Wednesday, November 13, 2024
More
    Home Blog Page 339

    U.S. Army Orders Ravens for SOCOM & Other Services

    The U.S. Army exercised an option for additional procurement of RQ-11B Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) from AeroVironment, Inc. (NASDAQ: AVAV). The total award value is $45.8 million. Each Raven system typically consists of three aircraft, a ground control station, system spares, and related services. and is fully funded.

    Hand launched Raven RQ-11AThe SUAS program of record provides the Raven hand-launched aerial sensor systems for the Army and Marine Corps. The additional contract will provide for additional supplies supporting Special Operations Command and other U.S. military services.

    Raven is a 4.2-pound, backpackable, hand-launched sensor platform that provides day and night, real-time video imagery for “over the hill” and “around the corner” reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition in support of tactical units. U.S. armed forces use Ravens extensively for missions such as base security, route reconnaissance, mission planning and force protection. Raven can be operated manually or programmed for autonomous operation, utililizing the system’s advanced avionics and precise GPS navigation. With a wingspan of 4.5 feet and a weight of 4.2 pounds, the hand-launched Raven provides aerial observation, day or night, at line-of-sight ranges up to 10 kilometers. The Raven delivers real-time color or infrared imagery to the ground control and remote viewing stations. According to the U.S. Army, Ravens were flown for approximately 150,000 combat hours in 2007. To date Sofar AeroVironment has delivered more than 8,000 small unmanned aircraft, most of them Ravens.

    A US Air Force team prepares to launch a Raven SUAS. Photo: US Air Force

    EPX – Studying a Future SIGINT Platform for the US Navy

    The U.S. Navy awarded three industry teams $1.25 million five month contracts (each), to help develop the system concept for the Navy’s EPX – the future manned SIGINT platform expected to replace the current EP-3. Planned as a replacement for the EP-3 Aries aircraft, the EPX will be a manned multi-mission, multi-intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T) platform. EPX will support carrier strike groups at sea and theater, combatant and national commanders, operating from shore based forward operating locations. The EPX would assume the role of the Navy’s EP-3E aircraft and provide greatly expanded capabilities. The EPX will operate in concert with other maritime patrol and reconnaissance platforms, such as Broad Area Maritime Surveillance and the P-8A Poseidon.

    “These contracts will allow industry to work with the Navy to analyze the current requirements for the EPX system and will further develop the concepts, cost and schedule for the program,” said Capt. Joe Rixey, Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft program manager. “These contractors will help us determine the technical criteria necessary to build a strong foundation for the EPX program.”

    One team receiving the contracts is led by the Boeing Company, partnering with Argon ST. Boeing is also the prime contractor for the P-8 Posedon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircrraft (MMA), the successor or the P-3C Orion maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft. “as the prime contractor for that program we can leverage logistics, maintenance, support, training and other relevant data.” said Paul Summers, Boeing director of airborne SIGINT campaigns.

    Another team led by Northrop Grumman joined by L3 Communications. Northrop Grumman is a major supplier of special-mission aircraft for the US Navy, particularly the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. L3 Com was the prime contractor for the EP-3E. “This competition is about more than replacing an aircraft,” said Patricia McMahon, vice president of Information Operations and Electronic Attack for Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Systems sector. “It’s about transforming Navy warfighters’ ability to perform the ISR&T mission and share that information with joint and allied forces.

    A third contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin, the original manufacturer of the P-3 platform and supplier of the Navy’s S-3B Viking, carrier-based aerial refueller and anti-submarine aircraft.

    Following completion of concept refinement, the Navy will solicit proposals and select contractors for the technology development phase of the program. The Navy is expected to down-select to one contractor for the EPX system development and demonstration phase in late 2011 or early 2012.

    The first completed P-3C to EP-3E conversion aircraft departs from the L-3 Communications modification facility in Waco, and heads to Naval Air Station Patuxent River for testing and fleet training. EP-3E JMOD Common Configuration spiral one ForceNet equipment suite. Photo: US Navy

    World’s Most Powerful Electromagnetic Railgun Tested by the U.S. Navy

    The U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research successfully conducted a record-setting firing of an electromagnetic rail-gun at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA. The new technology demonstrated in the recent test uses high power electromagnetic energy instead of chemical energetic (explosive) propellants to accelerate a projectile farther and faster than any preceding gun. At full capability, a future rail gun will be able to fire a projectile more than 200 nautical miles (ten times farther than current Mk 45 five inch guns) at a muzzle velocity of mach seven and impacting its target at mach five. These high velocity projectiles will be able to destroy targets by kinetic energy, rather than with conventional explosives. According to Dr. Elizabeth D’Andrea, ONR’s Electromagnetic Rail-gun Program Manager, the elimination of explosives from both propellant and warheads will have significant contribution to the safety on board future combatants.

    Science and technology challenges met by ONR in the development of the rail gun include development of the launcher, pulse power generation and the guided projectile design. The program’s goal is to demonstrate a full capability, integrated railgun prototype by 2016-2018.

    The program is conducted as a U.S. Navy Science and Technology investment, in partnership with industry (Boeing, Charles Stark Draper Lab, Inc., and General Atomics and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the U.S. Army and the UK MOD. Among the industry participants are Several Navy establishments are contributing to the program, including the U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Sea Systems Command (PMS 500), Naval Surface Warfare Center and Dahlgren Divisions.

    A projectile fired by the electromagnetic railrun races toward the target  at Mach 5 speed, during a record setting test conducted by the Office of naval Research. Photo: US Navy

    Tetherless Rifle Improves Training Realism

    The Cubic Corporation (AMEX: CUB) is introducing a tetherless version of the M-4 training rifle, fitted with a gas-operated recoil and wireless link, allowing for greater freedom of movement and more realism during tactical simulations. The new simulator battery operated weapons are linked to the EST via 2.4GHz wireless connection. The recoil is gas activated by an integral compressed CO2 cartridge housed in either the ammunition magazine or in attachments to the simulated weapon.

    Cubic Introduces Tetherless M-4 Training Rifle

    The tetherless training weapons can be used either with Cubic’s EST 2000 Engagement Skills Trainer or its Warrior Skills Trainer, an enhancement to EST 2000 that enables soldiers to move around either on foot or in a moving vehicle in a simulation environment that replicates the weather conditions, convoy attacks and judgment issues that arise in certain combat situations. These trainers are used by thousands of military personnel throughout the world to develop marksmanship, judgmental and collective training skills.

    “There has been a growing demand for the soldier to train as they fight, and a tethered weapon can prevent movement, restricting motion in a collective mode,” said Terry Fiest, director of Business Development for U.S. Army Programs for Cubic’s Orlando division. “A tetherless weapon is more suited to tactical engagements and gives the soldier more latitude. We are finding that our customers like tethered weapons for marksmanship and they prefer tetherless for dismounted and offensive training scenarios.”

    The first tetherless system was delivered in 2007 to the Mississippi Air National Guard at the Combat Readiness Training Center in Gulfport. Additional systems are on contract for the Wisconsin Air National Guard’s Combat Readiness Training Center at Volk Field later this year. More than 1,000 EST 2000 systems are operational at Army and Air Force installations worldwide, including the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Korea, Germany, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq. Cubic’s Orlando division is now working on converting other weapons used in EST 2000 and the Warrior Skills Training to operate in a tetherless environment. Cubic could potentially create tetherless technology for law enforcement users in the future. The company’s Orlando site is used as a training venue for Central Florida law enforcement teams who want to train with Cubic’s laser-based ground combat training instrumentation.

