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    Netfires – Non Line Of Sight (NLOS) Missile System

    The Non Line-Of-Sight-Land Systems (NLOS-LS) is in development for the US Army by Netfires LLC, a joint venture between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, under $1 billion System Design and Development (SDD) contract awarded by the Pentagon. NLOS-LS weapon system is a platform independent, self contained system, capable of autonomous or man-in-the loop operations. NLOS-LS has a joint service applicability for the Navy ad is included as a weapon module on the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Unmanned Surface vehicle (USV). A family of artillery missiles, NLOS-LS is fired from batteries of vertical launchers deployed by ground vehicles, or helicopters throughout the theater, and networked to each other and to a higher command and control center to quickly engage an enemy.

    Originally, two types of missiles are under development as part of the NeFires system – the Loitering Attack Missile (LAM), and Precision Attack Missile (PAM). Both missiles were designed to be vertically launched from the Container Launch Unit (CLU). Raytheon is developing the PAM. LAM has been eliminated from the program, to be replaced by other type of non expendable, persistent target acquisition capability. The NLOS CLU has 15 canistered missiles, the CLU has an autonomous vertical launcher weighing 3,150 lbs. Each CLU is self contained with autonomous location unit, data radio and launch control systems.

    NLOS-LS will be a key element in the US Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) warfighting transformation concept, as it becomes an essential battlespace effector, as part of the “unit of action” of tomorrow’s soldier.

    After the cancellation of LAM, PAM has remained the only missile in the NLOS system. Designed for operating at ranges 0-40km, the 117 lb, 7″ diameter missile uses a uncooled Imaging Infrared /semi-active laser with automatic target recognition for target acquisition and terminal homing. The missile is networked with in-flight updates, enabling retargeting and image transfer for BDA. PAM will include a variable thrust motor and a large multimode warhead effective against both hard and soft targets.

    NLOS-LS weapon system is expected to provide the core precision attack capability to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Brigade Combat Team (BCT). is expected to “spiral out” of the FCS program in “spin-out 1” phase to accelerate its deployment with current forces. When employed with current forces NLOS-LS will be tasked by the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for targeting and control. When employed with FCS BCT, the system will link directly to the BCT network. The missile is expected to be ready for evaluation around 2008. The NLOS program is currently focusing on the Precision Attack Missile version. The program could evolve over time to include a loitering missile, air defense missile and missiles with non-lethal effects capability.

    NLOS will also be carried on the future Littoral Combat Ship, where it will offer short range precision coastal attack and support of land operations.

    A-160/160T Humingbird

    A160T Humingbird on its first test flight

    The Boeing Company successfully completed the first flight of the A160T Humingbird unmanned rotorcraft June 15, 2007 from an airfield near Victorville, California. During this flight, the aircraft hovered in ground effect for about 12 minutes. Further flights are now planed proceeding with flight tests of the new engine. The new unmanned VTOL aircraft is powered by a turbine engine, replacing the piston engine used on earlier birds. The US Special Operations Command already ordered the A-160T. Some A-160s, equipped with piston engines have already been delivered said George Muellner, president, Advanced Systems, Boeing IDS. SOCOM is currently evaluating potential operational procedures, missions and tactics using few Robinson R22 helicopters converted to autonomous flying machines, surrogating the A-160 autonomous operations capability.

    A160T Humingbird on its first test flight

    According to Muellner, five alternative payloads have been identified for the A-160, including EO/IR and various radars, as well as precision resupply missions currently performed with the ‘Snow-Goose’ motorized paraglider. DARPA also contracted Boeing to test fly the ‘Forrester’ foliage penetrating radar on the A-160. The aircraft will be able to carry up to 1,000 lbs of payload or fly a distance of 2,500 nautical miles, carrying 300 pounds of payload for up to 20 hours. The aircraft will use a specially designed transmission to match the improved engine.

    Muellner told Defense-Update that with the new propulsion, Boeing is planning to extend the mission endurance to 24 and further to 36 hours, offering SOCOM true persistent mission capability. Hummingbird offers performance levels unique to an aircraft of its class. The platform has a rotor diameter of 36 foot, and length of 35 foot. It is configured for 4,000 – 5,000 pounds maximum takeoff weight. On persistent missions, A-160T will be able to fly at speeds up to 140 knots, operate at altitudes up to 25,000 – 30,000 ft and hover for hours at an altitude of 15,000 ft.

    Hezbollah’s Rocket Blitz

    Assessment of the Second Lebanon War By Col. David Eshel

    During the Second Lebanon War of summer 2006, Hezbollah achieved for the first time, strategic terror effects with tactical rockets – with thousands of WW2 era Katyusha rockets it rained down on northern Israel. The terrorist army had stockpiled over 14,000 short- and medium-range rockets in calibers between 100mm to 302mm weapons. Originally designed as area-suppression and psychological weapons to support tactical assaults, these rockets gained a new interest as terror weapons with strategic resonance, reaching their climax with hundreds fired daily on targets in northern Israel for nearly five weeks. The larger caliber rockets, mainly Syrian origin 302mm (designated Khaibar-1 by Hezbollah) and Iranian Fajr-3, were used to strike deep into Israel, repeatedly hitting and virtually closing down the strategic port city of Haifa and even landing halfway down the coast toward Tel Aviv.

    Hezbollah medium range rockets fired at Haifa, from the Lebanese coastal area of  Tyre.

    These Iranian made Zelzal 2 missiles (derivatives of the old Russian FROG missile) were considered by Hezbollah as their "strategic weapon". Most of these  weapons were destroyed by the Israeli Air Force on the first night of the war.The high-explosive warheads of these rockets were augmented with anti-personal steel balls and fragmentation sheets, causing deadly effect on Israeli civilian targets. Some were also modified to improve concrete penetration, to improve their effectiveness urban area. Official Israeli police reports documented 4,228 rocket impacts inside Israel. Thanks to an organized civilian defense, Israel suffered only 53 fatalities from these attacks, but along with 250 severely and 2,000 lightly wounded civilians.

    During the first two weeks of the war, Hezbollah rocket attacks averaged about 100 rockets per day. In early August, Hezbollah doubled the rate of attack to a daily average of 200 and in spite of IDF intensive operations; Hezbollah still was able to launch 250 rockets Aug.13, the last day before the cease-fire. Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel’s Missile Defense Organization concluded that “Israeli counterattacks apparently had no serious influence on Hezbollah’s rate of fire but did have effect on the accuracy and geography of the attacks.” Rubin advised that Israel needed to reduce the “flash-to-bang” cycle – the interval from the launch of a Hezbollah rocket to the Israeli counterattack – to a few seconds from the time of pinpointing launcher location. Rubin’s second major conclusion was that Israel needed without delay, “to develop and deploy effective and affordable active defense against rockets to protect vital civilian and military installations.” But in the war, Israel had no adequate answer to the problem, which it faced from tactical high-trajectory weapons.

    These short range 107mm  rockets were fired by Hezbollah in salvos , from cahched positions, operated by remote control. These small but illusive rockets  caused much of the devastation in the Israeli northern cities.Only the air force performed with utmost precision against the medium range rockets. Armed with excellent strategic intelligence and highly accurate targeting capability, achieving an impressive target-identification-to-kill cycle time of less than five minutes, the Israeli pilots succeeded in hitting nearly all of Hezbollah’s long-and medium range rockets on the first night of the war: 18 out of 20 Iranian-built Zelzal 2 launchers, as well as virtually all Fajr 4 and 5 weapons, were destroyed, ensuring the safety of Tel Aviv. Toward the end of the war, the air force developed effective means to strike medium range rocket launchers almost immediately after launching their first salvo, practically reducing their life cycle to a single shot. However the short range, man-pack 107 and 122mm rockets that rained down on Israel day after day proved too elusive for technical collection means. Notoriously inaccurate, most of the rockets proved ineffective, but nonetheless achieved multiple strategic goals when employed en-masse.

    A stack of 107mm rockets cached by Hezbollah in an underground basement.The rockets were maintained in ready to launch  state, and could be triggered by remote control (electrical activation line is seen at the bottom of the picture).When the Syrian-modified 302mm rockets started landing in Haifa Bay, government agencies began raising concerns about the chemical plants there. The Rafael Armament Development Authority, one of Israel’s leading defense contractors, was contacted and work hurriedly began at its Haifa headquarters to modify and deploy a counter rocket early warning and intercept capability. At the time, the company tried making modifications to the Barak missile system, used on Navy ships to intercept incoming missiles. An ad-hoc deployment on Mount Carmel, of a Patriot-2 battery also proved inadequate to intercept incoming rockets, but its radar was used to enhance early impact alert warning.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    Hezbollah anti-amour Tactics and weapons

    Assessment of the Second Lebanon War By Col. David Eshel

    Realizing the capabilities of the Merkava 4 tank, Hezbollah allocated their most advanced weaponry to combat this advanced tank, engaging these tanks exclusively with the heavier, more capable missiles such as 9M133 AT-14 Kornet9M131 Metis M and RPG-29.

    RPG-29 and 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5) were employed mostly against Merkava 3 and 2 while non-tandem weapons, such as Tow, Fagot and improved RPG 7Vs were left to engage other armored vehicles such as AIFV. The least used were AT-3 Sagger and, to a limited extent, the TOW as well as non tandem RPGs, were considered obsolete against tanks, but proved quite lethal against troops seeking cover in buildings.

