as to civilian lives and properties currently experienced in this area.

MaXess Military Wireless LAN System

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May 2, 2007

MaXess provides real-time, broadband intra-command wireless LAN, supporting rich multimedia communications between the elements of a command posts. The system supports two operating modes – MW-LAN supports networking at 1, 2, 5.5 and 11 Mbps transfer rates, including forward error correction, over intra-command post wireless LAN, over a range of 0.25 square kilometer (500×500 meters).

The system uses modified COTS IEEE 802.11b wireless LAN technology in a PCMCIA card or external WLAN module, to link tens of users over a network forming over ad-hoc protocols, utilizing self-healing and dynamic control, with flexible frequency band selection, to support unicast, multicast and broadcast communications. A different application is the EMW-LAN, utilizing WLAN and a power amplifier module, the system supports company and battery level “wireless on the move” data communications applications. This network can span over 25 square kilometers (5×5 km) and up to 30 km, with directional antenna. EMW-LAN supports the same data transfer rates as MW-LAN.

Micro-Air Vehicles to Get Nav-Aids Based on Insects, Bats Senses

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May 1, 2007

Aurora Flight Sciences has been awarded a contract to develop navigation and control technology that will allow micro air vehicles (MAVs) to avoid collisions as they fly through urban and other cluttered environments. Due to their small size, MAVs hold great potential for providing valuable military intelligence while avoiding detection and destruction.

Vision-based techniques derived from insects will enable negotiation through a near-field environment of relatively large obstacles. Bat-inspired echolocation sensors will be used for active sensing of imminent collisions. These sensing techniques will be integrated with Aurora-developed navigation and maneuvering strategies to create a highly sensitive, robust, autonomous system in a package suitable for the low size, weight and power constraints that are inherent to MAVs. “The technology that Aurora will develop under this SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] will allow MAVs to robustly navigate through very complex and cluttered environments” explains Dr. Thomas Vaneck, Aurora’s Vice President of Research and Development.

Safe navigation through urban environments requires the ability to avoid both stationary objects (such as buildings, wires, poles and trees) and moving objects (such as cars, trucks and people). Each obstacle may present a different potential danger to the MAV, and must be dealt with accordingly. Since buildings and other urban obstructions often limit or completely block communications between the MAV and the ground troops, the MAV must have the onboard capability to autonomously navigate the hazards. Such a capability would allow MAVs to look under objects that might be blocked from view from up above, look in windows or doors, or simply view things from a different, more advantageous perspective.

Aurora is partnering with Professor Sean Humbert and Professor Timothy Horiuchi, both of the University of Maryland, leveraging their expertise in bio-inspired sensing to create the technology that will allow MAVs to traverse urban areas without collision. This capability will enable unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in environments in which enemy forces, assets, and activities are hidden or obscured.

Defense-UpdateMilitary Technology & Defense News

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