    Non Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C)

    The primary purpose of NLOS-C is to provide responsive fires in support of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) and their subordinate units in concert with other fire effects, including line-of-sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS), Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS), external and joint capabilities. The system provides flexible support through its ability to change effects round-by-round and mission-by-mission. These capabilities, combined with rapid response to calls for fire and rate of fire, provide a variety of effects on demand.

    The cannon will be able to move rapidly, stop quickly and almost instantly deliver lethal first round effects on target. The cannon will have a Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) capability, to maximize the effect on a target, from a single gun or a small number of firing units. The NLOS-C system mounts an ultra-lightweight 38-caliber, fully automated 155-mm howitzer. A fully automated ammunition handling system is installed, holding 155-mm projectiles and Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) propelling charges in ready to load racks. The automation eliminates the physical handling of ammunition and provides the system to fire rounds at sustained rates with minimal physical effort. The system will enable rapid rearming and refueling.

    As a fully automated system, NLOS-Cannon integrates all crew operations – firing, moving, training and maintenance – into a digitized two-man cockpit, providing automated handling of all gun systems, real-time situational awareness, and effective protection from battlefield conventional and unconventional threats, including nuclear, biological and chemical environments. The NLOS Cannon, as with all FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV), incorporates active and passive protection systems to enhance crew and platform survivability against all types of battlefield threats.

    The NLOS Cannon chassis will feature highly durable, lightweight band track that provides a smoother ride over conventional steel track. The track is propelled by a diesel engine and hybrid-electric propulsion system designed to improve system mobility and reduce fuel consumption.

    In September 2006, BAE Systems completed the integration of the NLOS-C first Firing Platform, to be used for firing tests through 2008, when the NLOS-Cannon prototype was delivered on May 30, 2008.

    This prototype was the first of nine vehicles to be delivered to the Army for engineering, mobility, safety and reliability testing as well as gun firing, to be conducted at the Army Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, by 2009. The five early configuration platforms including the first prototype currently delivered will be supplied this year and the remaining three will be configured in a full system development and demonstration (SDD) design, will be delivered by early 2009.

    The firing platform uses a 38-caliber length, fully automated 155-mm howitzer, developed at BAE Systems’ Minneapolis System Integration Facility. The Firing Platform’s howitzer is integrated with a fully automated ammunition handling system. The platform, made of a combination of high-strength steel and aluminum, incorporates a cannon assembly that is 1,200 pounds lighter than the M777 cannon previously tested on the NLOS Cannon Concept Technology Demonstrator.

    The prototype of the NLOS Cannon is the first vehicle destined for the FCS program to utilize the new hybrid-electrical proplusion. All eight of the FCS manned combat vehicles are mounted on nearly the same chassis — they share more than 80 percent compatibility across the family of vehicles. They are unique in that they are electrically powered. A diesel engine on board turns a generator, which in turn charges batteries, which in turn powers electric motors that drive the tracks. In fact, the entire vehicle is electrically powered.

    Much of the advanced technology being developed for the NLOS Cannon is being incorporated into the design and development of other vehicles in the MGV family, such as the NLOS Mortar. The NLOS Mortar is being designed by BAE Systems to have an estimated 80 percent commonality with the NLOS Cannon chassis and mission equipment to reduce maintenance and logistics. A NLOS Mortar Firing Platform is expected to be delivered for testing and qualification in spring 2007.

    SnowGoose – Unmanned Logistical Aerial Vehicle (Photos)

    Who Threatens the 2008 Beijing Olympics?

    A mere week is left before the Beijing Olympics open and global counter terrorist organizations are on high alert. Especially jittery must be the Chinese security officials and they should have every reason to be so. On August 4, 2008 just few days before the grand opening, two men believed to be Moslems, drove a dump truck into a troop of policemen that were on a morning jog in the city of Kashgar. After the deliberate attack, they continued throwing homemade grenades at the wounded policemen before stabbing them with knives. 16 officers were killed and 16 oters wounded in the attack.

    Less than two weeks earlier, on July 23 an apparent terrorist group released a video taking responsibility for bus bomb blasts a few days before in the southwestern city of Kunming that killed two people. The group also claimed as its own, another attack in Shanghai that killed three people last May. In the video, the group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party, apparently a Uighur Muslim separatist organization, pushing for independence for China’s far western region of Xinjiang, threatened more attacks, including during the Beijing Games that run from Aug. 8-24. “Our aim is to target the most critical points related to the Olympics, the group warned.

    Although the Chinese government has assured its people and the Olympic community, that heavy security will ensure secure games, there is sufficient concern over a possible “repeat performance” of the notorious 1972 Munich Massacre, in which eleven Israeli athletes were murdered by the PLO Black September terror movement.

    Chinese security forces practicing emergency anti-terror training in Xinjiang, China.But for Chinese security, the Olympic terror threat could well be homegrown. This year, among the potential troublemakers which Chinese security specialists have identified are Tibetan separatists, who staged occasionally violent protests last spring. Tian Yixiang, head of the Beijing Olympic Games Security Protection Coordinating Group, said the top “terror” threats to the August Games come from Uighur militants campaigning for independence for Xinjiang in China’s far northwest, from Tibetan independence groups, and from followers of the banned Falun Gong sect. Tian, who has rarely given public comments on preparations for the Games, said a failed bomb attack on a plane in Xinjiang in March and anti-Chinese unrest across Tibet that same month, “amply showed that they are scheming to sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games”.

    East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

    The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a separatist Muslim group operating in China’s western Xinjiang province. ETIM is the most militant of the various groups in the Xinjiang region that demand separation from China and the creation of an independent state called East Turkestan. The Xinjiang region is a vast, thinly populated region that shares borders with several countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ETIM is one of the more extreme groups founded by Uighurs, the Turkic-speaking ethnic majority in Xinjiang, seeking an independent state called East Turkestan. The Uighurs is an ethnic minority group numbering about 8 million of the 19 million people in Xinjiang. Their ethnicity, language, and culture is more similar to the Turkic peoples of neighboring Central Asian republics.

    China has long viewed the ETIM and similar groups as a threat to its territorial integrity, and after the attacks on America on Sept. 11, 2001, executed a harsh crackdown on the region by increasing its military presence, detaining suspected members, and limiting religious rights. Chinese authorities blame separatist groups, including ETIM, for more than 200 terrorist attacks since 1990, resulting in 162 deaths and more than 440 injuries.

    Uighur extremist elements have been involved in two recent incidents reported by the Chinese authorities from that region. The first incident took place at Urumqi, the capital of the province, on January 27,2008. Chinese security sources mentioned an exchange of fire between the police and some Uighur extremists when the police raided a hide-out of a suspected sleeper cell of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Being a suspected associate of Al Qaeda with close links to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or Group, another Uzbek group, these people are dangerous.

    While the objectives of the IMU may be regional and confined to Uzbekistan and other Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang, those of the IJU are global in proportion. The IJU projects itself as a global jihadi organization with no specific ethnic identity. A second incident was reported to have taken place on board a Chinese commercial plane flying from Urumqi to Beijing on March 7,2008. Security guards traveling on board the plane overpowered two suspected Uighur extremists, who tried to create a violent incident. The Chinese media has regarded the incident as an attempted terrorist strike. Apparently, the plane made an emergency landing in the northwestern city of Lanzhou. The two persons, already overpowered by the security guards, were handed over to the local police for interrogation. No reports have been available over the outcome and official sources attempted to minimize the affair.