    Overall, almost 90% of the tanks hit were by tandem warheads. In general, Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava Mk 4 over Merkava Mk 2 and 3, and in general, targeted tanks over AIFV. At the beginning of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the main Israeli concern was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian Kornet antitank missiles. However, it also saw the RPG-29 Vampir with a tandem HEAT that had stolen the show. There were even rumors that Hezbollah had received the notorious TBG-29V thermobaric rounds, but these could not be confirmed in action.

    Hezbollah deployed their tank-killer teams in a thin but effective defensive scheme, protecting the villages where the organization’s Shiite members reside; villages where their short range rockets were positioned and where command infrastructure and logistics support was set up. An estimated 500 to 600 members of their roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah fighting strength in South Lebanon were divided into tank-killer teams of 5 or 6, each armed with 5-8 anti-tank missiles, with further supplies stored in small fortified well camouflaged bunkers and fortified basements, built to withstand Israeli air attacks.

    Due to mountainous area, engagements were encountered at ranges below 3000 meters. Hezbollah tank-killer teams would lay in wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, having planted large IEDs on known approach routes. Once an Israeli tank would detonate one of these, Hezbollah would start lobbing mortar shells onto the scene to prevent rescue teams rushing forward, also firing at outflanking Merkava tanks by targeting the more vulnerable rear zone with RPGs. In general, Hezbollah demonstrated rather slow regrouping and response rate, since their mobility and command links were severely restricted by the IDF dominating the open areas. However, even this slow pace was fast enough to match the slow and indecisive movements of the Israelis forces.

    The night vision equipment used by Hezbollah was not as advanced as the IDF’s. They possess mainly individual night vision equipment and some night observation systems, but generally lacked night capabilities for their anti-tank weapons. Benefiting from its superior night combat capability, the IDF conducted most movements at night, minimizing exposure of forces during day time.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    Assessing the performance of Merkava Tanks

    Assessment of the Second Lebanon War By Col. David Eshel

    Smoke was realized as a major deficiency of IDF armor. The lack of instant smoke  countermeasures exposed tanks to severe and unnecessary threats.  This Merkava Mk4 tank is employing smoke generated by the engine exhaust, however, this method requires the tank to maneuver to mask itslelf, while instantenous smoke covers the tank from the direction of the attack and enabling it to evade to a safe position.

    Four types of Merkava tanks were in action in Lebanon 2006, including Merkava Mk4, the Merkava Mk 2D (with its distinctive sloped turret), the standard Mk2 (mostly with reserve units), and Merkava Mk3Baz.
    Towards the end of the fighting, Brigadier General Halutzi Rodoi, the chief of the IDF Armored Corps was asked to assess the performance of his tank force and especially the lessons drawn from the fighting against advanced anti-tank missiles fired by Hezbollah on the coveted Merkava Mk4, which saw its first combat engagement in Lebanon. According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize the risk even when it was penetrated.

    Merkava Mk4 damaged by a heavy AT missile, demonstrating the high protection and complexity of the armor systemThe IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about ten percent were hit by various threats. Less than half of the hits penetrated. In overall assessment, the potential risk to crewmen would have been much higher, if the tank would be of a conventional design. A colonel commanding an armored brigade, which bore the brunt of battle, mentioned in an interview that during the war that hundreds of antitank missiles were fired on his unit and in total only 18 tanks were seriously damaged. Of those, missiles actually penetrated only five or six vehicles and according to statistics, only two tanks were totally destroyed, however, both by super-heavy IED charges.

    The unique Merkava design uses various types of hybrid armor as well as additional protection to defeat penetration by kinetic and shaped charges, and minimize the risk of spall, generated by the shaped charge plasma jet. All Merkava types use fire retardant containers to store and protect heavy small-arms ammunition, preventing high-lethal secondary explosion.


    Furthermore, tanks are equipped with rapid fire extinguishing system that eliminates sympathetic detonation of ammunition. As result, the risk to crew members is reduced, even when the armor is penetrated. During the fighting, and only few tanks encountered catastrophic fire hazards after being penetrated by anti-tank missile, substantially reducing lethal burn casualties to crew members. Only few hits penetrated the frontal arc, where the tank has the heaviest armor. Realizing this, Hezbollah aimed their missiles to the sides, and rear, when possible. While the flanks were designed to withstand significant threats they are not designed to defeat all threats, but are capable of defusing and reducing the risk to the crew and tank, even when they fail to defeat the threat. Therefore, both frontal and side armor demonstrated very high effectiveness against all threats. One of the major lessons of the war is the importance of an active protection system, which can be used to augment current armor and extend the maximum protection, currently limited to the frontal arc, to the full 360 degree region.

    Some of the tanks were equipped with ad-on belly plates to protect against heavy mines and belly charges. Despite the extensive use of these charges by the Hezbollah, since the IDF did not use existing roads and paved new routes to the objectives, only few Merkava tanks and heavy AFVs encountered these charges, some weighing well over a hundred kilogram. While heavily armored vehicles can hardly be expected to survive such an attack, the latest versions of the tank demonstrated effective protection for the crew, which, in some cases, even managed to survive such attack with only minor injuries. In one instance, a Merkava tank was hit by such heavy belly charge, killing one crew member and wounding the remaining six, (some traveling in the rear compartment). Despite the loss of one crew member, this incident is considered proof of the effective protection of the new tank.

    To reduce the threat of such “super charges”, heavily armored D-9 bulldozer were employed to pave new routes for the armored vehicles, and precede the tanks over high-risk tracks, causing IEDs to blow up with minimum damage thus clearing the way for the following tanks.
    The IDF Armored Corps has traditionally invested considerable effort in examining hit after-battle statistics on its tanks, in order to establish new tactics and techniques. The founder of this procedure was Major General Israel Tal, “Father of the Merkava” and one of the leading tank experts of word-wide recognition. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War General Israel Tal led a development team which took into consideration Israel’s unique battlefield characteristics and lessons learned from previous wars. On General Tal’s orders a special team of experts examined every single tank hit, while still on the battlefield and on the findings an in-depth investigation was made to develop effective means for crew protection, which formed the basis of the unique Merkava project. A similar investigation team has already recorded all hits on tanks received during the Lebanon crisis and a full report was made available for further detailed assessment team of experts which is already examining these reports in detail, in order to make the necessary amendments without delay, pending the resumption of the conflict, should the presently fragile cease fire fall apart.A crew member of a Merkava Mk2 tank loads an APAM round.

    Tanks were frequently required to support infantry units, with heavy direct fire which exposed them to missile attacks. During the war, Merkava tanks used various types of ammunition, particularly the APAM, anti-personnel/Anti-Material rounds, developed by IMI. These rounds, originally developed for 105mm guns, were used by Merkava 2 tanks.It was used effectively against Hezbollah targets identified in buildings and bunkers. Several hundreds of APAM projectiles were fired during the war. APAM proved to be the most effective anti-personnel and anti-structure weapon available to the combined arms forces, proving its effectiveness at all realistic combat ranges. Merkava 3 and 4s were equipped with 120mm guns, used modified Flechette for similar anti-personnel roles. These rounds 105mm projectiles are fitted with a 120mm sabot to fit the larger barrel. The projectile used all combat ranges. It is filled with 5,000 steel darts, providing the tank an effective open-area AP capability, and has a high kill probability. IMI is expected to complete development and production of a 120mm version of the APAM which will offer more advanced features, compared to the 105mm type.

    Merkava Mk4 in action - Photo: Noam Eshel 2006

    Additional MEDEVAC modified Merkava tanks were configured early in the conflict and were used to evacuate casualties. The IDF also used artillery fire to protect infantry and armor units exposed to enemy fire, but even the artillery consumed its stocks of smoke ammunition, revealing a serious deficiency in IDF requirements assessment. It took some time, until the units began to work in combined arms teams, an art of war abandoned by the IDF in recent years. This included sending dismounted infantry over suspected high-risk ground and take out enemy positions with close-in fighting, using tanks and attack helicopters to support such operation with direct fire, while using heavy armored D-9 for recovery action under fire.

    During the last six years, in which the bulk of the IDF was constantly engaged in low intensity urban counter terrorist warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, all regular forces, including tanks crews were retrained for small unit infantry policing activities, which was mostly dismounted action. This proved extremely painful, when young conscripts, which make up the bulk of the regular IDF were rushed into battle, after hasty retraining. Israeli tankers had to quickly re-adapt old-new procedures during combat.
    During the Intifada, the armored corps did not receive top priority among senior defense establishment officials. Short-sighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on armored units. As result, at the beginning of the war, tanks were lacking basic countermeasures such as instantaneous smoke canisters, laser warning detectors and infrared jammers. While some of these devices were urgently supplied later during the war, the damage was already done. Armored Corps officers blamed authorities after the war, expressing their frustration over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks and claiming that soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring, among others, to the Trophy a new and unique, locally developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles such as the Merkava 4 tank. If those measures would have been available, Merkava tank crews would have fared a much better survival chance against even third-generation weapons thrown at them.