    China Spares no Expense to Safeguard the Games

    With security of the Games as its paramount concern, China’s efforts – ranging from putting surface-to-air missiles around Olympic venues such as the Bird’s Nest stadium and Water Cube aquatics center, include the planned closure of Beijing’s international airport during the opening ceremony – are turning this year’s Olympics into the most security-focused Games in history. To ensure security, Beijing already held a series of anti-terrorist drills in June aimed at dealing with possible bomb or chemical attacks, as well as attempts to kidnap athletes. Now the capital is preparing to deploy more than 100,000 police, army troops, and trained volunteers around the capital. Police checkpoints have been set up along major roads to check identity cards for those trying to enter Beijing and primarily the Olympic Games compounds. Armed police with bomb-sniffing dogs now patrol the city’s railway and subway stations. An additional 2,000 security guards as well as 200 X-ray machines are in the capital’s 93 subway stations watching for guns, knives, explosive or flammable liquids. Even chemical substance monitoring systems seem to have been installed in focal places.

    Meanwhile, Beijing has placed 300,000 surveillance cameras throughout the capital to monitor any suspicious activities. Access to all Olympics venues is being constantly screened, with everything from standard metal detectors to technology for fingerprint and iris scanning. China will spend a record $6.5 billion on surveillance equipment.

    Chinese security authorities will also employ drones to patrol for security threats throughout the Olympics games, said a state media report that called it the country’s first “known” use of such aircraft. Indeed, drones were among three dozen other “anti-terrorism weapons” to be employed to maintain security during the Beijing Olympics that were put on display in the eastern city of Jinan in Shandong province. Other security measures employed include remote-controlled bomb disposal robots and battery-powered two-wheel segway vehicles to be used by armed police on patrols. With every hour remaining before the start of the games, tension in China and not only in Beijing itself is rising constantly. Will the terrorists strike?

    Chinese anti-terror units training in Xinjiang, China 2007.

    Winograd’s Blessing in Disguise: Last Wake up Call for Israel

    According to Professor Martin van Creveld, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the final report released last week by the government-appointed Winograd Commission, on Israel’s conduct of the so-called 2nd Lebanon War 2006, consisted of little but failures. For this the political leadership, the top military brass were to blame. Much of the criticism, by the Israeli public, is well founded. The war was indeed marked by a long series of failures. Van Creveld: Failures in planning, failures in intelligence and counterintelligence, failures in command, failures in mobilization, failures in execution, failures in logistics, failures in properly protecting the rear, and perhaps a failure to terminate hostilities earlier and at the cost of fewer Israeli casualties.

    Since the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, repeated attempts to kidnap Israeli soldiers continued to take place on average every three or four months, with Israel retaliating with minor reactions. However, on July 12, 2006, in response to just one of such incident, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, with almost the entire Knesset as well as public opinion behind him, launched the 2006 offensive, much to the surprise of Hassan Nasrallah and his Tehran bosses. The offensive did not go nearly as well as it should have and demonstrated numerous deficiencies in the Israeli military.

    However, it is a fact, that Hezbollah, judging by its leader’s repeated statements, was shocked by the violence of Israel’s reaction, while the Iranians were totally dismayed by the loss of their investment, which went up in flames, in 24 hours. Moreover, when the fighting ceased, hundreds of Hezbollah fighters had been killed. The organization was forced out of southern Lebanon, and a fairly effective United Nations peacekeeping force was deployed, together with the Lebanese Army, for the first time in decades.

    Hezbollah, while having restocked its arsenal with even more efficient rockets perhaps, does not seem to relish another round, with Israel, which having learnt a sharp and painful lesson, is already reshaping into a different armed force.

    The IDF is and always was basically a land forces Army. General Dan Halutz, an air force officer, wanted to reorganize the IDF into a three-service force, comprising virtually independent Army Air Force and Navy, depicting the armed forces structures common worldwide. In this concept, which was opposed by many of the ground forces leadership, but firmly overruled, Halutz made a deadly mistake, which backfired already on the first day of the war. Moreover, his warfighting doctrine, which was based on stand-off fire, primarily led by the air force and, to a lesser extent, on artillery fire, could not diminish Hezbollah’s short-range rocket offensive, which kept nearly a million Israelis in shelters for over a month.

    In a democracy, the political leadership is solely responsible to give the army clear and specific directives, how to conduct the war, in order to meet the nation’s strategic aims. For decision makers being capable of giving such directives, a crisis management team must be created, rendering professional assistance to the civilian leadership. This is normally provided by the National Security Council (NSC), which unfortunately, was not involved in the decision-making process. Without a clear directive, the army can, even unintentionally, misinterpret some of the top decisions, resulting in serious disorder, confusion and misunderstanding of orders issued along the chain of command. The lack of clear and unmistakable directives caused most of the failures throughout the warfighting conduct of the entire war. For example, the political leadership never really issued direct orders to the army to stop the rocket offensive against the civilian population, which lasted incessantly until the very last day of the war!

    You may also refer to our earlier feature “Israel’s Postwar Commission Urges: Crisis Management Imperative“, published May 2007, covering the preliminary findings of the the Winograd report.


    IDF officers are envious of their American counterparts: These have documents of “national strategy” that are issued by the president, and a “security strategy” published by the secretary of defense as a basis for “military strategy”, which is drawn up by the joint chiefs. In Israel, the army normally puts up with the blunders of the governments, which do not tell the military, in clear language, about their intentions. This leaves the army brass largely guessing about what their leaders really want them to achieve. The inevitable result from lack of orderly staff work at the political leadership level creates a dangerous situation, in which the army’s near sole domination of the nation’s strategic vision is unhealthy. Accordingly, the politicians are conducting their decision-making, usually lacking both understanding or without requesting alternatives from the military.

    Whatever the controversy over the latest Winograd Report may be, leading analysts consider the 2nd Lebanon War a last, indispensable, wake-up call to arouse the State of Israel from years of slumber and ignorance in matters of top national security. There are of course, those, who regard the first 48 hours of the highly successful air campaign on Hezbollah’s long-and medium range rocket arsenal, as sufficient response for the abduction of the two reservists. But should the action have stopped right there, it is highly questionable whether the two would have been released (in fact, Hezbollah did not provide any details about the two since their abduction). But, there is little doubt, that the former chief of staff, air force General Dan Halutz, would have stayed in top command, implementing his dangerous “three-service” force to the full – in other words, the decline in the warfighting doctrine of the IDF Land Forces would continue, in both national budgetary and training priorities. The tanks would have remained without their vital active defense systems, confronted by fourth-generation ATGM. Israel’s rear would continue to suffer from an overwhelming rocket threat, without adequate national funding for advanced rocket defense systems. The IDF would maintain enhancing its dangerous stand-off firepower operations doctrine, which failed miserably during the 34 days of its first realistic confrontation with a determined enemy, fighting in a virtual “empty battlefield”, lacking sufficient point-targets to attack from the air alone.

    But there is more. Even those actions, in which larger, brigade-sized formations were used, like the battle for Maroun a-Ras, the ruling misconceptions backfired due to lack of determined top level leadership. Maroun a-Ras can hardly be regarded as a fiasco, as the media described it. In a brigade attack, mounted by Brigadier General Gal Hirsh’s 91st division (who was blamed for his division’s mistakes and forced to retire) the fortified village was captured after fierce fighting, killing over thirty Hezballah troops. In the command bunker, classified documents, advanced weapon systems, supplied by Iran and communications equipment rendering vital tactical intelligence were seized, all this at a cost of five men killed and several wounded. In spite of this clear success, the impact of casualties brought about immediate cessation of activities and forced immediate withdrawal on specific GHQ orders, backed by a hesitant political leadership. Unfortunately, the hasty withdrawal only caused more casualties!

    A similar situation occurred during the last sixty hours of the war. It is irrelevant, to this analysis, whether the planned three-division offensive was necessary or not, when the UN sponsored cease fire was already within sight. Our insight, centers only on the military conduct of the battle. Crossing Wadi Saluki became the mission of 162nd Armored Division, which was spearheaded by “L” Company of 9th Tank Battalion, 401st Armored Brigade, equipped with Merkava Mk4 tanks. During a sharp action, fought in a forced narrow passage, the company lost five of its eleven tanks. Human casualties during the entire action, which lasted a few hours, were eleven dead and more wounded. Two of the five tanks hit were totally destroyed by multiple missile strikes, most probably Kornet laser-guided missiles. The others were later recovered.

    While MEDEVAC took care of the casualties, another company followed through and with support of the brigade’s second battalion, pushed uphill, only a short distance away, from the division objective, when it received orders from the top command, to halt immediately and disengage! Only a few hours later, another mission was aborted when, during a mass heliborne operation, tasked to capture the strategic high ground overlooking the Litani River, one CH-53 Sea Stallion crashed, probably hit by missile, with five crewmen killed. The mission, which included several thousand men and equipment, was called off by GHQ and the civilian leadership- with at least 24 hours left, until the cease fire came into effect.

    From a professional viewpoint, all these examples signify lack of determination by the military and civilian leadership – which are to blame for the botched conduct of the war. But this blame cannot include the combat troops and tactical leadership, which in many cases demonstrated utmost bravery in battle and devotion to their mission, even when sustaining heavy casualties. It is a matter of fact, that in every face-to-face combat with Hezbollah guerilla troops, the IDF clearly gained the undisputed upper hand. Should the military and civilian leadership have shown equal standards – the outcome of the 2nd Lebanon War would no doubt have been very different, even in its latest offensive phase.

    As for combat leadership there are many valuable lessons to be gained from this war. Network centric communications offer a wide range of hitherto unavailable, tactical situation awareness, to commanders at all levels, on real time basis. However, when practiced from stand-off distance, vision and sensor based command and control cannot replace combat leadership during critical phases, right alongside the troops. Another advanced service, the mobile subscriber exchange service (military cellular phone) providing person-to-person conversation (Mountain Rose) provided, under some circumstances, the only means of communications for field commanders. However, such method of communications was never designed to replace combat network radios. These means are useful enabling secure point-to-point conversations and coordination between senior commanders, but should never be used to issue orders, which have to be listened to by crosswise radio networks, reaching all tactical commanders simultaneously.

    Tactical commanders, (from division, down to the platoon level), must “feel” the heat of the battle, virtually smelling, the stench, heat, blood and tears of their troops, in order to get things moving again, when the going gets rough. Leading by virtually watching the conduct of battle from remote locations, as it rolls off on their screens, fed by the best resolution images, from the bird’s eye view of the UAV, cannot replace the commander’s presence at vantage points. Hearing the calm commander’s voice, over a crosswise radio net, for all to listen in, directing the battle during crisis situations, is irreplaceable in providing the foundation for victory, encouraging and guiding troops under stressful combat situations. Moreover, even in the modern battlefield, a determined fire-supported assault remains the best casualty reducing practice, provided it is led by frontline leaders. Mission persistence throughout the entire battle is imperative to achieve ultimate accomplishment of the objective.

    Under the leadership of its new chief of staff, Lt. General Avi Ashkenazi, the IDF is rapidly regaining its lost warfighting capability. One of the IDF’s biggest changes was regarding training protocols, recently holding large-scale divisional exercises, in which it implemented most of the lessons learned during the Second Lebanon War, including interfacing with the various government establishments. The military has further approved a NIS 250 billion ($68.8 billion) perennial work plan – Tefen – which includes the continuance manufacturing of Merkava 4 tanks, purchasing of hundreds of heavy tracked armored personnel carriers, reinforcing the Air Force with additional fighter jets and the Navy with warships, as well as accelerating the development of rocket countermeasures and anti-missile systems. Other changes involve redefining the responsibilities of Military intelligence, by creating a unit charged with liaising with intelligence factors in the field. Much attention was placed on retraining the reserves. The IDF has re-stocked on its ammunitions and equipment since the war’s end, but nevertheless, several deficiencies still exist and are due to be replenished over the next fire years, costing some NIS 2 billion ($550 million).

    A central thesis in the final Winograd report revolves around criticism of the paralyzing fear of the government and the IDF leadership of losses in the war, which made it difficult to take risks. The committee believes that Israel must be prepared for sacrifice when it comes to protecting its citizens. Although Israeli society has changed for the worse in its attitude toward losses, the committee members are now preaching to the public and its leaders about the need for change.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    FCS Vehicles Move On

    The new family of vehicles includes the mounted combat vehicle (carrying a 120mm cannon), a command and control vehicle, reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle, an infantry carrier vehicle, non-line-of-sight cannon (NLOS-C now in prototype stage), the non-line-of-sight mortar (NLOS-M) , a medical vehicle-evacuation and medical vehicle-treatment and recovery and maintenance vehicle. All eight vehicles will share a common platform, powertrain, suspension and tracks, chassis, and various systems such as sensors, active and passive protection, electronic and communications systems etc.

    The total cost of the program is currently estimated at $160 billion. The lead systems integrator team (led by Boeing and SAIC) is contracted $21 billion for FCS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase spanning 11 years, from 2003 through 2014. Unlike individual programs of record, FCS is designed as an integrated system of systems, and the aggregate contract cost is not broken out by either individual pieces or platforms. One of the most innovative and essential elements of the program is that all of the systems have been designed from the outset to work together seamlessly.

    Army officials said they have adopted a phased development approach for FCS. This plan allows the Army to deploy the most mature and urgently required elements, while maintaining other systems in developmental phase, allowing the resolution of problems and technical challenges without disrupting the Army’s entire FCS modernization effort. There are three planned ‘Spinout’ phases for the program – Unattended sensors and small unmanned vehicles are included in the first Spinout. Sensors, active protection systems, a larger unmanned system and the FCS Battle Command Network are candidates for the second and third Spinouts.

    The FCS family of vehicles is introducing many new capabilities to the Army. One of the most obvious, is the introduction of electrical propulsion for combat vehicles. “Every Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV), is going to be hybrid electric,” According to FCS Program Manager Maj. Gen. Charles Cartwright, during a session at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare Winter Symposium and Exposition, each of the FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV) will have an electrical power generation supporting 420 kilowatts, required to support the hybrid-electric propulsion and myriad of electronics systems on board. All eight MGV types will be powered by electric motors providing the traction drive. The motors will be powered by batteries, which are charged by side mounted high-power-density diesel generators. As technology matures, the diesel engine will be replaced by fuel cells for power generation, Cartwright said. The vehicle also uses active suspension system facilitating increased speed and agility and cross-country mobility, negotiating vertical and trench obstacles.