    Summing up the performance of Merkava tanks, especially the latest version Merkava Mk4, most tank crews agree that, in spite of the losses sustained and some major flaws in tactical conduct, the tank proved its mettle in its first high-saturation combat. The overall consensus was that with less well-armored tanks, the toll would have been much higher.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    Israeli Intelligence Dilemmas in Lebanon

    Assessment of the Second Lebanon War By Col. David Eshel

    In the years since Israel ended its military occupation of southern Lebanon in May 2000, Israel’s intelligence community watched warily as Hezbollah built up its military presence in the region. When Hezbollah militants kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, the Israeli military was ready to react almost instantly, based on years of extensive intelligence gathering. “Of all of Israel’s wars since 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most prepared,” said Gerald Steinberg, professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University. “In a sense, the preparation began in May 2000, immediately after the Israeli withdrawal, when it became clear the international community was not going to prevent Hezbollah from stockpiling missiles and attacking Israel”.

    A perusal of thick and detailed secret dossiers might show how deeply Israeli intelligence was able to penetrate certain levels of Hezbollah’s alignments, but also how limited in importance this was in the decisive test of utilizing the secrets. “Hezbollah’s Combat Concept” dated January 2006 is a highly restricted 130-page booklet, crammed with data on bunkers and Katyusha rockets and other military installations. Its author is a lieutenant colonel in Military Intelligence (MI), personal aide to MI director and formerly head of the Lebanon section in the intelligence department of Northern Command. The problem was, as is unfortunately so often with top secret documents, in hierarchical organizations, that while all this wealth was readily available, its contents were regarded so restricted, that only a select few were allowed to feast their eyes on its contents. The inevitable result was, as ridiculously as it may sound, that even the commander of 91st Division, which was in charge of the Lebanese border, was not party to such life-saving information before the war started on July 12!

    The problem of intelligence gathering capabilities intensified further with the outbreak of war. As is usual in combat situations, the intelligence that is available to the troops before the war, a great deal of which has been built up meticulously over years, goes up in smoke as soon as the troops go into action. The bank of targets that has been prepared diminishes after the first wave of attacks. There is a tactical intelligence difficulty in pinpointing new targets during the fighting, until the forward combat elements actually make contact with the enemy. The conduct of the battle, from there on, depends on tactical intelligence, mostly real-time in nature, as targets come into focus by the advancing troops, in modern warfare, through tactical intelligence elements, such as TUAV, electro-optical observation etc.


    Moreover, it is especially difficult to run human agents to provide actual information: Communications with them, even if they are equipped with state-of-the-art devices, usually break down because of a lack of physical contact. This became evident when the ground war started along the border region. Although Israeli intelligence had operated Lebanese human intelligence (HUMINT) agents for years, since the “Security Zone” era, some of which remained active, long after the IDF withdrew in May2000. During the IDF’s 18-year presence in Lebanon, the members of the IDF HUMINT unit were especially active across Israel’s northern border. To this day the Lebanese press occasionally runs stories about the arrest and trial of local agents who operated in the service of this unit. In November 1998, a Lebanese court convicted no fewer than 57 citizens of collaborating with Israel intelligence. But many of the surviving agents were forced to leave their homes in South Lebanon when the IDF distributed Psychop leaflets calling to evacuate their villages before these came under fire. Lack of HUMINT became critical when the fighting intensified and Hezbollah fighters mingled with the population in the villages, but were difficult to identify from non combatants.

    Mossad can certainly high marks for much of the high precision intelligence, which enabled the air attacks to pinpoint Hezbollah medium rocket sites and neutralize most of them during the 48 hours, which saved most of Israel’s major towns from these larger rockets. Air force intelligence also performed in clock-work fashion, identifying Hezbollah rocket launchers seconds after firing, which were then destroyed by immediate air attack through “cab-rank” cruising air assets, in the suspected environment. The unique rapid reaction “sensor-to-shooter kill-chain” tactics, similar to performance in the Gaza Strip, paid off handsomely in Lebanon 2006.

    IDF Military Intelligence gathering units ( HUMINT) and signal intelligence( SIGINT) were tasked with obtaining vital intelligence on Hezbollah forward deployments in South Lebanon and their work was in high demand by forward troops, during the initial stages of the war. But all this was not sufficient: For example, one place was indeed identified, using satellite photographs, as a Hezbollah bunker, however only from the ground at short range before contact, were special forces able to discover that it served as the entrance to a previously unknown extensive underground network of caves and bunkers stuffed with missiles. On the other hand, precise intelligence allowed IDF special forces to raid Hezbollah strongpoints deep inside Lebanese territory. The successful commando raids into the Beka’a Valley and Tyre, depended on real-time intelligence. In fact, the surprise raid into Baalbek, the most ambitious air and ground operation of the current conflict, had been conducted, based on excellent intelligence, demonstrating that Israeli forces could strike anywhere

    A major element in the Second Lebanon War was Hezbollah’s professional employment of advanced anti-tank missiles. The very presence of such weapons was no surprise to IDF intelligence. In fact, according to declassified reports, one of these was actually captured ( or obtained) and examined by experts long before the war started. What remained obscure, was the massive deployment and tactical method used by Hezbollah with these weapons, which became a dominant star player during all ground engagements. According to official statistics, anti-tank missiles hit 46 tanks and 14 other armored vehicles. However, fortunately, due to enhanced protection, in all these attacks the Merkava tanks actually sustained only 15 armour penetrations.

    Senior Armored Corps officers claimed in media interviews during the war, that the defense establishment had refused to provide tanks with the Trophy, a locally developed active protection system which creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles, such as the Merkava 4 tank. The system is designed to detect and track a threat and counters it with a launched projectile that intercepts the anti-tank rocket. The reason for such costly oversight, was claimed by the authorities, in the aftermath of the war, as lack of funding due to budget cuts!

    In overall perspective it seems, at first sight, that Israel’s miscalculation in assessing intelligence information in Lebanon has the same cause as America’s miscalculations in Iraq: plain old grade arrogance underestimating the enemy. It is however important to understand that Mossad and the rest of Israel’s intelligence apparatus are not all-knowing and all-powerful, despite their past successes, which have created an aura of great strength and invincibility around them. It is clear that Hezbollah has studied and learned more than a few lessons itself over the years. Members of its military wing, for example, are far less publicly visible and, by implication, identifiable, than members of Fatah’s militia, which the IDF has been to hunt and target with a highly successful “kill chain” apparatus.

    The war in Lebanon may have begun with a string of intelligence failures resulting from the fact that Israel had lowered its alert level on the northern border prior to the Hezbollah raid.

    But not all was lost. Last July, the war wiped out most of the vast sum of $4-6 billion the Iranian treasury sunk into building Hezbollah’s military strength. The organization was meant to be strong and effective enough to provide Iran with a formidable deterrent to Israel or the United States embarking on a military operation to destroy the Islamic regime’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran has now been manipulatively robbed of its primary deterrent asset ahead of a probable nuclear confrontation with the United States and Israel. Hezbollah, on Hassan Nasrallah’s hasty orders, squandered thousands of rockets – either by firing them into Israel or having them destroyed by the Israeli air force. This at least, may have been worth the effort by Israel.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    Hezbollah’s Intelligence War

    Assessment of the Second Lebanon War By Col. David Eshel

    Until the fateful date of July 12, 2006, when the Hezbollah triggered the Second Lebanon War, Israel was accounted an important world power in the development of electronic warfare systems – so much so that a symbiotic relationship evolved for the research and development of many US and Israeli, combat-proven electronic warfare systems. But the first indication of something amiss on the Israeli side already showed up on day three of the Lebanon War. Israeli commanders were certain, having cast an electronic blanket over South Lebanon jamming all Hezbollah communications and telephone networks, including even mobile phones. The IDF general staff were under the illusion that they had also knocked out the communication links between Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and his local commanders in the combat zone. But they were wrong.

    It took them a while to discover that with help of Iranian electronic warfare specialists, Hezbollah had chalked up a major success in, their “Harb Tammus” or the 2006 summer Lebanon War. They had prevented Israeli electronic warfare units from jamming Hezbollah’s communications networks in the battle zone of south Lebanon. In fact, these continued functioning even at the toughest fire-beaten strongholds holding out against Israeli attackst in the combat zone. However, to their surprise, after a fierce battle at Qantara just south of the Litani River, soldiers found the bodies of three Iranian intelligence officers with documents of identification and gear that indicated them as operators of local networks for jamming Israeli radar and communications. Israeli forces searching through the bunkers they cleaned out in South Lebanon were amazed to discover that many contained subterranean state- of the- art communications rooms fitted out with advanced instruments with Iranian encoding equipment.


    Brigadier-General Gal Hirsch, the commander of the IDF’s 91 Division, told the press, on 25 July that his troops found rooms full of Iranian-made equipment during the battle for Bint Jbeil (an especially tough Hezbollah stronghold in southern Lebanon), which included eavesdropping devices, computers and modern communications equipment, up-to-date and detailed military maps of Israeli strategic targets, and even lists of telephone numbers inside Israel. Israel’s electronic warfare experts, examining the sites, were surprised by the quality of the equipment they found, the network being, among others, connected by optical fibers which are not susceptible to electronic jamming.