    The first prototype of the Non Line Of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C), the lead vehicle in the FCS family of manned platforms is already in production; it is the first of five prototypes to be tested by the army beginning to be delivered this year. Another vehicle type, well underway is the Mounted Combat System (MCS). This vehicle will be the ‘tank’ of the FCS unit. MCS will have a crew of three – a commander/driver (common crew) and a gunner. The vehicle will carry a lightweight, low-recoil 120mm cannon, firing standard (line of sight) and beyond line of sight (MRM type) ammunition. The firing platform for the program’s Mounted Combat System 120mm cannon will enter production soon.

    Elements of the common sensors to be used with each of the FCS MGVs were shown at AUSA Winter. The Multi-Function Radio Frequency system (MFRF) and Medium Range EO Infrared sensor System (MREO), both developed by Raytheon, are part of the sensor suite used on all FCS vehicles. These RF/EO elements will operate as ‘networked sensors’ connected through the C4ISR interface computer to provide the crew with real-time situational awareness, surveillance and targeting data. The same data could also be shared across the FCS combat team over the Common Operating Picture (COP) generated by the FCS ‘system of systems’ networking infrastructure.

    Beside this family of vehicles, the FCS combat unit will field a number of unmanned systems, optimized for different combat roles. The largest unmanned element is the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment vehicle, (MULE), which was selected to be one of the candidates for the third technology ‘SpinOff’ scheduled for the next decade. This 2.5 ton unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) is designed to support dismounted and air-assault elements of FCS’ unit of action. There are three MULE versions in the planning – all are built by Lockheed Martin. These versions share a common mobility platform equipped with unique 6×6 independent articulated suspensions, in-hub electrical motors for each wheel, and a new suspension system enabling the MULE to negotiate rough terrain, far exceeding that of vehicles utilizing conventional suspension systems. The MULE will be equipped with one of three mission equipment packages – a transport, weapon and sensor/carrier and countermine platform. Two of the ground sensors are already in an advanced stage. The urban Unattended Ground Sensor (U-UGS) is designed to be a “left behind” asset for constant, 24-7 surveillance. Soldiers could leave an UUGS in a house that they cleared, and thereby eliminate the need for a Soldier to stay behind and monitor that structure. The UUGS would alert the Soldiers to the re-emergence of enemy combatants or insurgents.


    Other unattended systems include the Tactical UGS (TUGS) – these ‘left behind’ assets are designed to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, providing persistent presence in area of interest to the unit. Two classes of UGS are in development – an urban and a tactical unmanned ground sensor. According to Gen. Cartwright, both have been delivered to the Army Evaluation Task Force at Ft. Bliss for Soldier Evaluation. Recent exercises conducted at Ft. Bliss also involved the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle, (SUGV), and the ‘Class I’ Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). According to Gregg Martin, vice president and program manager, 25 SUGV and the 11 Class 1 UAS, (called Block 0) were delivered and are being used for testing, “We’ll deliver the rest of those new FCS systems in the April timeframe; they will then go through a Soldier evaluation around July.” said Martin. When the Army adjusted the FCS program, it dropped two unmanned aerial systems from the FCS systems lineup. As a result, specific roles, such as target designation functions (by laser) are to be integrated with the Class 1. Since the vehicle’s small size and limited payload capacity were inadequate for the new payload, the MAV required redesign to accommodate a bigger engine to account for the additional weight. The Class IV UAV, a joint Army-Navy program, will take delivery of its sensor package within the next two years, Martin said.

    The software backbone of FCS is the ‘System of Systems Common Operating Environment’ (SOSCOE), a key element of the FCS network service layer that will be the operating system driving all FCS elements. “We’re at roughly 70 percent complete on the application build off of SoSCOE,” Martin said. SOSCOE is “performing very well on the application side. We’re about 40 percent through our software development, so we just completed integration of Build 1, which accounts for about a third of the software. The second phase (Build 2) will make another third of the software, and is broken into two parts, the first is scheduled to start to drop in the April 08 timeframe, and start the integration process throughout the summer.

    Progress is made on the FCS network which is addressed in five specific layers: sensors, applications, services, transport and standards. In the transport layer, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) ground mobile radios (GMR) is the element required to interface and work with existing forces using current technology. “On radio side we have GMRs out in the field, working well,” Martin said. Current systems are pre-engineering developmental models and will be followed by more mature systems in late 2009. Other JTRS radios to be included in the system are handheld, manpack, and small form-fit radios that will be integrated into the various unmanned systems. Currently the Small Form Fit (HMS) radion is being integrated with the Class 1 MAV with testing scheduled to begin in Summer 2008.

    ARMY, USMC Set the JLTV in Motion

    The U.S.Army was designated as the lead service of the Joint Army/Marine Corps program. On February 5, 2008 the Army released the Request for Proposal (RFP) inviting suppliers to submit proposals for the development of a JLTV Family of Vehicles (FoV). The Army plans to evaluate at least three industry teams through the system’s 27 month development and demonstration phase, maintaining multiple contractor teams through the low-rate initial production.

    The JLTV Family of Vehicles (FoV) will utilize, as much as possible, the most advanced, yet mature technologies Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 or higher), being developed for other DoD programs, including the Army’s Future Combat Systems program, and other incumbents and studies, sponsored by the Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) developments, Army Research Lab (ARL), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR). While the program is designed for the U.S. military, it is anticipated that JLTV, like HMMWV preceding it, will be adopted by many armies around the world. Several foreign governments have already expressed a strong interest in joining the development of the JLTV vehicles.

    The 27 months Technology Development phase is scheduled to continue till 2010 and involve three teams. During this phase vehicle models will be designed and fabricated in 2009 being tested in 2010, leading to the selection of two teams for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD, Milestone B) in 2011. This phase will continue through 2012 and focus mainly on testing, leading to a final selection of the winning design and awarding production contracts (Milestone C) by FY 2013. The final decision will also address considerations such as fuel efficiency, life cycle operations and support improvements such as cost reduction, reliability growth, reduction of annual maintenance man hours, and accelerated deliveries.

    US Undersecretary of Defense John J. Young guided the services to seek foreign participation in the program, especially with the UK and Australia. Several industry teaming have already been formed to compete. By 2011 the current technology demonstration phase will transition System Development Demonstration (SDD) phase where two contractors will complete the design and development of the JLTV FoV, and companion trailers. The Army expects to select a single supplier for the entire vehicle family.

    The teams that already expressed their intention to participate include:

    • Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh Corp
    • General Tactical Vehicle (AM General& GDLS)
    • Lockheed Martin and BAE (formerly Armor Holdings)
    • BAE Systems and International Military and Government (IMG)
    • Boeing, Textron and SAIC
    • Force Protection Inc. and DRS
    • Other companies expressing interest in the program include Blackwater Inc., Raytheon and I3.
    Five Payload Categories Define JLTV FoV

    Five payload categories will address the range of vehicle derivatives in the JLTV family of vehicles (FOV). Each team is expected to build seven vehicles, four ballistic hulls and four trailers. The vehicles include a four-seat general purpose variant (JLTV-A-GP) which will be common for both services. This version is expected to be the lowest weight configuration. A C-130 transport aircraft could take two of these JLTVs each loaded with 3,500 lbs of payload. It will also be carried externally (sling loaded) by a CH-53 or CH-47 helicopter. All other versions of the JLTV are expected to be heavier, and although each could be carried by CH-53/CH-47, only one vehicle could be carried in a C-130.