    The Iranian electronic engineers’ success proved such that, on Wednesday, Aug. 9, nearly four weeks into the war, Hezbollah’s communications networks were still operating at points only 500 meters from the Israeli border and in spite of repeated bomb strikes on its Al Manar television and Nour Radio studios in south Beirut, both stations remained on the air almost without interruption.

    American and Israeli electronic warfare experts, who visited the combat zone, have concluded that Iran had probably decided to use the Lebanon conflict as the testing ground for its military, intelligence and electronic capabilities in preparation for a future clash with the United States and Israel in a potential anti-nuclear conflict. A major element, which declassified Israeli and allied intelligence sources indicate, was concern over the method that Iranian experts managed to render their Beirut embassy totally impregnable to western most advanced electronic or sophisticated hi-tech penetration. Unconfirmed reports even mentioned a war room in an underground bunker under the embassy, having been placed at Hassan Nasrallah and his staff’s disposal, after Hezbollah’s own bunker communications were destroyed by Israeli bombing of Hezbollah’s Beirut Dahiyah district. Although Israeli and American intelligence tried to dismiss Hezbollah officers presence in the embassy, there were several reports that placed Nasrallah and his high command in the Iranian embassy for some time during the war.

    But not only with electronic warfare did Hezbollah gain considerable success in penetrating Israeli territorial space. While Iran has assisted Hezbollah by providing advanced intelligence-gathering technology such as reconnaissance drones and sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment, Hezbollah HUMINT activities inside Israel managed to recruit valuable information rendering agents. One outstanding example, over such recruitment was the network operated around Omar el-Heib, a Bedouin who served as a lieutenant-colonel in the IDF and was sentenced to 15 years in prison on espionage charges last June. Using Lebanese drug dealers, Hezbollah transferred dozens of kilograms of narcotics to Heib’s network, which was tasked with gathering intelligence on IDF positions and smuggling these across the border, in exchange. Israeli analysts pointed out, that the accurate Hezbollah rocket attacks on IDF military installations, such as the air force monitoring station on Mount Meron, which was attacked at the outset of the war, must have been made possible through local intelligence reports delivered by HUMINT agents.

    As for preventative intelligence, against Israeli intelligence penetration onto their own network, Hezbollah had created a special counter intelligence department tasked with enforcing organisational security. This included also an excellent internal signals security apparatus, ensuring that members rarely used communications technology that can be monitored by Israel. It is even rumoured that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah himself, has not used a telephone since he became the group’s leader in 1992!

    Operational units are also said to have been frequently restructured in recent years, in preparation of the war, enhancing strict compartmentalisation of the various elements in the organisation and thus minimise the risk of infiltration. Finally, Hezbollah’s use of Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) has been the most publicised aspect of this intelligence-gathering effort, which may not have been implemented to its fullest effect, through Israeli counter measures during the war, but had substantial public relations result, in raising Israeli concern over these intrusions into its airspace.

    For further reading; 2nd Lebanon War Analysis:

    The Middle East is Back in Flames

    Hamas planned to inaugurate a mosque, on Friday’s prayers, as its official government seat at Mahmoud Abbas’ Presidential Guard-security service compound, the Muntada, in downtown Gaza City – the last Fatah bastion to fall under Hamas’ five-day onslaught. This will symbolize the Islamist character of the national Palestinian entity supplanting the defeated Palestinian Authority. All border crossings, including the strategic ‘Philadelphi’ border post at Rafah is now firmly under Hamas control.

    The European monitors have fled to safety in Israel, while the Egyptian troops in the Sinai side of the international border have sofar remained inconspicuously passive to these earthshaking events. In fact, the Force 17 commander Colonel Musbah Basichi and sixty of his compatriots have fled to Egypt already, escaping certain death by Hamas. Matters became even worse, as Hamas seized all the crossings into Israeli territory. Especially challenging could become Hamas’ control of the Karni goods crossing, over which the bulk of vital emergency supplies for 1.4 million Gazans are delivered daily. Hamas’ is now clearly challenging Israel how to react to this move- wether to co-operate and virtually recognize its “sovereignty” as de-facto ruler in the Gaza Strip, or be accused by causing a human catastrophy among the non-belligerent population. Meanwhile the fighting around the last of President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah last bastion in Gaza is raging relentlessly.


    Thousands of Palestinian security officers loyal to Fatah are under Hamas siege at the Gaza City’s Presidential Guard compound, rapidly running out of water and ammunition. Some of their prominent leaders and their families have already tried to contact Israel, requesting urgent evacuation by sea (Gaza Port is still under Fatah control) to safety in Egypt. But with over 80% of the Gaza Strip already overrun, loyalists of the President, including complete clans, have surrendered and turned in their weapons- the battle for Gaza seems for all purposes lost. The Hamas military leadership has given Fatah forces till Friday noon to surrender their arms or become wanted men under sentence of death.

    Military experts monitoring events in Gaza over the last week are surprised by the conduct of operations, which could clearly indicate guidance by professional elements, being Hezbollah, Syrian or even Iranian origin. Senior Fatah official Samir Mash’harawi has indeed accused Hamas of striving to establish, in the Gaza Strip, a small state modeled after the Taliban in Afghanistan. An Islamic fundamentalist entity, right on Egypt’s doorstep and along the Mediterranean sea, could become devastating, not only to Cairo, but to the free World itself. In fact, experts regard the present events in Gaza being the second triumph in a weeks for a Palestinian force backed by Iran and Syria. In less than one month, Islamic Fundamentalism in two Middle East sectors, remained virtually unchallenged. Arms smuggling over the Syria-Lebanon border is continuing without any control by UNIFIL under orders by UN Resolution 1701.

    Fouad Siniora’s US-supported government’s troops failed to break through to the Palestinian camp Nahr al-Bared and crush the pro-Syrian uprising by a relatively small armed group. In Israel, Ehud Olmer’s government stood by, inactively watching as the most radical elements in the Middle East snatched the Gaza Strip right on Israel’s southwestern threshold.

    But Lebanon and Gaza are not the only flashpoint rising to a bloody climax this week. In Iraq, a bold blow to Iraqi hopes for peace, by suspected al-Qaida bombers, toppled the towering minarets of Samarra’s revered Shiite shrine on Wednesday, adding new provocation to old wounds a year after the mosque’s Golden Dome was destroyed. The Askariya dome itself was destroyed in February 2006 in a bombing blamed on al Qaeda-linked Sunni insurgents, which sparked Iraq’s worst wave of sectarian violence. All over Sunni Iraq people are trembling for a Shi’ite revenge, which is surely coming. Almost simultaneousely, an explosion, apparently from a bomb-rigged car, rocked Beirut’s seafront Wednesday, killing an anti-Syrian lawmaker and nine others. The 65-year-old lawmaker, Walid Eido, was the seventh opponent of Damascus to be killed in two years in this conflict-ridden country. Eido’s son, two bodyguards and six others were also killed in the explosion, and eleven others were wounded.

    Yesterday’s explosion was the latest in a series to hit Lebanon in the last three weeks as Lebanese troops battled Islamic militants in a Palestinian refugee camp in the northern part of the country. And a new source of potential tension is already creating as Turkey is building up its military presence on its southeastern border with Iraq. Turkey is debating whether to launch an incursion into northern Iraq to root out members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and related Kurdish militant groups based there The PKK’s stated aim is to create a democratic and independent Kurdish state that would consist of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran.

    In the mountainous areas of northern Iraq, the Kurds have the advantage over the Turkish military in terms of terrain, using a network of caves for shelter and rendering air attacks relatively useless if not dangerous. While the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have enjoyed the greatest stability since the 2003 US-led invasion, the establishment of strongholds in the region’s far north by the PKK and related groups – coupled with a growing confrontation to the south over the future of the oil-rich Kirkuk area – threaten this stability with new bloodshed. But there is little more Washington can do to dissuade Turkey other than to express its displeasure at this point A key base in NATO’s southern reigon, Incirlik is situated only 12 kilometers east of Adana and 56 kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea. Some 5,000 US Air Force troops are deployed on the base, supported by Turkish military personnel. Incirlik served as main hub for missions in support for the war in Afghanistan after September 2001 and then in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and beyond. The Turkish military and intelligence community are key strategic allies of the Pentagon, the Israeli Defense Forces and associated intelligence agencies in the growing espionage battle against Iran and these strategic relations can hardly been jeopardized in favor of the Kurds.

    So, in the meantime the Middle East is going up in flames as fighting flares up on no less than four Flashpoints. The astounding victory of Hamas in Gaza will have a contagious effect on the entire region and especially on the moderates like Egypt, Jordan and even Saudi arabia. The creation of “Hamastan” preceived as another victory of “Islamic fundamentalism on the march” after last year’s Lebanon Fiasco, will reverberate all over the area and could even affect Islamic elements inside Israel. An international force is not only ineffective, but also totally superflous. The real key to this tragedy is in Cairo and only President Hosni Mubarak can still save the situation. By all means, the present situation should in fact serve as a last minute “wake-up” call to shake-up Egypt into action before it is too late to save Gaza from becoming a dangerous Islamic fundamentalist Taliban like mini-state. By issuing strict and undisputable orders to close the so-called ‘Philadelphi’ border line – only 11 kilometer ( 6,5 miles) long- will eventually, once effectively controlled, shut-down the Iranian-sponsored Hamas al Qaeda-Hezbollah lifeline, blocking once and for all all, access to weapons, ammunition and financial aid- a move, which will eventually “starve” the fighting potential and then enable an international force to enter into a fairly relative safe environment to restore some sort of orderly administration under a UN framework. But only a concerted effort effort by a sane leadership, emanating unflinching determination, not to let things happen Ahmadinejad’s way, can still prevent the Middle East becoming a hornet’s nest for his Islamic fundamentalist terrorism ambitions and only a determined action displayed, without further hesitation, can save the egion turning into a catastrophy.

    Unfortunately, as it seems, the UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, is far from acting as a decisive element to curb the spiralling violence in the turbulent Middle East. Reacting to the urgent demand to send a United Nations”Peacekeeping” force to Gaza, Ban Ki moon had only this to say: “This is an idea we need to explore,” the UN secretary-general, said on Wednesday, adding, that he had held preliminary discussions about the idea with members of the UN Security Council.I need to consider more in detail with the countries concerned. In this way, any UN reaction would seem like “shutting the barn door after the horses have already bolted”!

    For earlier analysis on the situation in Gaza please check:

    Also from David Eshel – 1967 Six Days War Retrospect:
    How the Kremlin Manipulated the 1967 War to the Brink of Nuclear Conflict 

    Cougar – Mine Protected Armored Patrol Vehicle

    Cougar, developed and produced by Force Protection Inc. is a multi-purpose, 12 ton mine protected armored patrol vehicle. The design uses a monocoque, bulletproof and blast-proof capsule fitted with transparent armored glass, which protects the driver and crew from small arms fire, mine blasts and IED. Typical roles for the vehicle are armored, mine protected troop transport for security, stability and peacekeeping missions, protected weapons platform, law enforcement special response vehicle, counter IED an EOD / Range Clearance vehicle. The vehicle can accommodate 10 passengers in a 4×4 configuration and 16 passengers in a 6×6 configuration. Cougar was selected to serve with the US Marine Corps as a Hardened Engineer Vehicle (HEV), to support engineer mine clearing and explosive ordnance disposal teams deployed in Iraq. As of June 2006, there are more than 130 Cougars and Buffalos in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since their deployment to Iraq in 2003 the Cougar and Buffalo vehicles employed with explosive ordnance disposal teams and engineers units have taken about 1,000 IED hits without a loss of life, said Wayne Phillips, a company vice president in charge of Marine Corps programs. The vehicle has proven to be superior to less protected vehicles, such as the up-armored Humvee or armored trucks.

    A USMC Cougar operated by an EOD team seen after suffering mine damage in Iraq, April 2006. The crew survived the blast with minor injury. For details, check this story at www.defensereview.com (Photo: Sgt Chris Clair, USMC)

    The initial 122 vehicles were procured in two batches, at a total cost of US$97 million. This procurement is part of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Task Force acquisition for Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle (JERRV). First vehicles were shipped on August 2005. A follow-on $50.8 million order for 79 additional vehicles was released by the US Navy on May 2nd, 2006 to be delivered within a year, by May 2007. In May 2006 Spartan Motors announced a contract from Force protection, for the supply of 45 chassis assemblies for the USMC JERRV program.

    Cougars will also make a significant part of the Iraqi fleet of armored patrol vehicles (ILAV), to be supplied by BAE Systems. On November 9th, 2006 the US Marine Corps announced a new order for 200 additional Cougar Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV) and 80 Buffalo mine protected explosive devices clearance vehicles. The total contract worth is estimated at $214 million. Following the recent orders, Force Protection signed GDLS and Armor Holdings as subcontractors for the manufacturing of the Cougar to meet the growing demand. In December 2006, Force Protection and General Dynamics have teamed to propose the Cougar for the joint US Marines, Navy and Army Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program. Due to its maturity and proven combat survivability, Cougar is currently the vehicle of choice for the USMC MRAP program. In January, February and April 2007 the USMC issued three orders for a total of 1,400 vehicles, making about 25% of the total initial order for the new V-hulled armored vehicles.

    Through 2006 Force Protection built and supplied 378 cougars as a subcontractor to BAE Systems. Production order for 20 additional vehicles was awarded to BAE Systems in October 2006 bringing the total amount ordered to date to 398. The Pentagon plans to invest over $445 million to buy over a thousand armored vehicles for the Iraqis. First ILAVs were delivered in August 2006. The ILAV uses a chassis produced by Spartan Motors. Spartan’s share of the total program is expected to reach $45 million. Spartan plans to complete production of the ordered chassis by mid 2007.

    On August 10th 2006 the Pentagon awarder Force Protection a US$62.9 million contract for the 86 British destined Cougars, This foreign military sale program to be delivered through May 2007. According to UK Ministry of defense announcements, British forces will receive 100 Cougars (to be designated “Mastiff”). The vehicles are expected to be combat ready by the year’s end. Cougar meets the requirement for a well protected, wheeled patrol vehicle with a less intimidating profile than tracked vehicles like Warrior or FV430. The vehicles will be fitted with removable spall liners, made of LAST armor. Once the vehicles are delivered they will be customized with Bowman radios and electronic counter-measures and then fitted with additional armor beyond the standard level, to ensure they have the best possible protection. The first batch of vehicles were delivered by mid November 2006.

    While the Cougar is considered a medium-heavy vehicle, Force Protection is developing a Mine-protected Utility Vehicle / Rapid Deployable (MUV-R) called Cheetah, a lighter-weight personnel carrier that incorporates the same protective capabilities as the Cougar. It is designed for a possible future alternative for up-armored Humvees.

    This new vehicle is expected to be ready for field testing by the end of 2006. 

    In October 2005 RAFAEL announced an agreement with FPI to equip the Cougar with reactive armor suit, similar to the type produced by the company for the US Army Bradley Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV). The new reactive armor system uses small volumes of insensitive explosives designed specifically for thin armored vehicles.


    Reactive armor provides optimal protection from IED and light anti-tank threats including RPGs. RAFAEL’s new insensitive light weight reactive armor suit was recently fitted to several APCs including BradleyM-113, FV-432 and International armored trucks.

    How the Kremlin Manipulated the 1967 War to the Brink of Nuclear Conflict

    40 years in Retrospect…

    “…if Israel produces the atomic bomb then I believe that the only answer to such action would be preventive war. The Arab states will have to take immediate action and liquidate everything that would enable Israel to produce the atomic bomb.”

    Excerpts from an Interview with President Nasser,
    by Iraqi Newsmen, 20 February 1966

    Egypt expressed deep concern over the nuclear reactor that Israel was allegedly building near Dimona. After an air battle over the Golan Heights on April 7, 1967, during which six Syrian aircraft were downed, Egypt announced that it was allying itself with Syria.

    Thus, on May 15, Egyptian forces entered the Sinai, in violation of the agreement signed in 1957, in the wake of the Sinai War. In addition, Egypt closed the Straits of Israel's nucler research center in DimonaTiran to Israeli ships and ordered UN forces to withdraw from their positions along the border.

    Moscow, humbled by the losses of the April air battle, had already goaded its Egyptian ally into greater hostility towards Israel as a way of easing the pressure on Damascus. Soviet officials conjured up imaginary Israeli troop concentrations on Syria’s borders, prompting Colonel Nasser to mass his own armies at the Egyptian-Israeli frontline in Sinai. But he even exceeded his mandate from the Soviets when he dismissed the UN’s truce-monitoring force in the Sinai Peninsula and mounted a blockade of the Red Sea’s Straits of Tiran, denying shipping access to the Israeli port of Eilat.

    According to Israel’s declared national security policy- Egypt’s provocative action called justification for an act of war (casus beli). But by June 1967, the Israelis found themselves increasingly surrounded by superior Soviet-backed forces of the Arab and Islamic world, all of whose leaders were vowing to “throw the Jews into the sea,” and the Israelis were considering a first strike, before it was too late. But the Soviets had already orchestrated a strategic plan of their own.


    An Egyptian plan to attack Israel codenamed Operation Fajr (Dawn) was set to start effectively at dawn for May 27, 1967. Another plan, which was already shaped jointly in November 1966, by Soviet Marshal Andrei Gretchko and Egyptian Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was named “Conqueror” and modeled on clear Soviet strategic concepts. A detailed report of the joint-Egyptian-Soviet plan was captured later by the IDF on the Golan Heights from Syrian sources, including Russian language documents. However, for reasons of political constraints, directed by highest authority at the time, these were kept top secret and were only released in part many years later. Indeed, Israel’s political cover-up succeeded so well that Kremlin’s proven responsibility for the Six-Day War had actually been withheld from the histories of the 1967 conflict until close to its frostiest anniversary!