    As for the infantry carrier, different versions will be required for the Marines and Army, since each service has different transportability requirements. Both will be required to carry an infantry or marine fire team (6 seats). Reconnaissance versions will also be deployed as scout and target designation (Knight) assets. The two infantry carrier variants could be based on the same vehicle as the height and other external dimensions could be common for both platforms.

    A four-seat Command and Control On-The-Move (JLTV-B-C2OTM) variant will also be common for both services. Similar configuration will be used for the Heavy Guns Carrier variant, to be used for escort, patrol and security missions by both services. This vehicle will accommodate four soldiers and a gunner. A two-seat utility vehicle capable of carrying a shelter carrier or used as prime mover. A JLTV based protected ambulance will also be designed, with accommodation of a crew of 3 and two litters. These vehicles are characterized as ‘Category B’, capable of carrying payloads up to 4500 lbs. A heavier ‘Category C’ variant will be abe to carry up to 5,100 lbs, configured as shelter carrier, utility vehicle and an ambulance with capacity for four litters. All vehicles will be geared to carry an integral trailer with additional payload capacity of 6,100 lb.

    Requirements Guidelines Outlined

    The current mix of tactical vehicles operated by the U.S. DoD has several drawbacks. The vehicles do not have basic protection and require heavy add-on armor, severely limiting their performance and payload carriage capability. Where sufficient armor is available, vehicle transportation and support to-and-around the theater of operation is severely degraded, since they are outsized and overweight for most transportation and recovery platforms. Furthermore, their electrical power generation capacity is inadequate for current requirement, supporting “power-hungry” devices such as multiple radios and computers, remote weapon stations, multiple electronic devices including high power jammers (CREW) and other countermeasures.

    In contrast, JLTV will be designed for commonality beyond major components, to include repair parts, tools, training, system design, maintenance procedures and sources of supply. JLTV will have the same soft soil mobility as HMMWV, improved off-road and on-road performance in dry conditions and superior capability in urban terrain, addressing lessons learned in recent combat mobility experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    The vehicle will be designed to be ‘ballistic tolerant’, enabling the crew to escape ambush zones, remaining mobile, even after the vehicle is being hit. It will incorporate crew counter-fire-protection and other basic safety improvements. Built-in means of recovery will include self recovery (by Winch), buddy recovery by another JLTV and recovery by wreckers. JLTV will be designed to avoid rollover, and remain resilient once it occurs.

    Diesel or Hybrid Electric Propulsion?

    Unlike earlier considerations of using hybrid electric propulsion, JLTV will be initially powered by diesel engines. Although the Army considers Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEV) powered vehicles have a great promise, they are yet to prove their maturity. The Army is cautious about batteries not yet offering the required energy density in a compact power and weight form. Batteries are still too bulky, and too expensive. One of the advantages of the hybrid-electric vehicles is exportable power. However, the Army considers current systems to be overweight and oversized for useful applications. Another area for improvement is the thermal management. Despite the current limitations, HEV will become a central element for future tactical ground forces and is addressing these issues with several ongoing programs, expected to be concluded by the end of the decade, paving the way for full-scale fielding of Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) vehicles within 5-7 years. Compared to the current vehicle fleet, JLTV will fit into existing maintenance and support infrastructure, introducing significant improvement in reliability, compared to the current HMMWV, given the modular approach and component commonality to repair and replacement, improving the speed of repair and availability of spare parts.

    Fuel efficiency is not a major factor in the system’s preliminary design, but maximizing fuel efficiency will be a major consideration in the final selection process. Power generation and energy storage are also addressed, to meet current and future unit-level power requirements. Vehicles will also utilize upgradeable power generation and storage capacity, supporting specific requirements and future advances.

    As JLTV enters the developmental phase, other programs are already underway which could influence and contribute to the final design. Among those are studies of advanced Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Survivability concepts, including tri-modal aluminum armor, shock mitigating seats, active RPG Defeat, and advanced modeling of blast and fragmentation effects, integrated vehicle electronic and data architecture, Hybrid Electric Vehicle Experimentation, Continually Variable Transmission Study.

    Gaza Exodus Threatening Repercussions on Egypt’s Future

    View the CBS News Photo Essay on the Gaza – Rafah situation

    These are moments of glory for Hamas. It conducted its campaign brilliantly last week, and as it seems, so far, with complete success. At no stage did Israel have sufficient response to counter the initiatives of Hamas: Its excellent intelligence community, normally capable of pinpointing Hamas leaders for targeted killings, failed to alert on the organization’s preparations along Philadelphi border line separating the Gaza strip from Egypt. But in fact, not intelligence gathering, nor experts, just plain common sense was the only thing needed to realize, that breaking the barrier between besieged Palestinian Rafah and free Egyptian Rafah, was only a matter of time.

    The steel wal erected by Israel in an effort to protect its soldiers patrolling the separation line between Gaza and Egypt was toppled by Hamas engineers, in an attempt to ease the Israeli blockade on the Gaza strip.
    It was also an impressive engineering feat. To plan, plant, implement and execute simultaneous explosions, creating a domino effect, toppling such a strongly built infrastructure, required high level professionalism. Analysts doubt that Hamas, alone could not have done this, without professional outside help. Intelligence sources suspect, that Iranian demolition experts arrived in Gaza, mingling with the pilgrims from Hajj in Saudi Arabia three weeks ago, when Egypt allowed them, reluctantly to return, without sufficient security checks.

    Hamas operatives had been sawing away the foundations of the wall between Egyptian and Palestinian Rafah for a few months, preparing it to blow it up when the time came, a source close to the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) in Rafah told ‘Haaretz’ newspaper on Wednesday.


    Explosions were set at no less than twenty points along the border fence, clear evidence of a campaign that was planned and coordinated well in advance. In destroying the wall separating the Palestinian and Egyptian sides of Rafah, Hamas chalked up another impressive, if not strategic coup. The organization demonstrated once again, that it is a disciplined, determined entity and an opponent that is exponentially more sophisticated than the Palestine Liberation Organization in Ramallah.

    But there was much more at stake here. While thousands of Gazans spilled over into Egypt, Hamas military used the confusion to seize Egypt’s strategic deep water port of Rafah on the Gaza Mediterranean coast. In August 2005 the Sharon government granted Egypt naval control over the territorial waters off the Gaza Mediterranean coast up to Ashekelon. Egypt constructed a new 300-meter pier for six 300-ton naval ships on the shore of Rafah, the town which was divided by mutual agreement between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

    Meanwhile a few miles southwest of the border, the Egyptian authorities desperately attempted to set up a more organized line of defense, trying to turn back Palestinians reaching El Arish town, halfway to the Suez Canal zone. But for thousands of Palestinians who flooded through the border breaches, it was the Eastern Mediterranean version of the ancient Bible exodus – only this time in reversed form. It opened a floodgate of people and there was no stopping them, apart from opening fire on the surging crowds, which the Egyptians could not afford.

    An interesting development which already seems to emerge is, that on President Mubarak direct orders, the Egyptian border police redeployed to a new line, covering El Arish, Bir Lahfan and Abu Agheila. This step would effectively hand over to the control of Hamas-led Palestinian terrorist organizations a Northern Sinai void of roughly 855 sq, km., almost twice the area of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

    A map showing Giora Eiland's "Grand Design" proposed plan to exchange territories between Israel, Egypt and Gaza to provide the Gaza  strip with pore populated area.Implementing the Grand Design

    It is little known, that in 2004 retired Major-General Giora Eiland, former chief of Israel’s National Security Council, made a similar proposal to then prime minister Ariel Sharon, calling for a regional solution of the Gaza dilemma. His proposal included adding 600 square kilometers to Gaza in northern Sinai, allowing for the construction of an international port and airport, and a city in which millions of Palestinian refugees could live. Eiland “grand design” plan (see map), sought compensating Egypt with 150 square kilometers in the southern Negev and offer a tunnel connecting Egypt’s Central Sinai with Jordan, north of Eilat. Unfortunately nothing came of General Eiland’s plan. Instead Sharon opted for the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in August 2005, which, turned into a strategic disaster-creating Hamastan, with all its painful “trimmings”.