    The story of Moscow’s active involvement in the Six Day War and its immediate aftermath, the so-called War of Attrition (June 1968- August 1970) reads like a prefect mystery thriller. It was conducted by all involved with shrewd manipulations, deceipt and deception concocted by the best brains of the intelligence trade, in Moscow, Tel Aviv and Cairo. Moscow’s action in 1967 followed a tend in veiled threats, which Premier Nikolai Bulganin had directed at Israel as well as Great Britain and France during the so-called 1956 “Suez Crisis”, warning them to halt their activities against Abdul Nasser’s Egypt. A few years later, a similar ploy nearly worked during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, only to be averted by a cool-headed John F Kennedy. Now as tension rose once again in the Middle East, The Kremlin, under Andrei Kosygin tried this ruse again, this time against Israel proper.

    For decades, it had remained an established consensus among historians, that the Six Day war broke out by a sequence of mistaken accidents and misconceptions, perhaps related to a Soviet perception of Israel’s aims against Syria, based on what caused the conflagration over the Jordan headwaters during the early Sixties. But some of the recently published studies of the Six-Day War actually hinted at the fact that the Israeli nuclear dimension played an important but hidden role in the events leading up to the war, but none of the books has focused on this aspect. Layers of ambiguity, secrecy and taboo, in addition to censorship, prevented the story from coming to light. However, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the war, a duo of reporters challenged this “accident theory” offering plausible explanation for the real causes of the war. In their new and well-researched revelations, Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez actually argue that the idea over the Six Day War originated in a scheme by the Soviet Politburo to eliminate Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona, and with it destroy the Jewish nation’s strategic aspiration to develop nuclear weapons for its ultimate defense. In their book “Foxbats over Dimona- the Soviets’ nuclear gamble in the Six Day War”, (Yale University Press) Ginor and Remez argue, however, that rather than become involved directly, the Kremlin devised a complex and shrewd scheme to actually lure the Israelis into starting a war which would then end with a Soviet destructive attack on the Dimona complex.

    Perhaps the most startling information in the book concerns Moscow’s military preparations during Spring 1967, when the Kremlin prepared a plan, surrounding Israel with an armada of nuclear-armed naval forces in the Mediterranean and even pre-positioning military matériel on land, and training troops nearby with the expectation of using them physically against Israeli targets. No less as an eye opener, is to learn from the team that Soviet photo-reconnaissance MiG-25s (the “Foxbats” of the title) actually overflew the Dimona nuclear reactor shortly before hostilities started, in May 1967. This particular disclosure seems however somewhat surprising, based on the fact, that the the official service year for the first production model of the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 (Foxbat) was in 1972. This experimental version, designated Ye-266 was a Stripped-down MiG-25 prototype used to set several speed and altitude records from 1965 to 1967. Photo: Paul NannAn earlier still experimental version, designated Ye-266 was a Stripped-down MiG-25 prototype used to set several speed and altitude records from 1965 to 1967, could hardly be expected to fly such a dangerous mission over a highly defended strategic target. To the best of available records, no operational aircraft of this type was available in the USSR at the time of the reported recce mission over Dimona. But this fact does not alter their main conclusion, that the Kremlin orchestrated the war for their own strategic reasons.

    Yak-25RV "Mandrake"A book published in Israel, using for the first time IDF documents from the highest level, revealed the concern among the top brass and the political level during the two preceding years about an Egyptian military response to Israeli nuclearization. The top military and government echelons assessed that the nuclear compound in Dimona was a major target for an Egyptian surprise attack, especially if and when Egypt believed Israel was close to producing a nuclear weapon. Two officially recorded (but withheld) high-altitude aerial photography flights over Dimona, on May 17 and 26, were indeed critical for the IDF and the government’s understanding of the Egyptians’ intentions. Now Ginor and Remez insist, that the Soviets instigated, if not flew these dramatic reconnaissance sorties themselves. Whether these were actually flown by MiG-25 or upgraded versions of the operational MiG-21 remains debatable, but certainly not significant. In fact, about 1966 a new version designated MiG-21RF PFM was put in service as a high altitude interceptor, preceding the MiG-25, which followed only a few years later. The MiG-21RF (NATO: “Fishbed-J”) a single-seat tactical reconnaissance version of the MiG-21MF, was recorded flying sorties over Sinai in the early seventies. Another possibility could have been a sortie by the Soviet high altitude, long range strategic reconnaissance aircraft designated Yak-25RV “Mandrake”, which could reach 68,000 feet altitude. The Yakovlev Yak-25 was a direct competitor to the American U-2 spy plane and was known throughout the sixties flying reconnaissance sorties in the Middle East.

    With Israel’s alleged nuclear activities becoming a hot topic in Cairo and Moscow, the Soviet Navy had already deployed some of its nuclear submarines to the Mediterranean in early 1967. One of its captains had received top secret sealed orders to prepare for action, apparently firing missiles at the Israeli shoreline, when ordered directly by the Kremlin. More vessels followed shortly as Moscow offered Cairo a “nuclear umbrella” to safeguard Egypt against an Israeli nuclear weapons capability. Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, the Soviet deputy defense minister in 1967Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, the Soviet deputy defense minister, actually had told his Egyptian counterparts in Cairo that the Kremlin had dispatched “destroyers and submarines to the waters near Egypt, some armed with missiles and secret weapons” to help wipe out the Zionists. Thus by the end of May 1967, Soviet amphibious forces were placed on readiness for action aboard of vessels “visiting” Port Said and an air component was placed on alert in the Ukraine, with a small staff group already forward deployed in Egypt.

    But then, on June 5th, 1967 the Israeli Defense Forces completely turned the tables on all involved. Instead of the carefully devised offensive scheme jointly prepared by Moscow and Cairo, the IDF attacked with all its might. Preceded by a brilliant deception campaign, which lulled the Arab air forces into total disarray, the Israeli air force, using purely conventional weapons only, destroyed three Arab air forces within hours in a magnificent feat of daring arms, preparing the way for a lightning campaign on the ground, which destroyed all three Arab armies, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of Jordan and the Golan height in a mere six days.

    The Kremlin leaders were flabbergasted by Israel’s daring exploits, in face of their quite open threat to intervene actively on the side of the Arab nations, should Israel attack. Billions of Dollars worth of Soviet-made arms had been seized or destroyed. Years of expensive funding to their Arab clients went down the drain and Soviet prestige was quickly unraveling around the world, especially in the Arab domain. U.S. intelligence was already picking up signs of this fear in the Kremlin. In the President’s daily brief on June 9, for example, the CIA informed President Johnson that “the Soviets are finding it hard to conceal their shock over the rapid Egyptian military collapse. An unidentified Soviet official could not understand ‘how our intelligence could have been so wrong”.

    But the Kremlin did not give up that easily yet. Within days the Soviets had recovered and Acting Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko and KGB Chairman Yuri V. Andropov were already pressing for the immediate dispatch of strong Soviet forces to the Middle East. In their book, Ginor and Remez mention a retired Soviet air force lieutenant named Yuri V. Nastenko confirming years later, that bomber and fighter jets, such as the MiG-21s that were under his command and placed already on highest operational alert on the evening of June 5, 1967, in what he expected in preparation for “real combat.” Another Russian officer, Yuri N. Khripunkov, a former Soviet naval commander who was serving on one of 30 Soviet warships that had been moved from the Black Sea southward to the Mediterranean in June 1967, also reported being on stand-by for action against Israeli targets.

    But real active Soviet intervention started in earnest during the so-called War of Attrition only one year later. The deployment of Soviet units to Egypt was relatively swift, while still gradual. Organized in the frame of the Operation “Kavkaz”, the first units of the Soviet Air Defense Force, the V-PVO started to arrive in Egypt equipped with SA-3 SAMs and early warning radars. A total of three SAM-brigades arrived, one deploying along the Hilwan-Suez axis, another in the Alexandria area, and a third one defending Cairo and two other important bases. The first SAM-site was declared operational by 15 March 1970.

    Once these units were in place the V-PVO started deploying manned fighter jet interceptors, flown by specially selected and highly trained pilots. The Russian did not risk any chances against the combat experienced Israeli pilots after their demonstration on June 5th. But Israeli intelligence was not dormant and as soon as the Soviet pilots were operational in Egypt, their radio traffic was monitored and carefully recorded. After losing several F-4 Phantom jets, to Soviet SAMs, the Israeli air force went over to try and confront the Russian pilots in aerial combat. Their chance came on July 30 shortly after midday, when two Phantoms attacked an Egyptian radar site on the Gulf of Suez, escorted by a Mirage III finger-four formation, flying high-cover As expected the Russian pilots took off to engage, scrambling no less than eight new MiG-21MF (J-type). In the dogfight that followed, five MiGs were shot down. Of the Russian pilots only one managed to eject safely, while the remaining four died in the action. It was the last time that Russian pilots engaged Israeli flyers. Soon after, a cease fire was arranged, which more or less held until October 6, 1973 when the Yom Kippur War started.

    During 1971 Israeli and US intelligence tracked several Soviet reconnaissance flights over Sinai and southern Israel. Those included suspected MiG-25R Foxbat B versions, which may have overflown the Dimona complex as well. None were intercepted, but one pilot, flying at top speed, to escape interception, which actually wrecked the engines on landing at an Egyptian airfield.

    A the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Soviets once again threatened Israel with nuclear intervention. With the IDF having crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt and surounding the Egyptian Third Army near Suez, the Russians became alarmed. There were intelligence reports that a Soviet ship allegedly carrying nuclear weapons had docked in Alexandria. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev threatened on 24 October, airlifting Soviet airborne troops to reinforce the Egyptians, cut off on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. No less than seven Soviet airborne divisions were placed on high alert. This action immediately prompted US President Richard Nixon’s counter action with the US military technically placed at DEFCON 3 status. Under this US Pershing I missiles, stationed in West Germany, were also placed on high alert status for immediate action. Once again, the world came on the brink of global nuclear conflict, which luckily was averted at the last moment, when Israel Prime Minister Golda Meir agreed to a cease-fire, relieving the pressure on the Egyptian Third Army.

    Shattered cease-fire sends Gaza spiraling into Civil War

    The bloody Gaza Strip once more became the scene of brutal fighting Monday, which reached its climax with a massive attack by Hamas on major Fatah security installations, threatening to take full control of the strip against President Abu Mazen’s forces.

    According to reports by Haaretz’ veteran Arab affairs reporter Avi Issacharov, Hamas militants turned Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, and Beit Hanun in the northern Strip, into barricaded military positions as members of two clans, Bakar and al-Masri, who arrived at the scene mostly to avenge the deaths of their Fatah-affiliated family members, targeted the hospital with gunfire and mortars and went as far as to execute the wounded.

    Only hours after an Egyptian brokered cease-fire collapsed, the fighting escalated into more brutality between the factions, with no quarter asked nor given. People were thrown out of fifteen story windows into the street, others gunned down in their homes, as Fatah and Hamas struggled with each other for control of the Gaza streets. In vain, President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), called for calm – the carnage continued relentless gaining momentum from hour to hour in its intesity. Monday afternoon, reports circulated over Hamas having already gained control in most of the northern Gaza Strip, from where the Qassams rockets are frequently launched against teh Israeli border town of Shderot. Earlier Monday, Hamas gunmen killed Fatah intelligence officer Yasser Bakar, and his 16-year old brother. The incident prompted members of his family to launch a revenge shooting spree. Two members of Hamas, barricaded inside Gaza’s biggest hospital, Shifa, were killed during the melee.

    Hammas units belonging to a different faction,  while the group has organized its forces , not all combatants are dressed the same. Yet, Hammas are better equipped, more organized. and, as they have the upper hand,  their morale is higher.At about the same time a senior Fatah Official named Jamal Abu-Jedian, was assassinated brutally, hit by no less than 45 bullets, by Hamas gunmen near his Gaza home. Abu-Jedian was a close associate of Mohammed Dahlan, the Fatah strongman and security adviser to Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, who was lately hospitalized in Cairo for an operation, and is still not back in the Strip, reports believe. As result, Fatah militias, the Al Aqsa Martyr’s brigades called their people to go and fight in revenge for a last stand in control of the streets.

    Palestinian policemen  fighting on the Gaza streets., amidst a civil war  between opposing Hammas and Fatah groupsA most dangerous development is foreboding already late Monday, when Fatah’s military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, threatened for its part to expand the fighting to the West Bank by announcing it would kill Hamas officials there unless the organization ceased its attacks. Should this move happen to materialize, a clash with the IDF cannot be ruled out, escalating into further bloodshed.

    Meanwhile, the factional violence continued unabated Tuesday with an attack by Fatah gunmen on the home of Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas. Hamas branded the assault with a rocket-propelled grenade an assassination attempt. Haniyeh and his family were in the house, but unhurt, in the second attack on his home in as many days. Also on Tuesday, Hamas accused Fatah gunmen kidnapping a member of the Hamas military wing and executed him in the street. The dead man was identified as a cousin of Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a Hamas leader assassinated by Israel in 2004.

    Both Hamas and Fatah, on Web sites and in text messages to activists, called for the execution of the other side’s military and political leaders. Both sides described the fighting, which is turning more brutal with each day, as all-out civil war.

    For earlier analysis on the situation in Gaza please check:

    Also from David Eshel – 1967 Six Days War Retrospect:
    How the Kremlin Manipulated the 1967 War to the Brink of Nuclear Conflict 

    Iran Challenges Israel’s Domination of the ‘high ground’ of Space

    The launch of the Russian-made Sina-1 (also called Mesbah- “Lantern”) satellite into orbit aboard a Russian Kosmos-3M booster rocket, in October 2005, marked the start of Iran’s accelerated space program, and Tehran officials said that a second satellite – this one an Iranian-built – could be launched early 2006 or early 2007, a warning which already raised Israeli concerns.

    In fact, on February 26, 2007 there were reports circulating that Iran has launched its second communications satellite, called Safir-313. Although no details were released, Iran is known to have developed a satellite launch vehicle of the Shahab family quite similar with the DPRK’s Taepodong 2 named IRIS. The day before, Iranian state-run television announced that a rocket, carrying unspecified cargo created by the ministries of science and defense, was successfully launched. Later reports stated that the rocket was not intended for the orbital flight, being a “sounding rocket”. After reaching the altitude of about 150 kilometers, it was designed to descend back to Earth using a parachute. The US Military expressed doubts about this launch since it was claimed not to have been detected by NORAD.


    The Iranians had officially declared their space ambitions back in 2003 when defense minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani made a sensational statement warning that Tehran would launch its first satellite with a home-produced booster-rocket within eighteen months. The words had shocked the Western experts, since the Iranian booster for the satellite could also carry a nuclear charge of intercontinental range. According to Yiftah Shapir, a former air force officer and currently researcher at the JCSS, not many details are known about the Sinah-1, but it carries two cameras and communication equipment and is reported to weigh 160 kilograms. Although Iranian officials have calmed that the satellites are designed to locate and monitor natural resources and perform other, similar missions, Israeli and American intelligence sources have pointed to the future military dimension of the Iranian space program
    Tal Inbar, vice president of the Israeli Space Society warns that that the development of the Iranian space program could allow Tehran to enhance the development of its long-range ballistic missile program while eluding the Missile Technology Control. It is well known that technologies accompanying the development of space satellites such as micro electronics can also be dual-used as cover for the development of small size nuclear weapons which will fit the advanced version of the evolving Iranian Shahab missile project.

    However, a closer examination of the projects in which Iran has been engaged in developing its space program shows considerable difficulties in attaining its target dates. When efforts to design an indigenous booster went off to a bad start, the the Iranian research institute in charge of the project, turned to the Russian Omsk-based Polet design bureau which took over the work on the spacecraft. As result, the Sinah-1 launch came extremely late considering Iran’s remarkable efforts in other space related projects, such as its ambitious ballistic missile program. The case of its other satellite, named Zohreh is even more revealing; more than 30 years of continuous efforts have yet to materialize. In fact, Iran has again turned to Russia to order the construction of the Zohreh satellite, which is now being developed by the Reshetev Research and Production center at Zheleznogorsk.

    Nevertheless, Israeli security experts regard Iranian’s recent success as a milestone event, clearly signaling its determination to expedite its efforts in space. Committed to the development of the space booster launch vehicle ‘IRIS’ a few years ago, Iran had achieved considerable know-how through its co-operation with the North Korean No-Dong missile technology. Western space experts studying intelligence photos of an advanced Iranian version of the Shahab -3 ballistic missile estimated the vehicle capable to carry an additional second stage solid motor in its bulbous front. This they regarded could contain a future satellite payload, making the IRIS launch vehicle a space-related ballistic missile.

    However, the Iranian space program has already suffered some painful setbacks in the past. On July 12, 2001 the Jerusalem Post reported, quoting the Saudi Arabian Ashark al-Awsat, that Iran’s chief engineer Ali Mahmoudi Mimand, called the “Father of Iran’s missiles” and Tehran’s space program had ” passed away under mysterious circumstances”, a demise, which had never been officially explained to the public.

    Saudi Arabia has invested considerable resources in creating a remote-sensing infrastructure, including an advanced centre, located in Riyadh. In late 1994, a Saudi company known as EIRAD, owned by Prince Fahd Bin Salman, sought to acquire a major interest in Eyeglass (now OrbImage), in return for an agreement to build a ground station in Riyadh and exclusive rights to receive and distribute OrbView satellite images in the Middle East. (EIRAD acquired a 20% interest in the company.) The main customer is expected to be the Saudi Defence Ministry.36 As noted above, this involvement raised fears in Israel regarding the use of this system to gather military intelligence information that would be used by various Arab states and terrorist groups against Israel. In addition, the Saudi Centre for Remote Sensing (SDRS), located in Riyadh, was established in 1983, and is developing an advanced capability for data analysis. In 1999, SDRS signed an agreement with RADARSAT International (Canada) for exclusive ordering, scheduling, reception, and product generation of RADARSAT I (7 meter resolution) data for the Middle East.

    Iran Challenges Israel’s Domination of the ‘high ground’ of Space

    The launch of the Russian-made Sina-1 (also called Mesbah- “Lantern”) satellite into orbit aboard a Russian Kosmos-3M booster rocket, in October 2005, marked the start of Iran’s accelerated space program, and Tehran officials said that a second satellite – this one an Iranian-built – could be launched early 2006 or early 2007, a warning which already raised Israeli concerns.