    Egypt’s Security at Risk?

    Now Egypt is watching with mounting alarm as the crisis in the Gaza Strip threatens to spill over onto its own heartland. This is part of a nightmare which was haunting Cairo’s security services for years, since Hamas became dominant in the Gaza strip, right on Egypt’s doorstep. Now it seems, that the unpredictable Middle Eastern scenario, in which the ever-volatile Israeli-Palestinian conflict, getting dangerously out of hand, has already matured into a real threat. President Hosni Mubarak is facing a painful dilemma: on the one hand he wants to maintain his, well paying US sponsored, relationship with Israel. On the other he must avoid the impression that he is abandoning the Palestinians, including the hated Gazans, which are Egypt’s traditional pain-in-the neck.

    Meanwhile, President Mubarak is pulling out the stops to get Israel to ease its restrictions, limiting the number of his security forces in the Sinai Peninsula, according to the 1979 Peace demilitarization agreement, which allowed only a restricted number of police forces deployed at the Rafah border and even the overall troops levels in Sinai.
    Egypt’s security services are already on high alert after learning that the 130,000 Palestinians, living in communities around Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal cities, are preparing to help their Gazan brothers steal into Egypt.

    Gaza’s links to Egypt go back to 1948, when it annexed the strip – then part of British-ruled Mandatory Palestine – after the war with Israel, with its population swollen by newly-arrived refugees. Israel occupied it for a few months after the 1956 Suez war but Egyptian rule was restored until the next round in 1967.

    There are already significant repercussions to the Hamas coup in Rafah. According to rumors spread among Palestinian media reports, early Thursday, Jan. 24, apparently American forces and equipment were to have wihdrawn from the Multinational-force and Observers (MFO) airbase at El Gora northeast of al Arish. However, a former member of MFO has informed us that this report was factually incorrect. Having contacted MFO officials stationed at North Camp El Gorah there were no plans, at this stage to redeploy or withdraw MFO contingents from this location. This message we find most reassuring to stability in this volatile region and wish to apologize for our earlier report, which seems to have been spread by intentional disinformation from involved sources, during the turmoil which aroused Northern Sinai.

    But the danger to Israel’s security in now real and imminent from another direction.

    Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, have already used the newly open border with Egypt, to dispatch numerous terrorists into the Sinai peninsula over the last two days, with the goal of sending them from Sinai into Israel to commit attacks, defense officials said Thursday. Carrying out spectacular attacks has been a long seeked aim, but was effectively thwarted by the sophisticated Gaza fence barrier. Accordingly, the Israel Defense Forces, the police and the Shin-Bet general security service have consequently beefed up their forces and their alert to highest level, along the Israeli-Egyptian border in an effort to thwart infiltrations. But all these efforts must be regarded virtually as ‘mission impossible’, as the desert stretch from Rafah to Eilat is over two hundred kilometers long, and mostly negotiable by 4×4 vehicles or on foot.

    Now that Gazans have ‘exploded’ out of their long besieged enclave, it may be up to Israel to seal up the border again, since the Egyptians are showing no signs of doing so. US Secretary Condoleezza Rice and David Welch, her assistant for the Middle East, made a point of warning Mubarak that he must act expeditiously to restore border security, because the entire Washington Palestinian strategy, hinging on Abbas and the Annapolis declarations, hangs in the balance.

    Wake-up Call ending “Pax Americana” illusion

    But the Americans have no one to blame but their own president, who, through his dangerous “pax Americana” illusion, tried to bring democratization into a region, where this is still regarded as counter productive, if not catastrophic. It started in Iraq and Afghanistan, spilled over to Egypt, Lebanon and culminated with the 2006 Hamas elections, their July 2007 coup and now, finally the “Sinai exodus”. This latest development could well announce the next step – a possible Moslim Brotherhood takeover bid for the post Mubarak era in Egypt. The Egyptian president already hinted his main worry is not the Palestinian issue but concern that his own opposition, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, may adopt Hamas tactics and stir up trouble in his cities. Foreboding signs are already evident: Underlining domestic sensitivities, 460 members of the semi-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood were arrested Friday, while heading for a demonstration outside the Cairo HQ of the Arab League.

    High concern is voiced by analysts over Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood gains in the recent elections. The Egyptian authorities received a shock last fall, when the Muslim Brotherhood, an officially banned, but venerable and tolerated fundamentalist group, won some 20% of parliamentary seats. The Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928 became outlawed in Egypt since 1954.

    The big question will be, whether Mubarak will allow Israel to mount a decisive military foray into northern Sinai and rout Hamas before it can deploy sufficient power, or link-up with terrorist forces, already strongly established in the barren Sinai mountains. For an effective counteraction, time is critical- any hesitation or political haggling can be catastrophic.

    Sinai: Safe House for Terrorism

    While the Egypt-Israel 1979 Peace Agreement has de-militarized the entire Sinai Peninsula, it also made it into a giant safe house for terrorism. Sinai’s geographical position places the Sinai Peninsula in a highly strategic area, astride of some of the most ancient smuggling routes through unpopulated desert and extremely difficult topography, making excellent hide-outs in mountain caves. Iran and Al Qaeda have focused on Sinai long ago, but increased its clandestine operations base, with growing emphasis, following the US campaign against Taliban in Afghanistan.

    These smuggling routes are of highly strategic importance in Middle East conflicts past, present and future. Counter intelligence sources estimate that major routes lead from as far as the Black Sea to the shores of El- Arish in northern Sinai ferrying arms and contraband in both directions. Now with Hamas in control in parts of Northern Sinai, and realizing that Iran is actively supporting the Islamic organization- an utmost dangerous situation can develop, in which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will finally establish its long sought forward base along the Mediterranean.

    Logically there might be a solution to this insoluble dilemma. Israel could agree to redraw the security annex of the 1979 Egypt-Israel agreement and allow Egypt to deploy several divisions into Sinai, deploying sufficient forces to restore its authority in the lawless peninsula. Taking such a step would, however be extremely dangerous for Israel, taking into account that a major change could occur in a post-Mubaraq regime, in which the Moslem Brotherhood will form a new government and make all agreements with Israel null and void. Under such circumstances, Israel would be faced by no less than four potential frontlines: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank ( under Hamas), Gaza Hamastan and a hostile Egyptian Army equipped with the latest US military equipment, matching its own arsenal.

    Triggering a Spillover Effect?

    But there is more at stake on the immediate outlook. There is little doubt that Hamas’s impressive gains will affect many Arab nations in the Middle East and primarily those, with a growing populating living under squalor and deprivation. Foremost of these will be Jordan, which is populated by over sixty percent Palestinians, many of which admirers of Hamas. Should these rise against the Royal Hashemite Kingdom rule, which they already tried in September 1970, this could prove disastrous to Israel and the United States Middle East policy.