    In fact, on February 26, 2007 there were reports circulating that Iran has launched its second communications satellite, called Safir-313. Although no details were released, Iran is known to have developed a satellite launch vehicle of the Shahab family quite similar with the DPRK’s Taepodong 2 named IRIS. The day before, Iranian state-run television announced that a rocket, carrying unspecified cargo created by the ministries of science and defense, was successfully launched. Later reports stated that the rocket was not intended for the orbital flight, being a “sounding rocket”. After reaching the altitude of about 150 kilometers, it was designed to descend back to Earth using a parachute. The US Military expressed doubts about this launch since it was claimed not to have been detected by NORAD.

    The Iranians had officially declared their space ambitions back in 2003 when defense minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani made a sensational statement warning that Tehran would launch its first satellite with a home-produced booster-rocket within eighteen months. The words had shocked the Western experts, since the Iranian booster for the satellite could also carry a nuclear charge of intercontinental range. According to Yiftah Shapir, a former air force officer and currently researcher at the JCSS, not many details are known about the Sinah-1, but it carries two cameras and communication equipment and is reported to weigh 160 kilograms. Although Iranian officials have calmed that the satellites are designed to locate and monitor natural resources and perform other, similar missions, Israeli and American intelligence sources have pointed to the future military dimension of the Iranian space program
    Tal Inbar, vice president of the Israeli Space Society warns that that the development of the Iranian space program could allow Tehran to enhance the development of its long-range ballistic missile program while eluding the Missile Technology Control. It is well known that technologies accompanying the development of space satellites such as micro electronics can also be dual-used as cover for the development of small size nuclear weapons which will fit the advanced version of the evolving Iranian Shahab missile project.

    However, a closer examination of the projects in which Iran has been engaged in developing its space program shows considerable difficulties in attaining its target dates. When efforts to design an indigenous booster went off to a bad start, the the Iranian research institute in charge of the project, turned to the Russian Omsk-based Polet design bureau which took over the work on the spacecraft. As result, the Sinah-1 launch came extremely late considering Iran’s remarkable efforts in other space related projects, such as its ambitious ballistic missile program. The case of its other satellite, named Zohreh is even more revealing; more than 30 years of continuous efforts have yet to materialize. In fact, Iran has again turned to Russia to order the construction of the Zohreh satellite, which is now being developed by the Reshetev Research and Production center at Zheleznogorsk.

    Nevertheless, Israeli security experts regard Iranian’s recent success as a milestone event, clearly signaling its determination to expedite its efforts in space. Committed to the development of the space booster launch vehicle ‘IRIS’ a few years ago, Iran had achieved considerable know-how through its co-operation with the North Korean No-Dong missile technology. Western space experts studying intelligence photos of an advanced Iranian version of the Shahab -3 ballistic missile estimated the vehicle capable to carry an additional second stage solid motor in its bulbous front. This they regarded could contain a future satellite payload, making the IRIS launch vehicle a space-related ballistic missile.

    However, the Iranian space program has already suffered some painful setbacks in the past. On July 12, 2001 the Jerusalem Post reported, quoting the Saudi Arabian Ashark al-Awsat, that Iran’s chief engineer Ali Mahmoudi Mimand, called the “Father of Iran’s missiles” and Tehran’s space program had ” passed away under mysterious circumstances”, a demise, which had never been officially explained to the public.

    Saudi Arabia has invested considerable resources in creating a remote-sensing infrastructure, including an advanced centre, located in Riyadh. In late 1994, a Saudi company known as EIRAD, owned by Prince Fahd Bin Salman, sought to acquire a major interest in Eyeglass (now OrbImage), in return for an agreement to build a ground station in Riyadh and exclusive rights to receive and distribute OrbView satellite images in the Middle East. (EIRAD acquired a 20% interest in the company.) The main customer is expected to be the Saudi Defence Ministry.36 As noted above, this involvement raised fears in Israel regarding the use of this system to gather military intelligence information that would be used by various Arab states and terrorist groups against Israel. In addition, the Saudi Centre for Remote Sensing (SDRS), located in Riyadh, was established in 1983, and is developing an advanced capability for data analysis. In 1999, SDRS signed an agreement with RADARSAT International (Canada) for exclusive ordering, scheduling, reception, and product generation of RADARSAT I (7 meter resolution) data for the Middle East.

    Israel’s Sustains its Space Superiority with 5th Successful Recce Satellite Launch

    With the successful launch Monday, June 11, 2007 of its Ofeq-7 imaging satellite, Israel sustained its essential intelligence asset for any war contingency. According to Israel’s Ministry of Defense, the new satellite was launched westward over the Mediterranean by the local-made Shavit three-stage solid fuel vehicle from the Palmachim aerospace base at 02:15 IT, June 11. The first images from space should be received within 24 to 72 hours from launch. The launching sequence was monitored under strict secrecy, but with growing tension by the ground crew, which had witnessed the failure of the Ofeq-6 launch, was destroyed on Monday 6 September 2004, when the third stage of the Shavit rocket launching malfunctioned a few minutes after launch.

    Once firmly deployed in space and functioning, Ofeq-7 will join its aging predecessor, Ofeq-5, still functioning in orbit, one year beyond its expected life span. Analysts claim, that the new satellite will fill the gap in covering long-distant areas, rendering real-time intelligence on high priority targets, such as Iran. Weighing 300 kilograms, the Ofek 7 will orbit earth from up to 600 kilometers in space. It has a minimum lifespan of four-years. Like its predecessors, Ofeq-7 will be able to store images taken during its flight and download them via downlink when flying over the IAI-run ground station.

    Ofeq 7 launched on a Shavit  launch vehicle on June 11, 2007. Image: IAIThe Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) intensified space drive comes amid increasing concern here about Iran’s nuclear development program, Syria’s contradictory intimations toward peace talks or war, and the support both nations provide to Hizbollah, Hamas and other designated terrorist groups. Three of the new imaging satellites – Ofeq-7, the TechSAR radar satellite and the planned Ofeq-8 – have been on the MoD manifest for years. Satellite imaging services are also available from Imagesat International, a Cyprus-based joint venture company partly owned by IAI, offering services of the Eros A and Eros B satellites which are also based on Ofeq technology. According to foreign sources, the Israel Ministry of Defense has acquired exclusive rights to the satellite’s photographs of Middle Eastern countries. But sources here said heightened regional tensions have already compelled near-term, multiyear funding for at least one additional spacecraft, dubbed Ofeq-Next. Moreover, the MoD plans to enter into a partnership with Spacecom, based here, so that the planned Amos-4 multiband communications satellite will serve the commercial market as well as military needs, reports close to MOD sources indicate.

    While refusing to divulge detailed performance data of the new satellite, defense officials claim that Ofeq-7 has by far the most advanced satellite Israel has sofar launched into space. Officials said that it was superior to the Eros B satellite – launched in April 2006 – which has the ability to spot images on the ground as small as 70 centimeters. The officials refused to give exact data as to what this superiority means. “With this launch we have improved Israel’s operational capabilities by dozens of percent,” said Brig.-Gen. Haim Eshet, director of Space Programming at the MOD’s Defense Research and Development Directorate (DRDD). “This is due to the improvements made to the satellite and also since we now have better coverage in the skies.”

    Israel has accelerated its activities in space reconnaissance since the Steinitz Knesset committee on Israeli investigating intelligence in advance of the 2003 war in Iraq mentioned the crucial contribution of satellite imagery to reliable intelligence, and included a recommendation “to expedite Israel’s espionage satellite development as a long-term visual intelligence infrastructure in the regional strategic balance”.

    One of the prime targets for Israel’s space intelligence is the growing threat posed by the Tehran regime, which has increased recently, with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s defiant speech. Israeli military intelligence has placed highest priority on detailed monitoring of Iranian efforts to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as long-range delivery systems and high resolution imagery has become one of its major intelligence and reconnaissance assets.

    Some of the known technologies involved include Multi-spectral imagery, which can take images in different wavelengths, including color. Analysis of images at different wavelengths can indicate the presence of hidden objects. El-Op, the payload developer is also working on a hyperspectral imaging sensor which will have a larger spectral band yielding even more imaging data. Ofeq-7 is based on the IAI’s OPSAT 2000 design (shown on the top of this page). IAI is already working on its new OPSAT 3000 design (the satellite is shown in the photo above and a model depicted at the bottom of this page), utilizing IAI common bus (also employed for the Tecsar and Eros C). This bus will support a new telescope, yielding greatly improved imaging without significantly increasing the weight of the spacecraft. It will employ PAN (pancromatic) and multi-spectral (MS) imaging cameras, sharing a common optical assembly and capable of simultaneous operation, including PAN-sharpening functions.

    TecSAR space imaging SAR based satellite. Image: IAI
    IAI is also planning to launch the TECSAR satellite (pictured above) , equipped with new synthetic aperture radar developed by Elta. This satellite is scheduled for launch with an Indian launch vehicle during this summer. It will provide Israel with all weather, day and night high resolution radar imaging capability.

    But Israel is not alone in its space activities. In fact, Space has become an integral component of modern military planning and the Middle East is no exception to its ambitious quest in space. For a related analysis – read Iran Challenges Israel’s domination of the ‘high ground’ of Space – by David Eshel

    An artist impression of the Opsat 3000 advanced optical recce satellite. Image: IAI

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