    On Friday Muslim Brotherhood activists marched in Amman to protest Israel’s closure on Gaza, and call on Hamas to resume suicide bombings. About 8,000 activists from Jordan’s mainstream Muslim Brotherhood took to the streets in support of their ideological brethren, the Palestinian Hamas group. Jordanian officials have been alarmed. They fear it broadens the popularity of the Islamist movement among a majority of poor Jordanians, many of them living in refugee camps and long disenchanted with the US-led Middle East peace process. “Hamas is winning more supporters every day because it represents the conscience of the nation,” Sheikh Hamza Mansour, a leading Islamist deputy said.

    There is however one bright element in these, otherwise all bleak developments: Egypt actually helped Israel on Wednesday, to complete the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Moreover, it clearly signaled Hamas’ disengagement from the insignificant and powerless, Ramallah leadership. The obvious would be a long term solution under which the Gaza Strip will be aligned with Cairo, while the West Bank- eventually to Jordan. A two-state Palestine, in which a non-territorial connected Gaza and West Bank can be functioning, is really unthinkable, under such abnormal terms. As matters stand this week, it seems logical, that further talks with the ‘impotent’ Abbas-Fayad team, which is not even ruling the West Bank, is a sheer waste of effort for Israel, which should now concentrate to find a viable solution to the new challenges – which are facing its security.

    President Bush’s Annapolis Palestine statehood dream seems no more than wishful thinking under the new circumstances. It is high time for the Washington administration, to wake up to Mid Eastern realities and discard their pipe dream policies, which have already backfired on every futile attempt. Why should Israel not start thinking on its own and decide what’s best for it. It certainly would not be a “Two -Palestine” state.

    The steel wall seperating Gaza from Egyptian Rafah. This wall erected by the Israelis collapsed by multiple explosions set by Hamas engineers.

    Topol / Topol M (SS-27)

    RS-12M/SS-25 // RS-12M2/SS-27

    Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

    Russia plans to field the Topol-M (RS-12M2 or NATO reporting name SS-27) Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) with a fifth strategic missile regiment operating under the Tatishchevo strategic missile division bringing the number of operational regiments equipped with the Topol M to eight.

    The Topol (RM-12 / SS-25) was first deployed by the Russian military in 1997, and is operated since by the Teikovo division under control of the Strategic Missile Forces in the Ivanovo region, northeast of Moscow.

    The Topol regiments currently operate 48 missiles based in underground silos. Two more will be deployed in 2008. In 2007 the regiment received its first mobile Topol-M, operated by the 2nd battalion. The unit is scheduled to receive additional mobile missiles in 2008.

    Topol-M missiles are expected to form the core of Russia’s strategic missile force. Toppol-M has a range of about 11,000 kms (7,000 miles), and is claimed to be immune to missile defenses, using terminal phase maneuvering, countermeasures and decoys. It is also claimed to be resistant to radiation (including laser), electromagnetic pulse and nuclear blast. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, SMF commander, earlier said that Topol-M systems would be equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) in the next two or three years.

    The mobile Topol-M missiles are less vulnerable to the technical reconnaissance of an enemy. Russian officials said that production of mobile missile will continue over the next few years. Topol-M missiles are expected to form the core of Russia’s strategic missile force.

    In a parallel move, Russian Navy submarines will get the naval version known as RSM-56 Bulava-M, (NATO Reporting name SS-NX-30) currently undergoing flight testing. The first submarine of the Borei series, Yury Dolgoruky, is expected to join the Navy in 2008. Russia has also made a decision to start serial production of the Bulava-M missile, following a successful test launch in late June 2007.

    Titan’s Acquisition Consolidates Chemring’s Simulation Offering

    Chemring Group PLC, a leading producer of expendable decoy countermeasures announces is set to buy the U.S. based Titan Dynamics Systems, Inc. from the Allied Defense Group (ADG). Chemring agreed to pay $4.75 million in cash for all Titan’s stocks. As a privately held company, Titan was acquired by the Allied Research Corporation in 2002 but now, ADG is oriented toward weapons and ammunition activities and decided to divest its non-strategic assets.


    Titan, a manufacturer of battlefield effects simulators, provides battlefield effect simulators (BES) and pyrotechnic cartridges offering warfighters to practice in realistic training throughout the military’s ‘digital training grounds’. Typical simulators include missile launch and IED effect generators, replicating the characteristics of shoulder-launched weapons against land or air targets. The company provides these services through a five year contract operated by the US Program Executive Office, Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEOSTRI).

    According to David Price, Chief Executive of Chemring, merging Titan with Chemring’s current cartridge-based military training pyrotechnics activity will consolidate the company’s position in this £90 million niche market, introducing multi-effects cartridge system (MECS) from IEDs to micro-pyrotechnics, which can be used indoors for training in urban warfare.

    BAE Systems Closes Pinzgauer 1 Production Line

    BAE Systems plans to close the manufacturing facilities at Guildford and Fareham and discontinue production of the Pinzgauer 1, with the potential loss of up to 102 jobs. Development of the Pinzgauer 2 vehicle will be transitioned to the BAE Systems South Africa business. Reviewing current and future potential workload, and the current cost base of the Pinzgauer vehicle, the company decided to end the program, maintaining a core team of about 25 people to support existing users, primarily the Armies of UK and New Zealand.

    BAE will continue the assembly of Pinzgauer 1 and vector vehicles currently on order for the UK Ministry of defense will be completed at the current locations. The Pinzgauer line of business was acquired by BAE Systems in August 2007 as part of the Armor Holdings acquisition. The Pinzgauer proved to be a costly product that consumed expensive production resources that could not fit within BAE’s wheeled vehicle strategy.

    Diehl’s Sky Sphere set to Defeat UAS, OWA Drones Head-On

    0
    Diehl Defence has teamed up with Skysec to develop a drone interceptor. Diehl works with Skysec’s subsidiary, Skysec Defence, to modify the original civilian-oriented net-arresting interceptor into a hard-kill system suitable for military missions....

    Defense Update Weekly News Summary

    0
    Welcome to the latest episode of Defense-Update News Summary! In this episode, we dive into this week’s developments in defense technology, military acquisitions, and strategic partnerships worldwide. Some of this week's highlights include: Elbit Systems...

    Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Program Launches as Part of Rafale F5 Standard

    0
    The French Ministry of Armed Forces has officially launched the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) program as part of the Rafale F5 standard development. This event marks the beginning of a new era in...

    Air Defense & C-UAS Innovations at the AUSA 2024 Exhibition

    0
    Army Air Defense Undergoes Significant Modernization to Counter Drone Threats The U.S. Army's air defense branch has experienced its most substantial modernization and growth in over four decades, primarily driven by the need to counter...

    Elbit Systems Address US Army Artillery Modernization with Sigma 155×52 Wheeled Howitzer

    0
    Elbit Systems of America showcases the Sigma Next Generation Howitzer at AUSA 2024, where competing systems from Sweden, South Korea, France, and Germany are likely to be presented, some in models, others in full...

    Defense-Update Weekly News Summary

    0
    Welcome to the latest episode of Defense-Update News Summary! In this episode, we dive into this week’s developments in defense technology, military acquisitions, and strategic partnerships worldwide. Some of this week's highlights include: Elbit Systems...

    Israel Revamps Aerial Bomb Production

    0
    Elbit Systems has signed a 1.5-billion-shekel (approximately $400 million) contract with Israel's Ministry of Defense to establish an aerial bomb manufacturing bombs for the Israeli Air Force. In the past, the government-owned IMI operated...